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question of why the press was so consistently wrong in its analysis of 
the outcome. Nor has the press admitted to an unreasonably biased view 
of Harry Truman. They maligned him unmercifully, still he prevailed. 
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CHAPI'ER I 
MAEL3TROM OF DOUBT 
t'Mr. President, we are ready to eat crow whenever you are ready to 
. t 111 serve 1 • Thus blazed the sign on the front of the WashinGton Post 
Building as the President rode triumphantly up Pennsylvania Avenue in 
Washington, D.C. He had won the election of l9i+8 in spite of all the 
dire predictions of the political pundits. If Truman hat'bo:--ed any i:;rudge 
against the fourth estate he stifled all semblanc~ of gloating~ Instedd, 
he sent a message to the 'dash:i.ngton Post saying, "I did not want anyone 
to eat crow ••• I said I felt the tremendous responcibility that was mine 
for the next four years, and that I hoped for the s11pport of all the 
people in carrying out the program which I thought they had entrusted me 
to accomplish. 112 And so it was that Truman embarked unon the roller-
coaster of political life, for the last time, in the capacity of Pres-
ident of the United States. A role he was already fa~iliar with since 
he had served three years and six ~onths. Only this time he came in by 
the . front door, not the back door of th-e \·Jni te House. 
But who was this man that so baffled the nation by his "miraculous" 
victory? Was he the "ordinary, 11 "simple" man so often depicted by the 
press? Dean Acheson didn't seem to think so judging from his comments 
1Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), 
II, 222. 
to Merle Miller. ~uote Mr • .:.cheson: 
I ha~.'e never understood why the press did such an abysmally 
poor job in writing about the President ••• It's a3 if the cor-
respondents had r:'lade up their minds when 'l'ruman b.acame Pres-
ident that he was a country bumpkin, and I am afraid a great 
man:,-· of th err: never clwnge<l their minds. 
I have read over and over again that he was an ordinary man. 
Whatever that rneansa •• I consider him one of the most extraor-
dinary human beings who ever lived.3 
Perhaps Mr. Hiller himself explained the negative reaction of the 
press most succinctly when he said, "I had never quite forgiven him 
[Truman] for not being Franklin Roosevelt, for being plain instead of 
t . . 114 pa :r1c1an. 
Unfortunately, this image of the Missouri farmer ascending to the 
presidency cast a pall of doubt and fear over his ad~inistration. Events 
were transpiring so rapidly in both foreign and do8estic matters that the 
populace trembled lest Harry couldn't cope with the burden. Needless to 
say, the Republicans capitalized on this image and unrelentingly added 
to the picture of inadequacy and gaucherie. Only a man of stature and 
posseasing a sureness born of maturity could have withstood the barrage 
of epithets hurled in his direction. 
However, Truman himself became vexed by the speculations and in-
accuracies coHcerning his life. "Stories were being written about my 
early life, associations, and education, intended, perhaps, to shed some 
light on the reasons for my actions and what course I would be likely to 
take," said Harry Truman in his Memoirs. "These speculations about what 
I would do len to rw.n.y baseless conclusions. Far toe of~en they grew out 
3r.:erle i1iller, Plain Speakin~ (New York: Berkeley Publishing 
Corporation, 1973), P• 376. 
of inaccuracies and e\~en untruths about rrry life. 115 Consequently, to dis-
pel any further guesswork about his background he proceeded in a matter-
of-fact style to write of his early development as a man and a politician. 
What emerges is a man of complex diluensions, with a tenacity that knows 
no equal. He was indeed an extraordinary man and one well-suited to wrest 
the political plum of 1948 from Thomas E. Dewey. 
Harry Truman's childhood was markedly stable. "The dominant the:ne 
in ••• family memories is not woe but a wonderfully Eolid happiness rooted 
in the peaceful rhythms of a slower, more deliberate time. 116 He was al-
ways aware of the supportive love and influence of his parents, and in 
spite of a slight handicap of bad eyesight--presumably the most traumati~ 
bVent in his developmental years--he studied, played, and thorouehly en-
joyed life. His father* lost his money speculating on the grain market in 
1901 thus eliminating any chance for Harry to go to college. It is at 
this juncture that we see one of the outstanding qualities of Truman's 
personality. He never looked back, and apparently never benoaned his lot 
in life but rather went forward with resolution. He was a timekeeper, 
bank clerk, farmer, artillery captain, haberdasher, judge, senator and 
vice-president before he became President of the United States. 
"Associations" connoted for Truman a happy roster of people who 
colored his life: relatives, high school friends, wartime buddies and 
political companions. For the press, the word "associations" generally 
5m M • I 12 ... ruma.n, :1er:io1rs, , • 
6 Margaret Truman, Harry s. Truman (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, 1973), p. 45. 
•rt is amusing to note that John Anderson Truman's occupation is 
listed as "farmer and livestock trader," or ''farmer and mule trader, 11 de-
pending on the political affiliations of the various writers. 
meant one thing, Pendergast, the boss of Y.ansas City and Jackson County. 
Truman had received the backing of the Pendergast machine when he ran for 
judge and later as senator. This association, which was mutually bene-
ficial, was to plague Truman for years. In i-/ashington, D.C., the epithet 
"the senator from Pendergast" was the derisive appellation unjustly given 
Truman. Not until Harry Trul'lk"Ul won the re-election to the senate in 1940, 
while Pendergast was in jail, did he emerge as his own man. 7 Upon his 
return to Washington, D.C. he was given a standing ovation as he entered 
8 the senate chamber. 
Harry Truman is the only president in the twentieth century who has 
never attended college.* After graduating from Independence High School 
he was forced, by necessity, to seek employment in order to nelp his 
Th;is may explain Truman's tre:;.endous program of self-education 
which was manifested by an astonishing knowledge in a broad field of 
interests; e.g. architecture, music, art and history--the latter being 
a special ~nterest to him. The lack of a college degree might also 
account for a part of the incredible bias of the press. 
7Cabell Phillips, The Trumar.. PrAsidency CHew York: 
and Company, 1951), ch. 2; and Irwin Hoss, 'I'he Loneliest 
York: New American Library, 1968), ch. 2. 
8 
Margaret Truman, P• 136. 
Doubleday 
Campaign (New 
*George Washingtor"', Andrew Jackson, Martin VanBuren, Zachary Taylor, 
Mil:ard Fillmore, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, Grover Cleveland, and 
Harr·y s. Truman are the only presidents who did not attend college. How-
ever, Andrew Jackson, Martin VanBuren, Millard Fillmore, Abraham Lincoln 
and Grover Cleveland all studied law in an office a.!'ld were admitted to 
the bar. Out cf this group only George Washington, Zachary Taylor, Andrew 
Johnson and Harry s. Tru~.an failed to get a law degTee. Of these nine 
presidents listed, five are ranked as "great" or ":it::ar great.:: they are 
1) Abraham Lincoln, 2) George Washington, 3) Andrew Jack!.!on, 4) Grover 
Cleveland, and 5) Harry S. Truman. (Phillips, pp. 397-98.) 
5 
There is a lesson to be learned from TeYye in )'Fiddler on the Roof. 11 
\\'hen he sang, "If I were a rich man ••• the most important men ••• will ask 
me to advise them, like Solomon the wise ••• it won't make one bit of 
diff'rence if I answer right or wrong ••• when you're rich, they think you 
really kuow, 119 the audience chuckled with eobarrassed deligtit. Truman 
was much like Tevye. He was not rich and he did not have the educational 
background of his aristocratic predecessor. In short, he had little to 
commend himself to a nation that placed great emphasis on externals. Per-
haps that is why Truman almost wistfully declared, llT,-Jhen you get an edu-
cation, that is something nobody can take from you--money is only tempo-
rary--but what you have in your head, if you have the right kind of a head, 
10 stays with you." Truman surely must have recognized his ideas would 
be more acceptable to Congress if he could have flourished a "Ha'va.d" 
degree. 
The dialogue which took place between Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry s. 
Truman when he was called to the \Jhite House and informed of F .D. :t. 's 
death foretold his plight in simple terms. With masterful control Mrs. 
Roosevelt so.id: 
"Harry, the President is dead. 11 
After a.."l agonizing interval Truman replied, "Is there anything I 
can do for you?" 
And again, Eleanor Roosevelt with a calm dignity answered, "Is there 
911If I Were a Rich Man." Lyrics by Sheldon Harnick. Music by 
Jerry Bock. 
lOWilliam Hillman, Mr. President (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Young, 1952), p. 219. 
6 
anything we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble now. 1111 
And indeed he was the one in trouble. Never had a President been 
catapulted into such a critical period of history. The difficulties with 
which Harry Truman was beset cannot be overestimated. 11 ••• Mr. Truman 
had to be both a war President and a postwar er reconstruction President, 
and he had to accomplish the transition with hardly more forewarning than 
had preceded his E::iUdden induction into the presidency itself •1112 
Added to these problems was the handicap of following in the steps 
of F.D.R. The prestige and adulation which Roosevelt enjoyed died along 
with the man from Hyde Park. "When ••• Harry Truman took his place, it war; 
as if the star of the show had left and his role had been taken by a spear 
carrier from the mob scene. ~obody had the heart to criticize his early 
performance. 1113 
On April 17, 1945, only five days after taking office, Truman held 
his first press conference. Apparently it drew a record attendance of 
348 correspondents which, according to James E. Polls.rd, gave ample evi~ 
dence of Truman's popularity. In fact, Pollard contends, "In Mr. Truman's 
first year and a half in the White House, the press on the whole treated 
him rather we11. 1114 Though the last statement is highly debatable, Truman's 
1~ruman, Memoirs, II, 5. 
12r..ouis Koenig (ed.), The Truman Administration: Its Principles 
and Practices (New York: New York University Press, 1956.), p. 1. 
13Robert s. Allen and William V. Shan."l.on, ~he Truman Merry-Go-Round 
(New York: Vangua.rd Press, 1950), P• 3. 
14The Presidents and the Press (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1966, p. 28. 
popularity in the first few months in office was an established fact. The 
Gallup poll indicated that in July, 19lf5, his popularity stood at 87 per 
cent.15 The future boded well for the man from Independence. 
world War II was still raging, though the long sought victory seemed 
near, and no one wanted to jeopardize its successful conclusion. The fer-
vor of patriotism was high and anyone who failed to back the President 
was anathema. In May, 1942, Thomas E. Dewey delivered a speech in which 
were stated the principles by which most Americans functioned during the 
war. Politicians were cautious with their opponents. Here is a sample 
of wartime rhetoric: 
Somehow, with the tragedy of war, there are many compensa-
tions to sustain us. The most important of these is this 
greater unity among us all--a unity fused by the white r.tat 
of patriotism. Only a complete singleness of purpose will 
sustain us. Past differences must be forgotten. Political 
passions must be rationed. Personal interest must be subordi-
nated to the common welfare. The American people will not 
stand for the feuds and bickering that attended the down-
fall of France. 
The President of the United States is our elected leader 
in this fateful war. We shall all support his every effort 
to win.the war. We shall even support him in spite of mis-
takes pr~lided they are solely the result of zeRl to win 
the war. 
But with the coming of peace, the honeymoon ended. The "white 
heat of patriotism" burned itself out and the fraternal charity expressed 
by political parties vanished. Shortly after the cessation of the war, 
forces began to militate against Truman's popularity. 
Pandora's box opened as World War II closed. The American public 
15Roy v. Peel, "The 1948 Pre-Convention," Annals of the American 
Academy, September, 1948, P• 87. 
16stanley ';/alke~", ~ewey, an A~erican of This Century (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1944), p. 258. 
8 
was really begiru,ing to think equality meant just that, equality. No 
longer were the minority groups willing to let the white, Protestant stock 
rule the nation. Blacks, Jews, Catholics had prospered during the war 
and had broken a chink in the armor of bigotry and prejudice. Tnough 
the break-through was small it nevertheless turned the old social struc-
ture topsy-turvy. Jackie Robinson hurled invectives back at the whites 
who taunted him thus creating a watershed for the American negro. As one 
newspaperman said about the incident: "By God, there's a black boy squawk-
ing just like everybody else and nothing happening. I don't mean to be 
silly but somehow I think this is one for the history books. 1117 Jackie 
Robinson may have been one of the most famous blacks to rebel but he ~ost 
assuredly was not the first. An article which appeared in Phylo.!! in 1944 
indicated the growing impatie~ce and belligerence of the blacks. It ~aid 1 
0 When we get to the front the first thing we'll do is to shoot our white 
officers; then we'll start shooting Japs and Nazis ••• the next war is going 
t b . M. . . . ul8 o e in 1ss1ss1pp1. It was becoming hard for politiciar.s to ignore 
the race issue. 
Though the blacks were the most vocal ~~nority group, all lower sta-
tu.s groups were seeking greener pastures. Veterans used the G.I. Bill cf 
Rights to advance themselves in business and education. Many who had 
thought of college G>.s the "preserve of the rich" found themselves rubbing 
elbows with the best. 19 The mystique was gone. People had money and a 
l7Eric Goldman, The Cru<'ial ::::>ecade (New York: Random House, 1960), 
P• 52. 
18 H.C. Brearley, "The Negro's New Belligerency," Phylon V (Winter, 
1944), p.339-45. 
19Goldman, P• 12-13. 
9 
new status. Change was in the offing and restless, eager crowds were 
ready to grab the golden ring. Hard work, energy and ~ow-how took pre-
cedence over social status. The \falls of Jericho were tumbling down. 
!:quality was not the only thing people longed for. After four years 
of wartime restrictions Americans hungered for luxury items. ''Women had 
trouble getting furniture, nylons, a new electric iron; men found clothing, 
even a razor blade that would shave clean, in short supply; families were 
20 forced on to hopeless-appearing waiting lists for a new car." 
Housing, food, wage and price controls all clamored for the govern-
ment's attention. "Scarcities plus price controls had held a lid on living 
costs, with the result that at war's end there was an unheard-of nest egg 
of S136.4 billion of personal savings in banks and governmer.~ bonds itch-
ing to be spent. 
"And therein lay the hot fuse of a disastrous inflation ••• Abundant 
dollars chasing scarce commodities equals spiraling prices; ergo, boom 
and b "" u21 us .... 
The reckless, exuberant forces unleashed by the termination of war 
cared little for the problems conf::-onting the President. "Normalcy" was 
demanded NOW and woe unto the politician who couldn't deliver. The Repub-
licans recognized Truman's tenuous position and capitalized on the recon-
version problems for the gain of their party. 
Joe Me.rtin, Minority Leader and Republican Speaker of the House, 
adrr." .. tted the problems Tru'.'llB.n encountered were a direct result of the up-
20~ ,d 26 Uo..1. man, P• • 
21
Phillips, PP• 102-3. 
10 
heaval of World War II. Said Martin, "No political system could have re-
mained insulated against such shocka. 11 Nevertheless, he and a host of 
stalwart Republicans set out deliberately to jettison the Democratic pro-
gram for reconversion. In somewhat sanctimonious terms Joe Martin boasted 
of his opposition to Truman. " ••• as Speaker of the Eightieth Congress in 
1947-48, I led the Republicans in what looks in retrospect like the last 
stand against heavy federal spending, high taxes, centralization, and extra-
vagance. 11 He went on to say that the opposition the GOP was able to mus-
ter had been the most formidable ever allied against the New Deal. "In 
the Senate, Bob Taft was in his prine, a deadly critic of Truman's poli-
cies. Southern Democrats were again stout allies. And once again the Re-
publicans were fired up in the illusion that after four successive defeats 
we would recapture the h'hita House at last in 1948. 1122 
Low-cost housing was becoming a major problem before America's entry 
into World War II, and by the time the ·.reterans began to return home the 
shortage had reached epidemic proportions. "Throughout the nation, many 
veterans and their families lived in attics, basenents, chicken coops, and 
boxcars. Washington, D.C., for example, reported 25,000 homeless veterans; 
Chicago had four times that number, while rela.tl.vely small Jefferson City, 
Missouri, needed 500 homes for returned servicemen. In Atlanta, 2 1 000 
p·ersons answered one advertisement of a vacanc~·, and a want ad in an Omaha 
newspaper read, 'Big Ice Box, 7 by 17 feet. Gould be fixed up to live in.11123 
22Joe Martint My First Fifty Years ir, Politics (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1960)• PP• 176-79. 
23Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform during the ?ruman Administra-
1i2.u (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966), p. 41. 
11 
The comments were c~ever, bitter and desperate, but one thing was clear, 
the necessity for governmental action. Though Truman had inherited this 
burden from the Roosevelt administration and wrestled with it for the al-
most eight years of his presidency, he was never able to solve the prob-
lem. 
It was not political expediency alone which motivated Truman in 
supporting housing reform; he seemed genuinely concerned for the people. 
In his Message on Reconversion, which Truman sent to Congress on Septem-
ber 6, 1945, he said, "A decent standard of housing for all is one of 
the irreducible obligations of modern civilization." Furthermore, he 
told Congress that his goal could be reached only by "the enactment of a 
comprehensive housing bill that included public housing, slu1J clearance, 
liberal aids to private housing, and the adoption of a national housing 
policy affirming the government's responsibility in postwar housing. 1124 
Unfortunately, Truman faced the same conservative coalition of Southern 
Democrats and conservative Republicans that had held Roosevelt in check 
on many of his proposals. The half-hearted attempt to relieve the housing 
shortage failed. 
Truman's popularity suffered another reversal du~ to a curious back-
lash of public opinion connected with the housing problem. On December 3 9 
1945, the Commission of Fine Arts approved plans for the renovation of 
the ~lhite House. Crews had already begun work when newspapers, architects, 
and Republicans stormed disapproval. "Builders protested the White House 
addition at a time when veterans were unable to get housing materials. 1125 
24D . 32 avies, P• • 
2511Repairs at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue," Newsweek, February 11, 
1946, P• 25. 
12 
The result was that on January 24 the House voted, 110-41, to an amend-
ment to the appropriations bill which would recall the funds voted in 
December for 1:I'nite House improvements. 
Life magazine took a more balanced view of the situation. Recog-
nizing the state of deterioration, there appeared an article in Life 
which said, 11'.l/hether President Truman presses the issue will not make 
much difference. The old 1tibite House has a way of catching up occasion-
ally with the times. And it has been a long time since January 1, 1903, 
when Teddy Roosevelt held the reception formally opening the 'new' \~1ite 
26 House." The passage of time certainly was to prove the validity of this 
statement. In 1948 Truman and his family were forced to move into Blair 
House because the White House was literally falling down.• 
Before the November election, a wave of strikes shut down one in-
dustry after another, just as Truman had predicted. Auto workers, steel 
workers, packinghouse workers, electrical workers a.nd communication workers 
had all revolted. (Most of these strikes were settled quickly with an 18.5 
cent wage increase.) However, it was the threatened walkout of the soft 
coal miners and the rail strike which created the biggest headache for 
Truman. 
Labor Secretary Lewis B. Schwellenback, an old senate crony of Tru-
2611The White House," Lif~ October 4, 1946, P• 61. 
•rn 1947 a chandelier nearly fell during an official reception •. By 
1948 the foundation was sinking in the swampy gr0und beneath ~t. £here 
was no visible support for the ceiling in the Green Room but a few rusty 
nails. And a spinet broke throueh Margaret Truman's sitting room, (a long 
thick piece of wood from the 'i'ihi te House beam is on display in Truman's 
library in Independence, ~~issouri). Only the walls were safe. (Margaret 
Truman, Harry s. Truman, pp. 398-99, and "Ramble in the Past with t'ir. 
Truman,"~' April 24, 1964, p. 29.) 
man's, was chosen as mediator at the bargaining table, but when he failsd 
to negotiate satisfactorily, ,John R. Steelman* was called in to help. 
When all compromises were rejected by the unions Truman himself took over. 
In his Memoirs Truman stated that t!1e strike "was no contest between labor 
d t b t b t all "" d th . ' '127 an managemen u one e ween a sm group o ... men an eir goverru~ent. · 
Consequently, Truman appeared before a joint session cf Congress and re-
quested emergency legislation to draft strikers. But even while Truman 
was talking, Leslie Biffle, Secretary of the Senate, handed Truman a note 
announcing settlement of the railroad strike~ 
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Case bill to rsgulate labo:i: 
unions. Trur;;a.n vetoed it on the grounds that its way of controlling st-r·:i.kBs 
:·•as basically antilabor and would produce r.iore conflict. Though his veto 
was sustained, the issue of federal controls to curb union power did not die. 
Along with the rash of strikes which confronted the President, was 
added the burden of increased tensions between the Soviet union and the 
United States. "The get tough policy, 11 which Henry ~Iallace warned, 0 would 
only produce a get tougher policy11 with ... :.:u.ssia, drove the Secretary of 
Commerce from the Democratic ranks into the waiting ar~s of the Progres-
sives. 28 ~he formation of \fallace' s third party created another hiatus 
in an already rupturing Democratic party. In 1946 it was difficult to 
*In 'i'he Truman Nerry-Go-:~ound Steelman is described as an apple-
polisher, a tombastic hack, an anti-labor labor expert, and a congenital 
glad-hander wl'lo was all thi::igs 'o all men. He was big, 215 pounds of 
hulking hu~c..r ... ity. Re was not s:J)rts-minded, not ·flas he well read. In 
fact, according to Aller., Steelman had only one unswerving interest, he 
always listened to Amos 'n Andy on the radio. 
27Truman, Memoirs, I, 501. 
28 
H~nry Wallace, "My Commitments," Vital Sneeches, August 1, 1948, 
P• 620. 
14 
determine how many vot<~s this split would cost Truman. Senator Scott 
Lucas, an Illinois Democrat said, "He [wallacd won't get enough votes 
to wad a shotgu.n .. 1129 Howeve?·, Marquis Childs said that Wallace might draw 
a vote of ten million, while Jim Farley estimated a vote of six million 
for him. 30 Only the final tally in November, 1948, would prove which 
analysis was correct. 
The landslide victory of the Republicans in the 1946 congressional 
elections, attested dramatically to the dissatisfaction of the American 
public. In fact, "So overwhelming was this Republican trend that voters 
in Atlantic City, New Jersey, elected a Republican as justice of the peace 
who had died a week before election day. 1131 It was ironic, however, that 
the housing problem was one of the issues which caused an iwpatient puhlic 
to vote in a predominantly Republican Congress. Trurr.an, who had consis-
tently fought for public housing had been repudiated by the American 
people who elected men adar.:iantly opposed to federal assistance. The ultra-
conservative faction of Congress viewed housing legislation as socialis-
tic experimentation. Susan M. Hartmann does not agree with this inter-
pretation, however. She contends that the election returns were not a 
repudiation of the New Deal. " ••• the vote reflected primarily the frun-
trations and stresses that accompanied adjustment to a peacetime economy. 
Pre-election polls had shown little opposition to the prewar social and 
economic programs; the public was most concerned abou.t inflation, short-
29Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York: Henry Holt, 
1959), P• 21. 
30Ibid., P• 22. 
31R. Alton Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky, 1966), p. ~B: 
, -· ... 'J 
ages of food and other cor.imodities, remainin.g wartime controls, and strikes 
and other labor problems. 1132 \./hat ever the motivating forces were which 
ushered in the Eightieth Congress, one result stands out clearly. The 
Republicans, after sixteen years of playing second fiddle, were glowing 
in the warmth of the spotlight and manipulating Democratic reversals for 
their own benefit. A campaign of disparagement was set in motion with 
slogans such as "Had :Znough?", "To Err is Truman," and ''Under Truman: 
Two Families in 1::,very Garage. 1133. 
Senator Fulbright of Arkansas was so demoralized by the Republican 
coup that he suggested Truman resign. As if this proposal was not enough, 
he went on to say that Senator Arthur Vandenberg should take his place.34 
Ludicrous as this idea may se~~ in 1974, it was a clear indicator of Tru-
man's popularity in 1946. Apparently, no suggestion was too absurd in 
order to get rid of the man in the White House. 
-:z2 
~ Susan M. Hartrr-;ann, Truman and the 80:h C:onF;ress (Columbia: Uni-
versity of ~<issouri Press, 1971), P• 8. 
33Ibid., PP• 8-9. 
•According to Davies, the slogan ''Two Families in Every Garage" was 
actually sal.J by I'ruman about Taft during a speech at Wilmington, Delaware 
on October 29, 1948. (Homdng Reform, p. 97.) 
34~ 9 10 .ccoss, pp. - • 
CHAPTER II 
HARBIIIGER OF HOPE 
"Until after the 1946 elections, President Truman had taken no sig-
nificant step to improve his party's position or to ensure his selection 
as Democratic standard-bearer in 1948. 111 Though most Americans considered 
Truman a "first-rate second-rate man," the truth revealing Gallup poll 
indicated that his initial popularity of 87 percent had dropped contin-
ually from 1945 through 1946. "A series of strikes brought it [Truman 1 .s] 
popularity down to 63 percent in February, 1946; price rises thrust it 
down to 50 percent in April, 1946. From then till October there were ~ore 
t . k d t h t h t'- h. t b tt t 3::: t 112 s ri es an a mea s or age-- e nen i o om a ~ percen • 
"Within the first months I discovered that being President is like 
riding a tiger. A man has to keep on riding or be swallowed. 113 ·rruman's 
actions from January, 1947 on, bear out the obvious fact that Truman had 
no intention of copying Jona~'s antics with the whale. It was the top-
side not the inside of the tiger Truman was interested in. With the aid 
of Clark Clifford, the President set out to renew his lease on the White 
House in 1948. The elections of 1946, instead of crushing 'I'ruir.an' s hopes, 
1Roy V. Peel, ''The 1948 Preconvantion Campaign," Anr.als of the 
American Academv, 3eptember, 1948, p. 85. 
3riarry S. Truman, gem~ (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956) 
II, 1. 
goaded him on to greater efforts. He "felt freer to be himself, to act 
4 on his own in his own ways. 11 As Truman himoelf quipped, "When you're 
at the bottom you've got no place to go b1..it up."5 
On November 21, in defiance of a court injunction, John L. Lewis 
led the coal miners out on strike. The subsequent stand which Truman 
took, broke the deadlock and achieved for the President the first real 
victory he had had in the domestic field. Though his stock in trade 
had gone up slightly, Truman nevertheless faced a long and exhausting 
struggle before he was accepted in his own right. 
17 
Since the Eightieth Congress was dominated by Republicans, the re-
sponsibility for solving domestic and foreign problems fell largely to 
th.em. Truman recognized this when he said, "If the Democrats really go 
after it, as they should, the Republican responsibility can really be 
made their responsibility as it should be. 116 This, then, "Nas going to 
be the main thrust of the Democratic offensive. The GOP was going to be 
made to feel the sting of criticism which had till now been rainly de-
volving around Truman. 
During 1947 and 1948 a core group gathered, under the aegis of 
Clark Clifford, to formulate a positive progra~ of action for the Pres-
idential race in 1948. The nucleus of this group consisted of Oscar R. 
4Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade (New York: Ra."'l.dom House. 1960), 
P• 62. 
5Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency (New York: MacMillan Com-
pany, 1966), P• 161 
6 Susan M. Hartmann, Truman and the 80th Cont!Tes~ (Columbia: Univer-
sity of Missouri Press, 1971), p. 18. 
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Ewing, Director of the Federal Security Agency; Clark Clifford,* Special 
Counsel to the President; Leon Keyserling, member of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers; c. Girard Davidson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior; 
David ~. Morse, Assistant Secretary of Laborj and Charles S. Murphy, an 
administrative assistant to the President.7 These men, referred to as 
the "palace guard," were to shape a liberal philosophy both persuasive 
in doctrine and attainable in reality. Said Clifford, "Our interest was 
to be exclusively on domestic affairs, not foreign ••• We wanted to create 
a set of goals that truly met the deepest and great~st needs of the people, 
and we wanted to build a liberal, forward-moving p:cogran around those 
goals that could be recognized as a 'Truman' program." 8 
According to Susan Hartmann, one of the first things T~uman did 
to strengthen the administration against attacks from the new ma.)ority 
was to establish the Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty•• on Nov-
*Clark Clifford, a young lawyer from St. Louis, played an enormous 
role in Truman's administration. He has been described in such glowing 
terms one wonders whether writers are :talking about the Creator or the 
created. Allen and Shannon, who speak in superlati7Bs, gave the following 
description of Clifford. "His face was too handsome, his blond hair too 
evenly waved, his smile too dazzling, his voice too resonant, his manner 
too patently sincere, his family background, childhood, college record, 
romantic courtship~ and legal career all too storybc1okish to be real. 
Somewhere there must be a flaw ••• But so far \l!ashi.n;~t0n hasn't discovered 
it." And apparently neither had anyone else. (The 'fr·uman Merry-Go-Round, 
P• 58.) 
?Phillips, P• 162. 
8Ibid., P• 164. 
**Revisionlsts feel that Truman's establishment of governmental 
loyalty procedu!·es in 1946 and 1947, satisfied no one. He was condemned 
by conservative llepublicans as being soft on Reds, and antagonized liberals 
by being too militant. 
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ember 25, 1946.9 An outburst of unreasonable, irrational fear against 
Communist influence in the United States had gripped the American people. 
The tensions of the Cold War and the revelation of the Soviet spy rings 
in Canada in 1946 had created an atmosphere of suspicion which led to 
a tightening of security.10 
By 1950 "red-baiting" ha.d become a. tortured labyrinth of fear, 
anxiety and panic, culminating in a reactionary desire for investigation. 
A scapegoat was needed to assuage fear. The scapegoat was Truman, the 
Democratic party, and any unlikely official who fell under the fanatical 
eye of Joseph McCarthy. Sad to say, even a man of Taft's stature sue-
cumbed to the dernagogical ravings of this 11star performer." Several re-
porters• quoted Taft as saying in March, 1950, "at the height. of the car:.-
pa.ign of Senator Joseph McCarthy alleging a Corr:munist infiltration of th.? 
State Department, that McCarthy should 'keep talking and if one case 
doesn't work out he should proceed with another. 11111 However, prior to 
the elections of 1948, this issue was not that dominant. 
Truman continued his positive course of action when he spelled out 
in specific terms the legislative program in his State of the Union addres2 
on January 6, 1947. Noting that a good many of the members of Congress 
9 Hartmann, p. 20. 
10Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, The Truman Administra-
.!,!y_~ (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 357. 
*Both William S. White, and Richard Rovere stated McCarthy used 
questionable tactics to discredit Truman and his administration. 
11William s. White, The Taft Story (New York: Harper and Row, 
19.54) t P• 85. 
had moved over to the left since he had laGt snoken there, Truman pro-
12 ceeded to give his report. 
He asked for speedy ratification of the peace treaties with Italy, 
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Bulgaria, Rumania ;:i.nd Hungary. He advocated a trade system free from ob-
structions and stressed the need for legislation as regards displaced per-
sons. International control of atomic enerey and the problem of universal 
military training all received his attention.13 
In his message Truman reiterated his request for a massive housing 
program, compulsory health insurance, civil rights, and a national fair 
employment practices act. He emphasized the importance of a balanced bud-
t d 1 t h 1 f . t• 1 b ~ . 1 t• 14 ge an a comp e e over au o exis ing a or iegis a. ion. The recorn-
mendations in the pasGage on Labor and Management were noteworthy because 
it was in this area that a great deal of controversy was to develop. The 
President had specifically requested that a commission should study the 
underlying causes of :at:or disputes. 
In exploring problems involved between labor and me.nagement Truman 
had urged Congress to be circumspect in its methods in dealing with the 
unions. 11We must not ••• adopt punitive legislation. 1'ie must not, in 
order to punish a few labor leaders, pass vindictive laws which will re-
strict the proper ri5hts of the rank and file of labor. 1115 
But from the outset of the Eightieth Congress, interest in a labor 
12Harry S. Trurn..<tn, ''The State of the Union, 11 Vital Speeches, 
January 15, 1947, P• 194. 
14Ibid., P• 197. 
15Ibid., P• 195· 
control bill had been strong. On the first day alone, seventeen labor 
l~ bills had been dropped in the House hopper. - "T~e anti-labor drive in 
the states reac!J.ed its peak in 1947 when, under the lobbying pressure of 
state and local employer association3 and the backing of the NAM anj the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, some thirty sGates restricted the 
rights of organized labor. 1117 Senator ',fayne Horse capsulized the feeling 
of the nation when he said, "Congress yielded to l)Ublic heat, not to pub-
lic reason. 1118 Thus it was that the climate for the Taft-Hartley Act was 
created and the vehicle by which Truman won back the labor vote was set 
in motion. 
"Mr. Republican," Robert A. Taft, was the undisputed leader of the 
R:-publican party and the man most responsible for the structure of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. His counterpart, Fred. A. Hartley, Jr.,• and his vol-
canic sidekick, Charlie Halleck, who claimed he had a hell of a lot to 
16 James T. Patterson, Mr. Renub1ican: A Biop;ranhy of Robert A. 
Taft (Boston: Hout;hton Mifflin, 1972), p. 253. 
17R. Alton Lee, Truman and 'l'aft-Hartle_y (Lexington: University 
of Kentucky, 1966), p. 50. 
18Ibid., p. 51. 
*Fred A. Hartley, Jr., who was appointed chai.rr'.lan of the House 
Committee on :t;ducation and Labor, was denounced by Nary Norton of New 
Jersey. A woman of great personal inter;r:i.ty nnd an unS"..ierving friend 
of labor, Mrs. Norton, the ranking :Uer.:ocrat and for!ner chairma.n of the 
committee, resigned because "she would not serve under a chairman who 
did not know his head from a buck~t of lard as far as labor problems 
were concerned." .Said Mrs. Norton, "In the ten years I served as chair-
man, Hartley had attended exactly six meet~ngs and yet talked about 
labor as if he knew something about it." :.:artley did not deny the charge, 
but simply said she was a bad loser. (Allen and Shannon, The Truman 
Merr;i:-Go-;~ound, p. 2o6; Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartl~, p. 55.) 
do with drafting the Taft-Hartley bil1,19 worked i~ unison towards the 
formation of the measure. The resultant bill, generally viewed as more 
moderate than the earlier bills introduced, passed both houses by an im-
posing bipartisan sweep. 
William s. 'dhite, former reporter and sympathetic biographer of 
Taft, has given c~edit to the Republican l~ader for warding off the lib-
eral faction in the senate, as well as softening the harsh approach that 
the House had taken in the battle to curb the labor unions. (A dubious 
honor for pro-labor adherents.) According to White, Taft had reconciled 
these divergent views, attaining a "just bill, mild in comparison to the 
punishment which might have been meted out if certain extremists ••• could 
write the bill. 1120 Not everyone felt as White did, however. Senator 
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Harley M. Kilgore, a West Virginian Democrat said, "a twenty-five percent 
solution of carbolic acid might be considered mild compared to a hundred 
percent solution. 1121 
Even before the passage of the "slave labor law" thousands of 
workers protested with vigor. Thundered George Meany, "American wo1·kers 
will not cheerfully accept any statute which compels them to work against 
their will. They will resent and resist such flagrant violation by Congress 
of the Constitution of the United States--in particular, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which forbids involuntary servitude." He went on to say that 
l9Henry z. Scheele, Charli.:~ Halleck (New York: Exposition Press, 
1966). P• 115. 
20, .... •t ""u e, P• 73. 
21Ibid., P• 74. 
"Henry Wallace would giggle with glee if the measure were enacted into 
law."22 However, labor leaders were unable to make their voices heard. 
The press was generally unfriendly to labor and the one-sided news cov-
erage ~ept organized labor on the defensive. 
Philip Ash has made an interesting study of the relationship be-
23 
tween the periodical press and the coverage it gave the Taft-Hartley Act. 
"N"ews and general circulation magazines accounted for the largest share 
of favorable treatment, while the small circulation opinion magazines 
were the only ones in which appreciable opposition was noted. The ana-
lysis concludes that, the public had scarcely had a fair opportunity to 
learn both sides regarding this controversial issue." The following 
chart clearly reveals the bias leveled against organized labor. 
TABLE I 
PERCEN'l' OF I'I'EM-CIRCULA'.1.'ION BY ATTITUDE .A.I'ID BY PERIODICAI, 
CATEGORY FOR ITEMS CONCERNING TAET-HAfcTLEY ACT 
Total items 
Total for circulation 
each f Qr all 
Favor Neutral Oppose categoa catee;ories 
Periodical 
catei:;_ory 
Trade 74.456 25.3% 0.3% 100.0% 1.4% 
Financial 79.6 15.3 5.1 100.0 o.8 
News 31.2 68.6 o.o 100.0 52.4 
General 90.5 8.6 0.9 100.0 41.7 
Opinion o.o 64.1 35.9 100.0 3.7 
Pol.& Soc. 
Science 41.5 58.5 o.o 100.0 + 
All 
categoriec 55.7 42.5 1.8 100.0 100.0 
22 George Meany, "'I'he Mandate of Big Business," American Federa-
tionist, May, 1947, P• 5. 
!\nal;tsi.s of data: 
First, 94.l percent of the itern-circul2.tion discussing the 
Taft-Hartley Act is to be found in news and general periodicals. 
This is consistent with the relative circulation of such jour-
nals as the Reader's Di~ and Time, as compared with any trade 
or opinion journal. 
Second, somewhat over one-half of the item circulation (55.7 per-
cent) is in ?aver of the Act, and only 1.8 percent is Opposed. 
These findings sugr,est that labor ar;;uments, whatever their 
validityt were presented in the periodl~al press with negligible 
impact. 
Third ••• No news periodical carried an item Opposed to the Act. 
This study strongly suggests that the position of oreanized 
labor reGarding tl'1e '.:'aft-'."iartley Act had neglit;ible iminct on 
the magazine-reading public. The viewpoints of organized labor, 
presented in positive terms, did not appear in any of the major 
periodica1s of wide circulation. On the other hand, the view-
points of management and related groups t~3t favored the Act 
appeared frequently in th~0e periodicals. 
There is no way of est:i.mating the role the press may have played 
in the passage of the bill. It is highly probable, however, that it 
helped shield the iiepublicans from the truth. No one could disabuse 
the GOP of its dream of abolishing New Deal legislation. The mandate 
for change was r~al for them, and anything less than Democratic annihi-
lation injured their sensibilities. 
While labor waged a losing battle against the enactment of the 
Taft-Hartley bill, the 'dhite House was delueed with propaganda regarding 
th~ measure. On June 9, 1947, the bill was sent to rru~an for his con-
sideration. Tr.e ~/hite House staff evaluated the proposal and on June 20, 
1947, Truman delivered his veto message over the radio. 
23Philip Ash, "The Periodical Press and the Taft~Eartley Act," 
Public Ooinion :;uarter];.r, Summer, 1948, pp. 266-71. 
In challenging tones I~:uman lashed out at the restrictive provisior • .s 
of the law. He said, "I 'Tetoed this bill because I am convinced it is 11 
bad bill. It is bad for labor, bad for management and bad for the coun-
try." He went on to say that it was a shocking piece of legislc:>tion de-
signed to take us back in the direction of the old evils of individual 
b . . 24 argaining. 
That same evening Senator Taft delivered a speech over the radio 
in rebuttal to President Truman's veto message. As usual, the address 
was well thought out and dry. He compared the President with Lee Press-
man, a well-known communist, and said that the President's veto shows 
that he k.~ows practically nothing about the bill. 25 The press echoed 
Taft's remarks and peppered t~e public with scathing comments about the 
President's veto, but few seemed to realize the political significance 
of his action. 
Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley bill raised his prestige with 
labor and marked a turning point in his adrrdnistration. Even though the 
senate overrode his veto, Truman liberalized his domestic program. Said 
the President, "I had done all within my power to prevent an injustice 
against the laboring men and women of the United States."26 He meant 
it, but more than that he had found an instrument with which to bludgeon 
t~e GOP. "Truman use:i the 'Do-Nothing Eightieth Congress' as a whipping 
24 Harry s. Truman, "Labor Relations Measure," Vital Spe_~~, July 1, 
1947, P• 547. 
zr::. 7 Robert A. Taft, "Labor Relations Measure," Vital Speeches, July l, 
1947, P• 549. 
26 Truman, Memoirs, II, 30. 
boy in the campaign of 1948 to arouse the American people into voting 
for him and the Democratic Party; the 'I'aft-Hartley Act W3.S one of the 
major issues he used in castigating this Congress. 1127 
Irwin Ross contends the upswing j.n ·rruman' s popularity continued 
throughout 1947. The new air of resolution and authority which he had 
26 
. . 28 displayed in domestic affairs also r;ianifested itself in foreign affairs. 
The formulation of the Truman Doctrine, with its aid to Greece and Tvx-
key in March, 1947, and the launching of the Marshall Plan in June of the 
same year, received generous support from the Eightieth Congress. So 
much so, in fact, that Charlie Halleck said with a pouting tremor• in his 
voice, "It always galls me to think that Harry Truman won in 1948 by 
attackir1g the Congress which gave him his place in history. 1129 
27 Lee, p. lo6. 
28Irwin Ross, The LonelieE:'.; Car!lpaign (New York: New American 
Libra~y, 1968), p. 17. 
*The words "pouting trerr:or 11 were not used in any account. The de-
scription is the author's interpretation. 
29Jules .Abels, Out of the ,Jaws of Victor'( (New York: Henry Holt, 
1959), P• 1)9. 
CHAP1ER III 
THE 1948 OFFENSIVE 
At the closing of 1947, Henry Agard 'Jal1ace fi!1ally made public 
his intention to run for the presidency of the United States under the 
banner of the Progressive Party. Shortly after, in January, 1948, Tru-
man delivered his State of the Union message which presaged his campaign 
for the presidency. This strategy had been suggested by George t~. Elsey, 
a young assistant to Clark Clifford, as far back as August, 1947. Said 
Elsey, ''The speech must be controversial as hell, must state the issues 
of the election, must. draw the line sharply between l~epublicans and Demo-
Crats. ul It d"d l. • On the following day, Robert A. Taft accused Truman 
of trying to capture the Left-wing vote by having the Federal government 
play Santa.Glaus. Said '.I'aft, "One cannot but feel that the recent an-
nouncement of Mr. Henry Wallace has had a substantial effect on the State 
of the Union. Henry himself will have a hard time to find anything to 
2 promise the people of this country which is not included in this message. 11 
The first goal cited by Truman was "to secure fully the essential 
human rights of our citizens ••• '.Vb.ether discrimination is based on race 
or creed, or color, or land of origin, it is utterly contrary to American 
1Irwin :~oss, The Loneliest Camnaip:n ( NP.w York: New American Libr:iry, 
1968), P• 55. 
2Robert A. 'l'aft, "l'he President's Tax Plan, 11 Vital Sneeches, 
January 15, 1948, P• 199. 
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ideals of dernocracy. 113 Provocative? Perhaps. Albeit witnesses claim 
the statement drew little response at the time. However, the civil rights 
issue was to play a prominent role in the 1948 election when Strom Thur-
DX>rrl and the Dixiecrats bolted from the Democratic Party. 
Truman reiterated many of the New De~l policies mentioned before. 
He asked to raise the level of unemployment compenaation and social se-
curity. He requested Federal Aid for education, health insurance, a long 
range housing program, extension of rent controls, conservation of natu-
ral resources, crop insurance for farmers, and a minimum wage increase 
from 40 cents to 75 cents an hour. He asked for S6,8oo,ooo,ooo for the 
European recovery program, but it was the "cost-of-living tax credit" 
which drew the sharpest response. Hoping to aid lower-income groups, 
Truman recorr~-:1•:mded a system whereby each taxpayer could deduct Sl~O for 
4 himself and S4o for each dependent. Republican Representative Harold 
Knutson gasped at this last proposal. Said Knutson, "Tom Pendergast 
paid two dollars a vote, and now Truman proposes to pay forty dollars. 115 
And Majority Leader Charles Halleck, 11harkening back to the Reconstruction 
6 slogan of 'forty acres and a mule~' exclaimed, 'What, no mule!'" 
Studied indifference would seem to describe the general reaction 
towards Truma.~'s State of the Union message. According to newsmen the 
4tarry s. Truman, "The State of the Union," Vital Sueeches, 
January 15, 1948, p. 194. 
4Ibjd., PP• 195-98. 
6 Jules Abels, O~t of the Jaws of Victory (New York: Henry Holt, 
1959), P• 4. 
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only spontaneous applause which was heard during his delivery was when 
he pledged to uphold the Taft-Hartley Act because it was the law-of-the-
land, and again when he urged military strength for the United States. 
However, if the Republicans ti1ought to ignore the President's pro-
gram, insofar as it suited them, they were in for a jolt. Truman him-
self stated that the compelling motive in his decision to run for the 
presidency in 1948 was to protect the hard-earned refer~~ of the New Deal. 
"These benefits were still vulnerable to political attack by reactic!7a:-ies 
and could be lost if not safeguarded by a vigilant Democratic administra-
tion.117 Thus it was that Truman bombarded Congress with a succession of 
messages pertaining to his program. He deliberately used his presidential 
~owers to generate publicity, convinced as he was that the only lobbyist 
the whole people had in Washington was the President of the United States48 
"Nine messages descended on Capitol Hill between February 2 and 
March 1: civil rights, extension of certain wa1'time controls, highway 
construction, assistance to Greece and Turkey, the International Tele-
communication Convention, assistance to China, U.S. participation in 
the United ::ations, h::>using·, extension of the .Reciprocal ~rade Act." 
According to Irwin Ross, a good portion of these messages were relatively 
unimportant; their function was to illustrate Congress' inability to act.9 
That is a moot point. But one thing was certain, there was nothing pre-
cipitous about the decision to launch the campaign in this way. Clark 
7Truman, Memoirs, II, 170. 
8Louis Koenig (ed.), The Truman Administration: Its Princinles 
and Practices (New York: New York University rress, 1956), P• 17. 
a 
"Ross, P• 60. 
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Clifford's forty page memorandum, outlining the campaign strategy, list~d 
six major points of conflict in 1948. Prominent on the list was the civi1 
rights issue. 
On Februe.ry 2, 1948, the President delivered his historic rri..~ssag:e 
on civil rights. The ten-point program was forceful, volatile and ex.-
plicit. After stating his belief in the equality of men, Tru~an speci-
fied his recoCTmendaticns. His ten points were as follows: 
1. Establishment of a permanent commission on civil '::'i.ghts 
and the creation of a civil rights division in the Depart-
ment of Justice. 
2. Strengthening of existing civil rights statutes. 
3. Federal protection against lynching. 
4. Protecting the right to vote--specifically to abolish the 
poll tax. 
5. Establishr:ient of a fair employment practice commission. 
6. Prohibition of segregated facilities in interstate trans-
portation. 
?. Self-government for the District of Columbia. 
8. Statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a greater measure of 
self-government for the territories. 
9. Equality in naturalization. , 0 10. Evacuation claims of the Japanese-Americans • ..1. 
Since civil rights were equated with Negro rights in 1948, it was 
the first six points which created the greatest furor. Yet the President 
doggedly continued on his course. Truman stressed that it was a "minimum 
program,'' and anything less would fail to fulfill the Federal government's 
obligation to protect individual liberties. He promised executive action 
to prevent tliGcrimination in federal employment and asked for the elim.i-
..... f d. . . t. . t' d . 11 na1ao.u o 1scri.r.n.na ion in ne arme services. 
The repercussions which followed this pronouncement were explosive. 
10 Harry s. Truman, "Civil Rights," Vital .Speeches, February 15, 
1948, PP• 258-61. 
11Ibid., P• 260. 
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The audacious rese~tment exprs:,ssod by the white suprem!"icists seems shock-
ing in 1974, but given the racist circumstances of 19~~3 the Dixiecrat re-
vol.t. is a.t least understandable. Truman had w1leashed the fury of the 
South. Politicians such as the Talmadges and Longs were able to arouse 
a state of fear, bordering on frenzy, in the minds of the poor whites. 
"In the eyes of the poor whites, Mr. Truman is trying to break down seg-
regation and compel industries to hire negroes. This would nake it even 
harder for the poor white to earn a living •• ;Wh.ite supremacy, to the poor 
white, means more than a hold on self-respect. It means food and clothes. 
It gives him an edge over the Negro in a fight for a living. 1112 Though 
the advocates for racial justice viewed the message as a victory, the 
South viewed it as a challenge to arms. The struggle, which has yet to 
be settled, had begun. 
Five days after 7ruman spoke, a Conference of Southern Governors 
was held at \clakulla Springs, :Florida. Amidst the c..crir-:oni.cus debates, 
Fielding L. Wright of Mississippi, "a 53-year old lawyer, who is as 
smooth and cold as a hard boiled egg;' suggested an all-southern confer-
ence convene in order to discuss a bolt from the Democratic Party. His 
proposal was denounced. However, a committee was appointed to go to the 
White House to demand concessions on the civil rights issue. They re-
so1~ed to meet again after forty days, hoping the cooling off oeriod 
would bring the Democratic Party to its senses. 
In the interim, Truman spoke at the annual Jefferson-Ja~kson Day 
dinner in 'da3':J.ingtcn, D.C., on February 19. Addressing an overflow 
audience, Truman called O!'l the Democratic Party to "battle against reac·-
1211People of the ';v'eek," U.S. i'fow.s, September 17, 1948, p.43. 
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tionary conservatif;m and th~ y-1ri. vileged few i71 the comir:.g elections. 1113 
Yet he assiduously avoided any direct reference to the dissatisfied ele-
ments in his party. This must have been difficult since some southerners 
had boycotted the dinner. 
"A group of South Carolina Democrats canceled pla.'ls to attend the 
fund-raising festivities because of a 'no segregation' policy. Governor 
and Mrs. Strom Thurnond and 3enator and Ers. Clin D. Johnston headed the 
list of scheduled absent~es. 1114 Ho price was too high for the latter 
couple to demonstrate their outrage. The Senator and his wife had pro-
cured a table located in front of the dias for the prir::e of Sl,100 for 
the sole purpose of keepint; it empty. '.:lhEn qu:=stioned about t::is silent 
rebuke to the President, }!rs. Johnston said to the press that she had de-
cided not to come "because I might be seated next 't;O a :Jegro. n15 
On February 23, six southern governors conferred with J. Howard 
McGrath, the Democratic national chairman. The BToup, led by the tight-
lipped and ant3.gonistic J. Strom Thurmond,* fired one question after an-
l3Associated Press Dispatch, The Ore~onian, February 20, 1948, P• 6. 
14Associated Press Dispatch, The Oregonian, February 19, 1948, p. 1. 
l5Ross, P• 62. 
*Senator Strom Thurmond's vindictive attitude towards civil rights 
legislation can be better understood in the light of his family background. 
His grandfather l:.ved in South C3.rolina after the Civil '.:ar w!1en the legii::-
lature was "Packed and dominated "by illiterate and bewildered Negrces.n 
He was resentful and passed this "es~ntr:ient on to his son John who grew U:? 
witnessing violence in the South. John Thu.z-mond in turn looked for nis 
answer to the Hezro problem in the demagosical ravings of Senator Tillman, 
who openly ~dvoc~~ed shooting a Negro rather than submitting to his domi-
nation. John Thurmond himself later shot a man because he accused him 
of being a Tillmanite. He was acquitted of murder. (".Southern L<evolt," 
~' October 10, 1948, p. 26.) 
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other at the Senat0r in the attem9t to force him to capitulate to their 
demands. When the party chairman co!ltinued to endorse Truman's civil 
rights plank, t!l.e rr.:Uita!!.t group departed with the warning that the South 
1 . h b 16 was no anger in c e ag. 
Whereas the Sb.tes Rights movement seriously imperiled Truman's 
chances for regaining the finite House, the presidential aspirations of 
Big Jim Folsom, the Kissin' governor from Alabar.ia, did not. However, 
his antics did furnish an amusing respite from an otherwise worrisome 
campaign. On February 18, Robert Huark reported from Eontgomery, Ala-
bama, that the seven foot ~xhibitionist, who "delighted in kissing women, 
taking off his shoes in public, and sleeping on the sidewalk," desired 
to straighten out the Democratic Party and announced his intentions to 
run for the presidency. FolGom claimed he was one of the most dignified 
men alive and that "when they took a !)icture of hi:n asleep on the side-
walk, he wasn't showing off. 'I had a nervous stomach and I was tard ••• 
after that, when they run the picture to smut me, I kept on a-layin' down 
out of spit·e. 11117 Needless to say, Folsom's self-nomination for the pres-
idency posed no real threat. 
But the rising tide of anti-7ruman feeling was beginning to infect 
the Democratic rankc, undercutting the President's prestige and c&using 
an ever widening rift in the party. Said Arthur Krock in the New York 
Times, "The Democratic ?arty is imperiling the President's effectiveness 
as r.o major party in this country has done since the Republican radicals 
16 
Donald R. McCoy and Richard Ruetten, 'JUest and Resnonse (Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 196:)), Tl• 102. 
17~a·t . 1 . mh ~ . ~ b 19 1948  J. or:i.a in l. e 1..1regon1~, re ruary , • 
impeached Andrew Johnson ••• At this writing, the President's influence 
is weaker than any President's has been in modern histcry. 1118 
On May 19 the Dixiecrats held another conference at Jackson, Miss-
issippi. By common consent they agreed to recomrene at Birmingham, Ala-
bama, if the Democratic convention insisted on inserting a strong civil 
rights plank in the platform. In the meantime, the States Rights Comrn.it-
tee planned their strategy for the convention which would meet in Phila-
delphia in Juiy. Until then, they held their angzr and ammunition in 
abeyance. 
One of t.he most absurd aspects of the "dump" Truman movement, 
which was gaining momentum during the spring, was the drive to enlist 
Eisenhower for President. "Among the chief agitators," said Truman in 
his Memoirs, "who claimed that I was not perpetuating the New Deal pol-
icies ••• were the late President's sons, James and Elliott, former Cabi-
net members James F. Byrnes and Harold Ickes, and Senator Claude Pepper 
of Florida. There were many others who felt that because the press and 
polls made it appear that my chances of success ••• were falling away ••• 
someone else would get the Democratic Party nomination. 1119 
The peculiar thing about the boom to draft Eisenhower was that no 
one seemed to have a clear idea of the General's views on disputed issues, 
and even worse, didn't seem to care. 20 (He had purportedly said he would 
have signed the ~aft-Hartley Act.) This unethical approach adopted towards 
18Editorial in the New York Times, April 4, 1948. 
l9Truman, Memoirs, II, 185. 
20 ''People of the Week, II u.s.~rews, July 16, 1948, P• 32. 
Eisenhower as a political vote-getter and figurehead was summarized in 
an article entered in the Congressional Record. It read: 
The Confederates cared little whether or not the general felt 
as they did about civil rights for Negroes. V.ayor Hague and 
the other city bosses were indifferent to Eisenhower's views 
on good government or anything else. The Jimmy Roosevelt 
liberals were equally unconcerned. All these characters were 
united on only one thing: Ike Zisenhower would make a wonder-
ful label to paste on a package that was rapidly becoming a 
slow mover. Once in, he would be expected to "go along." In any 
event, the patronage would be safe921 
In retrospect the whole movement seems ludicrous. The r-arty reg-
3.5 
ulars backed the President all the way. And at no time did Truman indi-
cate that he was willing to relinquish what he felt was his inviolable 
right to the :aomination. "The President is traditionally the leader of 
his party ••• And no matter ho;: many detractors there may be ••• The conven-
tion will operate in the manner in which the chairman and the President 
want it to." Furthermore, said Truman in his Memoirs, "In 1948 I was 
in a position to control the nomination. lVhen I made up ro:y mind to run, 
those in the party who turned against me could do nothing to prevent it ••• 
Presidential control of the convention is a political principle which 
has not been violated in political history. 1122 
The Eisenhower boom failed to get enough support to insure its 
success. I-t had only resulted in humiliating the President, and in ex-
p0sing the weak..n.ess of the Democratic Party. Although there was a brief 
resurgence to nominate Ike at the Democratic convention, the drive was 
essentially irrational and unrealistic. 
21 Gordon McDonough, in A::mendix to the Con~ressional Record, 
August 5, 1948, P• A4903. 
22 Truman, Memoirs, II, 186. 
The southern white revolt, the recalcitrant attitude of the Eight-
ieth Congress, the Democratic draft-Eisenhower movement, 1./allace' s third-
party candidacy, and the deterioration of international affairs all per-
suaded Truman to take the offensive in order to bolster his sagging popu-
larity. 23 The vision of attack germinated in Truman's mind until at 
last the vehicle whereby he would accomplish his goal was realized. He 
boldly conceived of a plan to set off on a "nonpolitical," cross-country 
tour of America. The trans!'arent excuse given for this non-·partisan trip 
was to accept an honorary degree and to deliver the commencement address 
at the University of California. 
Complained Robert A. Taft in Philadelphia, "President Truman has 
cipened his campaign for nomination and election. He is traveling through 
the country with a fifteen-car train at the ex::-ense of the voters. He 
is blackguarding Congress at every whistle stop in the West for the sim-
ple reason that Congress happens to differ with him in his whole philo-
h f 1124 sop y o government. 
True or not, the famous "whistle-stop" tour, which lasted from 
June 4 to June 18 and covered eighteen states, was a srr:ashi.ng success. 
Truman spoke from the rear of the platform in order to get closer to the 
people, developed an "off-the-cuff" style of delivery which proved im-
mensely popula.r. 25 The "Give 'em hell, Harry" rejoinder demonstrated 
conclusively the enthusiasm of the crowds. 
2~cCoy and Ruetten, p. 119. 
24
Robert A. Taft, "Truman's Program," Vital Speeches, June 11, 1948, 
P• 553. 
25Truman, Memoirs, II, 179. 
Since the press and radio were primarily controlled by Republican 
oriented interests, the President felt it was necessarv "to exnlain the ,, ... 
workings of American fo~eign policy and the status of our do~estic prob-
lems in a way that the people could understand. I also felt obligated 
to make clear the obstructionist role which the Eightieth Congress was 
playing. 1126 In the seventy speeches he gave, including five major ad-
dresses delivered in Chicago, Omaha, Seattle, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
Truman achieved his desired goal. 
The President, buoyant, optimistic and jaunty, struck a responsive 
chord with his wayside audiences. The tour, which from all accounts 
started off slowly, gained momentum and daring as it progressed. HAll 
27 along the way he jabbed at Congress." In Gary, Indiana, 'l'!uman said, 
11 ••• Arnerica must have a sound and solid econoriy ••• If you support me we 
will probably get it." In Chicago he cautioned that "comn1unism succeeds 
only where there is wea.~ness, misery or desrair, not in a strong, healthy 
society." .On the occasion of the lOOth anniversary of Swedish Pioneers 
Truman carefully interjected a statement about civil rights. 11Let us 
adopt legislation that will provide ••• the full rights of citizenship 
28 and an equal chance for good jobs at fair wages." 
According to the authors of Ouest and Resnonse, the statement 
aoout civil rights was not lost upon the minority groups. "If appre-
hensive Negroes feared, or southern revolt Democrats hoped, that the man 
26Ibid, p. 173. 
27Associated Press Dispatch, The Ore.r::onia.n,.June 5, 1948., 
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would backtrack from civil rights advocacy as an integral part of the 
program the fears of -'::he former were needless, and the 1-iopes of the 
latter have gone with the wind."29 T:ie fact that Truman carried Illir:ois 
by 33,612, while Chicago's Negroes alone gave hii:i a 128,541 plurdlity, 
would indicate the veracity of this statement.30 
The "Presidential Special" continued to roll westward as Harry s. 
Truman continued to 11Pour it on." Though the reporters failed to recog-
nize the meaning of the ever increasine; crowds, the undisguised adula-
tion of the people did not escape the keen political eye of the Pres-
ident. At Grand Island, :rebraska, he was given a pair of silver spurs 
which he held triumphantly aloft and said, "':!hen I get them on, I can 
take Congress to town$ Don't think I can't. I'll give them a trial 
just as soon as I get ba::;k to 'Jashin.zton. ·131 
But the tour had its share of political missteps as well. Accord-
ing to an editorial in the Portland Oregonian, the presidential tacti-
cians seriously blundered in Omaha. Chairman viilliam Ritchie of Nebras-
ka, announced his withdrawal of support for Pr~sident Truman because 
he felt Nebraska and Iowa had been given the "bums rush." Due to mis-
management Truman's address in Omaha was attended by 2,000 in a coliseum 
with 10,000 seats. "ilhat may happen when h.e gets t.o Wallace-split Cal-
~2 
ifornia is anyone's guess," solemnly intoned a reporter.--' 
29McCoy and Ruetten, p. 119. 
30 44 Ibid., P• 1 • 
31Associated Press dispatch, The Oregonian, June ?, 1948. 
32Editorial i~ The Oregonian, June 8, 1948. 
"I like old Joe .Stalin," a remark Truman purportedly made to a 
trainside audience at Eugene, Oregon, was another fau...x pa!3 credited to 
the President. 33 ~'iidely reported in the newspapers, the patently na.ive 
39 
statement was distorted to signify ':l'ruman was "soft on communi.sn." ?'rom 
evidence attainable, no one appears to know how the people received this 
declaration of affection. Using hindsight, however, the results of the 
1948 election would indicate the people imputed no such motive to the 
President. The obvious prejudicial view of the press had blown the inci-
dent way out of proportion. 
A record crowd of 100,000 thronged the streets of Seattle to greet 
the President. Division Chief P.D. Batson of the police department said 
t.he crowd in the downtown area was the biggest he had ever seen. "Con-
34 fetti was piled deep in the gutters after the riarade. 11 'l'rurr.an pressed 
his advantage. Skillfully playing upon their western loyalties, the Pres-
ident warned the Seattleites that Congress had fought against western de-
velopment. "They still seem to look on the 11lest as some sort of wilderness 
in which the nation should invest as little as possible. 1135 He declared 
private interests had blocked the development of public power to the people 
at low cost and threatened, tr~{e can't stand for that, and if you people 
out here stand. for it, it's your own fault. 1136 
He flayed Congress in Bremerton, Olympia and Tacoma, Washington. 
33Associated Press dispatch, The Oregonian, June 13, 1948. 
34News dispatch in The Oregonian, June 11, 1948. 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
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In the latter pollution-ridden city he attacked the Do-Nothing Congress 
"for eliminating price controls and for passing a rich man's tax law. 1137 
Truman created a slight wave in Oregon--this can be taken literal-
ly an~ figuratively; the Vanport flood was in progress.* However, the 
majority of the news reports of the presidential tour waxed dull since 
the Portland Rose Festival and flood preempted the headlines. '1~he fol-
lowing was typical of the coYerage given the President in Oregon. 
Oregon may already be considered a }:)st political cause to 
the Democratic party, but his (Truman's) smile belied it ••• He 
smiled when he said hello and when he said goodbye. He smiled 
when he asked for
8
information and when he gave instructions ••• 
He kept smiling.3 
Such was the astute observation of Tom Caton, staff writer for the 
Oregonian. One can't help but wonder, however, if Tom Cato1i. smiled on 
November 3, 1948. Nevertheless, this insightful critique should not be 
surprising since Oregon is traditionally Republican. 
As the train clipped along, '.:'ruman and his entourage were 
speedily reaching the highpoint o:f the trip. At Berkeley, California, 
5001 000 people attended the commencement exercises to hear Truman 
speak.39 The crowd was double its usual number. And two days later, 
37Ibid. 
*President Truman was scheduled to be in Portland approximately 
two hours for a few hurried conferences about emergency relief for 
flood victims. A senate resolution which had been approved by the 
house provided up to :£.10,000,000 for relief of flood victims in the 
Portland-Vancouver area. The measure was sent to the President to 
sign while he was in Portland. (The Oregoni~n, June 11, 1948.) 
3BN .. · 1 '""'- O · ews ar·i.ic e, .1.ne ;rep:onian, June 12, 1948. 
39Associated Press dispatch, The Oregonian, June 13, 1948. 
an estimated one million people packed th.:: streets of Los Angeles to 
give Harry Truman the wildest, mo::;t prolonged reception he had yet 
received. Even the dubious Jimmy Roosevelt blanched at the reality. 40 
In his speech delivered to the Greater Los Angeles Press CJub, 
the President acknowledged that, "This has been a most rousing wel-
41 come." He recited the record of the Eightieth Congress again, 
vilifying their ineptness. Ar.d then clrove the shaft deeper by 
depicting the hauteur of the East towards the West. He said: 
You know, Dan 'debster, when the United States was r;oing 
to build the Pacific Railroad, made the statement in the 
Senate along in the Eighteen Thirties that the West wasn't 
any good and the further it could be kept from the eastern 
part of the United States the better off the country would 
be. And there are a lot of rtepublicans nowadays l'iho believe 
just like old Dan Webster did.~2 
Truman was popular and love.d and he knew it. He ended his 
speech in Los Angeles by saying, "I've made this trip so I could lay 
before you my views ••• If I'm wrong you'll have a chance to tend to me 
later on, but if I'm not wrong you ought to tend to somebody else. 1143 
The effectiveness of the whistle stop campaign was due to a 
number of factors. The greatest, of course, being the star performer 
himself. Merle Miller once wrote "That Harry 'l'ruman might be the last 
human being to occupy the White House, and considering, as he would 
say, 'the fo~r fellas that succeeded me,' I see no reason to change 
40cabell Phillips, The Truraan Presidencv (New York: The: 
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 216. 
41 Harry S. Truman, "The Zightieth Congress," Vital Speeches, 
June 14, 1948, P• 550. 
42Ibid., P• 552. 
43rb·~ -..!:::.•, 553. 
. d n44 cy l!lln • Nor did a number of other people who witnessed the jovial, 
informal and totally human President while he was on his tour. 
Margaret Truman, an admittedly pre.judicial witness, concurred 
with this opinion. "I have always believed that the great difference 
between Harry S. Truman and Thomas E. Dewey in 1948 was Dad's uninhib-
ited refusal to be anyone but himself • 11 She illustrated her point 
by citing the following example. "After his whistle-stop talks, Dad 
would introduce first my mother and then me. Mother was introduced 
as 'the boss' and me as 'the one who bosses the boss.' We never did 
get him to stop introducing us this way in spite of numerous de-
mands.1145 So!Jhisticated? No. Human? Yes. 
Another incident which ~ypified his down-to-earth attitude and 
his concern for others took place in Barstow, California. Unwilling 
to disappoint a crowd who had waited at the railway station until after 
midnight, Truman appeared on the rear of the platform of the train 
clad only in his pajamas and blue bathrobe. The appearance drew cheers 
and light-hearted banter. Shouted a woman from the crowd, "You sound 
like you have a cold." "No," quipped Truman, ''I only sound like that 
46 because I ride around in the wind with my mouth open." 
On his return to the capital, the President was quoted as saying 
he was very happy and pleased with his 15-day, 8,000 mile rail journey 
44 Merle Miller, Plain Speaking (New York: Berkeley Publishers, 
1973), P• 15. 
45Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: '.villiam Morrow 
and Company, 1973), P• 23. 
4611The Presidency," Time, June 28, 1948, P• 13. 
to Los Angeles and back. ''I· think it was educational both for me and 
the country. 1147 
But Washington sages differed amongst themselves about whether 
Hr. Truman had gained or lost polit~cal grcund by his trip. His allies 
contended he had gained stature and had aroused enth~siasm by portraying 
himself as the chanpion of the people. His critics said he had spread 
48 disharmony by his constant denunciation of the Eightieth Congress. 
Yet no one did anything to offset the label of the "worst Congress." 
There were a few who recognized the danger to the GOP and 
sounded the clarion call to arms, but no one heeded the tocsin. Joe 
Martin claims he called Dewey in Albany after the ~epublican Conven-
·i..ion to warn him. "I cautioned him that he would be making a mistake 
if he did not begin to talk about the constructive as~ects of the 
Eightieth Congress and not let Truman get away, unanswered 1 with his 
1~9 constant criticism of our record." However, the Republicans had 
by this time decided to keep their campaign techniques on an exalted 
level of performance. No low gibes or barnyard talk was to be dis-
played in 1948. Besides there was no need since the GOP had the 
election cinched. 
With the Republican Convention only a few days off, both the 
President and Congress had ~uch to do. :'here were 150 or more bills 
47Associated Press dispatch, The Oregonia~, June 19, 1948. 
48~. 
49Joe Martin, Ny First Fifty Years in Politics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1960), P• 195. 
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passed by the Congress which demanded 'I'ruman' s att0ntion. 50 Three 
bills Truman vetoP-d and :hree times Congress overruled his vetoes. 
Still, the President promised "'more vetoes--in due tirne' ••• one may 
be slapped on the housing bill which the ?resident says has been 
'emasculated' and now was only 'a real estate lobby bilL 11151 
The closing days of the session were hectic and exhausting • 
. According to Jules Abels, the House had been ahead of the Senate in 
its work and on the last day had taken a short recess, and then 
dissolved into a carnival-like atmosphere. Whereas "the Senate 
remained in continuous session for forty-three and one-half hours, 
the galleries were jar.imed with men and women in evening dress until., 
at 7:00 a.m. in early dawn, the Senate finished and the ~igh~ieth 
Congress closed up shop. 1152 
50Associated Press dispatch, The OreKonian, June 19, 1948. 
51Ibid. 
52 Abels, p. 48. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ELEPHANT COLLAPSES 
The rubber elephant, shamefacedly standing on the marquee of 
the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia, drooped, sagged a.Yld 
weaved. To the superstitious the GOP symbol may have appeared as 
an omen of F.~sfortune, but to the confident Republicans it merely 
indicated, what it was, a defective bauble. The elephant needed 
1 constant inflating from a vacuum cleaner. 
The convention which optned on June 21, signaled for the 1,094 
delegates, a return to power after sixteen years of obscurity. In 
that interval, the face of the GOP had changed radically. No longer 
was that party ruled and dominated by the Grundys and McCormicks.• 
Wrote Elmer Davis, ''Traditionally the Republicans have been an oli-
garchic party ••• a party of group leadership ••• But," sai.d he, "the 
solid core is by no means so solid as it used to be; a good deal of 
it has moved with the times--has realized that the prosperity of the 
rich is largely dependent on what they sell to the poor, and conse-
quently will be not too brilliant unless the poor have something to 
1"Back to ·rruman by Default," Newsweek, July 19, 1948, p. 15. 
•Joe Grundy, 85-year old, semi-retired boss of Pennsylvania 
and Colonel ~~obert McCormick, publisher of the Chicago 'l'ribune, were 
accustomed to dominating GOP politics in their respective states. 
McCormick had waged a relentless editorial battle for Taft. 
I 
buy with. 112 Thomas E. Dewey was said to possess the attributes of 
this new look. Apparently he was a conservative liberal who could 
combine an avant-garde progressivism with a solidly rigid business 
base. 
The presuma.bly liberal stance was not the only change to be 
observed in the Republican fold. Women began tc play a more impor-
tant role. There was a total of 113 female delegates at the conven-
tion,_more than had ever been present before. It marked a 12 per 
cent gain over the 1944 party gathering.3 Four women were listed 
as speakers. The most attractive and flamboyant being ex~Congress-
woman Clare Booth Luce. 
And in the Dewey camp, for the first time in history, women 
ran the official headquarters for a major candidate. Led by Mr3. 
Charles H. Weis, Jr., Jane Todd, and Mrs. Carl T. Hogan, a neighbor 
4 
of the Dewey's, they managed the activities of 200 volunteers. 
The introduction of women into an arena once reserved solely 
for men drew forth a nostalgic sally from Sam Koenig, a New York 
delegate. Mused Koenig, ''They've--uh--limited our stronger lang-
uage a bit and they've brought in the parlor touch." At one time, 
"a man could air his purple profanity in thicker cigar sr'loke and 
liquor reek, without fear of offending. 115 Koenig, who had been 
2Elmer Davis, "President LF--:wey' s Strange Bedfellows, 11 Earoer' s, 
Septecber, 1948, pp. 25-26. 
3Associated Press dispatch in The Orcsonian, June 20, 1948. 
4 Alden Hatch, "The Men Around Dewey," Harper's, October, 1948, 
P• 41. 
5Meyer Berger, Special to the New York Times, June 24, 1948. 
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p:resent for the McKinley nomination, refrained diplomatically from 
saying whether the change was for the better or the worse. 
4'/ 
The day before the convention, Philadelphia was treated to a noisy 
demonstration by the exuberant delegates. The pre-convention dill shat-
tered the solemnity of the sabbath, proving that amplifiers are not 
necessary to break the eardrum. By all accounts, poor Eva, Taft's mascot 
elephant, was totally bewildered by the madcap antics cf the crowd.6 
The Convention Hall, affectionately dubbed ''The Steamheated 
Iron Lung11 , 7 was given a last check before the delegates oozed their 
way into the stadium on Monday. Improvements totaling t650,000 had 
been ma.de. The lighting system which had cost $150,000 was brighter 
and hotter than ever. So ~~c~ so, in fact, that the delegates had 
been cautioned to wear sun glasses to protect their eyes against the 
glare.8 (Considering later reports of colossal hangovers, the sun 
glasses probably served a dual purpose.) 
Harry MacMillan, the organist for the convention, practiced 
for the opening session. It is not recorded whether he pounded out 
the theme song "Date in 148 11 , but it has been verified that he rocked 
the walls of the stadium with his music. In the afternoon, Governor 
Dwight Green of Illinois and Walter Hallama.n of West Virginia, chair-
man of the arrangements committee, also pra.cticed gesticulating for 
the TV cameras. Everything seemed to be proceeding without a hitch 
under the copper domed roof of the stadium. 
6Ibid. 
?Meyer Berger, Special to the New York Times, June 21, 1948. 
8Ibid. 
Of the presidential hopefuls, ex-Governor Harold }~. Stassen 
of Minnesota was the first to arrive. Eager and confiderit, he told 
a news conference that he would get the rna.jcrity of delegates amongst 
the 300 war veterans. (Apparently he imagined his navy record plus 
his Tarzan-like physique spelled charisma~) Furthermore, he conjec-
tured that he would trail along in third spot on the first roll call 
and by the ninth would be nominatea.9 
Stassen's headquarters were established at the Warwick Hotel, 
with the suave, well-known Ted Gamble managing his affairs from the 
10 tenth floor of the hostelry. However, Stassen made his presence 
felt in Dewey's domain at the Bellevue-Stratford ~s well. In the 
lobby of the staid Victorian edifice, the Stassen forces had dry-
docked a canoe with a beautiful blonde perched in the boat. The 
nautical effect wa:=; topped off by a sign which read: "l·:an the oars 
and ride the crest; Harold Stassen has the best. 1111 
The contingent of polj.tical aspirants continued to pour into 
Philadelphia. Dewey, who was considered the leading contender in 
the race, with Taft running a close second, arrived at the Bellevue-
Stratford Hotel en Sunday to the cheers of 1,500 spectators. In the 
meantima, the rubber elephant had collapsed again a~d five men raced 
frantically to upright poor D~mbo, while Dewey walked up the steps 
for his first reception. 
9Associated Press dispatch in The Oregonia~, June 20, 1948. 
lOEditorial in The Ore~onian, June 20, 1948. 
11 8 Meyer Berger in the New York Times, June 21, 194 • 
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With quiet sureness. Dewey told a group of reporters that he 
thought the estimated votes predicted in the "Review of the Week" 
section of the New York Times was a fair appraisal of the situation. 
The estimate gave him 331 on the fi:.:st ballot with 129 for Senator 
Taft, 152 for Stassen, fifty-three for Governor Earl Warren, and 
12 forty-three for Senator Vandenberg. Actually, he was to receive 
more than 331 votes on the first ballot, but Dewey and his team were 
being cautious. His lead position had not been easily attained and 
was at best tenuous. It was felt that unless he won on ti1e first few 
ballots his chances for the nomination were slim. A brief glance at the 
history of the primaries will show why Dewey and his staff were anxious. 
In a July article in the U.S. News and i:iorld Rer;ort, the story of 
49 
Dewey's build-up was attributed to solit-second timing, smooth organiza-
tion and luck.13 His past record of failure in the \:isconsin and Nebraska 
primaries had badly damaged his image. This plus the fact that he had 
already received the Republican nomination once and failed, caused him 
to slip further. As Alice Roosevelt Longworth had quipped, "You can't 
make a souffl{ rise twice. 1114 Thus it was that in 1-iay Dewey set out 
for the West to test his strength against Stassen, who was at that time 
a 3-to-2 favorite to win. Oregon was to be the pivotal state. 
Standing at the brink of political oblivion, Dewey said, "If 
12 Leo Ega..~, Special to the New York Tim£§., June 21, 1948. 
1311Inside Story of Dewey Victory," U.S. ?fows, .July 2, 1948, P• 11. 
14 Jules Abels, C'ut of the Jaws of Victorz (New York: Henry Holt, 
1959), P• 62. 
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I lose he..,.e i·n O~e-on I'm f'i"ni·~·ned."l5 • - ·- ... 6 ., - In desper·ation he appealed 
to .Senator Wayne Morse for advice. He wanted to know why his strength 
W-aS waning and how he was to overcome it in order to win in Oregon. The 
advice he received was to get out and mix. Morse told him he gave the 
impression of being cold and impersona1.16 Dewey followed his instruc-
tions and cavorted from one end of Oregon to the other. 7he much publi-
cized picture of Dewey romping up the street surrounded by the Oregon 
cavemen typified his new approach in campcdgn.i..ng. It was the radio de-
bate* over KEX, however, which clinched Dewey's victory in Oregon and 
cost Stassen his top-spot as contender in the Republican party. 
What may have appeared as an accidental victory in Oregon was, in 
point of fact, a well-thouE;ht-out and deliberate:y executed battle. The 
triumvirate, Herbert Brownell, Jr., John Hussell Sprague, and Edwin F. 
Jaeckle, cleverly laid the groundwork and masterminded the strategy for 
the campaign. 
Contrary to Taft's inept campaign manager, Clarence Brown, Dewey's 
"Team" were geniuses in organizational ability. Brownell, who held the 
veto power in the triumvirate, had traveled all over the country from 
1944 to 1946 building up the image of Governor Dewey. A transplanted 
Nebraskan lawyer, Brownell has been described as "an idealist in politics; 
a·slim, youngieh man with a high balding dome, a long thin face, and the 
l5''The Party Chooses to Win, II Newsweek, July 5, 1948, r~· 13. 
1611Inside Story of Dewey," U.S. News, July 2, 1948, n. 11. 
•For the complete text of the radio debate, "3hould the Cor.ununist 
Party in the United States be Outlawed'?" check Vital Sneeches, June 1, 
1948, PP• 482-89. 
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eyes of a devotee."17 
John Spragt:e, the second man in the trio, was considered the 
master politician of the groupc He was a "handsome man of sixty-one 
who looks at least ten years younger, with a square tanned face and a 
powerful body." The third and final member of the triurr.virate, Ed 
Jaeckle of Buffalo, was said to look like an old-time political boss. 
He was a ''huge, white-haired r.ian of fifty-three, with a benevolent smile 
and shrewd eyesj who came up the hard way t~rcugh the wards. Like the 
Roman Emperors of the East and West, he and Sprague divide the Empire 
State between them."18 
Under the guiding hand of this formidable group, Paul Lockwood, 
Dewey's secretary, set in r:iotion the letter writing car.ipaign in Oregon .. 
According to Alden Hatch, the "big shots 11 in New York wrote to the "lit-
tle shots" in Oregon asking for campaign contributions. As one person 
bluntly confessed, HThey really put the screws on the boys in Oregon. 1119 
The coup de grace, as stated previously, was delivered on the night 
of May 17, 1948. Dewey, who was fatigued and apparently suffering from 
a cold, drew on his reserve strength and like the crusading District 
Attorney of yox·r~, sparred deftly with Stassen, leaving him stunned and 
beaten. The triumph of the radio debate raised Dewey's prospects and 
created the image of a potential winner. The team, eager to propagate 
the illusion of an unbeatable candidate, worked harder than ever to start 
a bandwagon effect. With this b~ckground, the stage was set in Phila-
delphia for the final bout between Governor Dewey and Harold Stassen. 
17 
Hatch, P• 39. 19!£i9.., P• 41. 
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Having partially eliminated, or at least weakened Stassen's 
chances, Dewey cold-bloodedly set out to capture the nomination. 
He had declared his availability for the presidential candida.cy as 
far back as 1939 when Harold Ickes taunted him by saying, "Dewey 
th h . d" · t tn· e ri·ng. 1120 rows is iaper in o Overeager and politically inexperi-
enced at that time. he had since learned the political machinations 
which spelled the difference between defeat or success. However, 
the nomination was still anyone's prize. Just as he had stood at 
the brink of oblivion in Oregon, he now stood at the threshold of 
success in Philadelphia. But he could never forget that his most 
formidable opponent, Robert A. Taft, was ensconced in his headquarters 
at the Benjamin Franklin Hotel. 
On Sunday, Senator Taft and his wife had driven 150 miles from 
Washington, D.C. to Philadelphia following the adjournment of Con-
gress. Arriving early in the afternoon, the Senator remained remark-
ably cheerful and alert during his reception even though he had only 
had two and a half hours sleep in seventy-two hours--two hours Fri-
day night and a half-hour Saturday night. 21 
As the Senator stepped out of his 19li-6 Plymouth, a phalanx 
of police cleared a path to the entrance of the Benjamin Franklin 
Hotel while 1,500 supporters roared their welcome. A brass band 
played 11I' m Looking Over a Four-Leaf Clover, 11 the official Taft 
. 22 con.«rention song. According to James Patterson, his biographer, 
2011F.e Did Co:ne Back, 11 Newsweek, July 5, 1948, P• 21. 
21c1ayton Y.nowles, Special to the New York Times, June 21, 1948. 
22Ibid. 
Taft patiently endured the c:!1c~less refrains. ''Iere is an example of 
one verse: 
We're looking over a four-leaf clover 
That we've overlooked before; 
One leaf is COl.trage, the second is fight, 
'rhird is our party, that always is right; 
No need explainin' the one remainin' 
It's Bob Taft over--the four-leaf clover 
That we'll overlook no more.23 
And to add to the tedium and cheaper. Taft as a candidate, the 
Senator was obliged to shake the trunk of ":Sva Tfat" {Taft spelled 
24 backwards) in order to accommodate the photographers. But this 
was not the end. Mishaps and foolishness seemed to dog the Senator. 
In a press conference held in the Crystal Room of the Benjamin 
Franklin shortly after his arrival, Taft demonstrated a forebeara~ce 
few could parallel. As the Senator and his ca~paign manager, Clarence 
J. Brown, settled themselves on a pink sofa, two huge photo0raphs of 
Taft fell from the wall and scored a direct hit on Taft and Brown. 25 
Quickly regaining his composure ':'aft launched into a dis-
cussion of his prospects as a candidate. 11 I think the race is 
largely between Governor Dewey and myself, and I think I am in the 
better position." He estimated that there would be "in the neighbor-
hood of 300 votes for him on the first ballot. 1126 Like Dewey, Taft 
23James Patterson, Mr. Renublica:'l: A BioITanhY of Robert A. 
~ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 398. 
24Ibid., P• 410. 
25Irwin Ross, 'l'he Loneliest Camnaio:m (New York: New American 
Library, 1968), p. 94. 
26Knowles, Nr:d York Tjm<>.c:: .. June 21, 1948. 
had miscalculated. Yet there we~e valid reaz~ns for his appraisal. 
Taft's stature in the Republican Party was unquestioned. He 
was considered the ablest figure in American politics, a man of inte-
2" grity and independence of mind, albeit provincial in his views. ' 
Richard Rovere conjectured that the kind of government Taft would 
lead "would be like him, honest, energetic, competent, colorless, 
and economical. Strictly from the standpoint of admin:i.stration, it 
ld b b, b f. t t ·128 wou pro a .J..y e :.rs -ra e ••• · Though many found his views on 
foreign policy too parochial, he nevertheless had a substantial fol-
lowing within the ranks of his party. 
Both because of his preeminence in the GOP and because of the 
tentative agreements with the favorite-son states*, Taft had good 
reason to think he would poll 300 votes. Many of the states were 
undecided, but some delegates, specifically the Stassen** coalition, 
were for Taft not Dewey. It was only through the bungling of Taft's 
20 
forces that he lost states previously slated for him. / 
27Richard Rovere, "Taft: IE: This the Best Gift We've Got?" 
Harper's, April, 1948, p. 289. 
28
Ibid., P• 297. 
*The success for either Dewey or Taft depended largely upon 
the substantial blocs of votes in the following states: 73 in Penn-
sylvania, 56 in Illinois, 53 in California, 41 in Michigan, 35 in New 
Jersey, 35 in Massachusetts, 29 in Indiana, 22 in Tennessee and 19 in 
Cor~:1ecticut. (l1oss, p. 92.) 
**Stassen was unrelentingly and unrealistically for Stasse~. 
After his defeat in the Oregon primary, Stassen sought the advice of 
Alf M. Landon concerning his chances for the GOP nomination. During 
the three-hour conference Landon said, "Harold, you can put over Dewey, 
or Taft, or Joe Martin, but you can't make it yourself.'' Stassen re-
mained unconvinced. ("Behind the Dewey Blitz," Newsweek, July 5, 1948) 
29Patterson, p. 411. 
c;l.i. _, . 
Although the three lea:::~:'..ng candidates, Dewey, Taft, and Stassen, 
controlled the majority of votes, the Vandenberg and Warren supporters 
hoped their man would emerge as a compromise candidate in case of a 
deadlock. 
Governor Earl '.-/arren of California, was considered the most 
liberal of all the candidates placed in nomination. He supported 
a strong military establishment, aid to Western Europe, and recipro-
cal trade. In addition, he had a political personality which was 
a real vote-catcher.30 "Six-foot-1, weighing 215 pounds, and with 
silvery-blond hair, v/arren is an imposing figure. He is soft-spoken, 
calm, amiable, ever-sure of himself, and ever smiling. 1131 The 57-year 
old Californian's biggest han~icap, of course, was that he was from 
the West, ergo, less well-known nationally. 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, was rated an ideal can-
didate because of his leadership in foreign policy. But again, it 
was felt his popularity was too regional. uThere was no real Vanden-
berg sentiment," said Raymond Maley, "except in Washington, D.C., 
New York City and Michigan. 1132 Still it was anybody's race and 
the Senator "was in an ideal position to emerge as compromise choice 
of battling delegates who could agree on no one else. 1133 
Upon his arrival in Philadelphia, Vandenberg declared himself 
30Ernest K. Lindley, "'l'he Republican Ticket and the Dem.,crats," 
Newsweek, July 5, 1948, P• 20~ 
311'Man of the West,'' Newsweek, July 5, 1948, p. 24. 
32Raymond Maley, "Victory for Management and Logic," Newsweek, 
July 5, l9q8, P• 19. 
33"Inside Story of Dewey Victory," U.S. News, July 2, 1948, P• 11 
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"available" and then disappeared into the st::clusion of his headquar-
ters at the Warwick Hotel. His supporters, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
of Massachusetts, Arthur E. Su!lii~erfield and Governor Kim Sigler of 
Michigan, wer.e frustrated by his refusal to "run11 • 34 Yet the Senator 
was only being faithful to his word. "He said he wasn't 'running' 
and he isn't," stated the New York Times. In fact, he was less access-
ible than any::me else in the party. He was quoted as saying, "To deal 
and trade for delegates ••• might be good politics, but he felt, it would 
be, in his case, bad faith and he maintains he will not do it. 1135 
The stakes were high. It was a Republican year and whoever 
received the nomination had a one way ticket to the Nhite House. The 
flattery, wheedling, coaxing and "well-placed promises" of patronage 
had reached Me.chirl.vellian proportions by the opening of the convention. 
Dewey's hurricane forces had taken the initiative in the pre-convention 
warm-up and aggressively pursu~d their advantage. The Governor from 
New York was off to a good start. 
While the whiskey glasses and cigarette butts accu~ulated in 
the various smoke-filled rooms, the candidates' wives fenced with the 
press. By far the most exhilara.ting woman, Mrs. Robert Taft fired 
salvo after salvo at the reporters, who found her excentionally good 
C?PY• When asked why she wanted her husband to be President she shot 
back, "BP.ca.use I want what he wants and because I'd like a good 
34special to the New York Ti~es, June 22s 1948. 
35James Reston, Special to the New York TimAs, June 23, 1948. 
President. 1136 Que!"ied further about the new perch on the White House, 
Mrs. Taft remarked that on her reGent speaking engagement she found 
the people more excited about the $15,000 balcony than the 4 billion 
dollar budget. "To many people," quipped Mrs. Taft, "$15,000 seems 
like a lot of porch. 1137 (It has been said Mrs. Taft would have waged 
a better can1paign than her husband, Robert "Coolidge" Taft.) 
Far less colorful, the non-committal, impeccably dressed and 
somewhat priggish Ers. Dewey purred her way through he1~ press confer-
ence. "I answer no political questions. I think that most of you know 
that by now, 1138 said Mrs. Dewey, and then proceeded to discuss food 
and fashions. Perhaps the inane level of communication resulted 
in the gauche question which followed. "A woman reporter asked if 
the Governor's mustache tickled when she kissed him. 1139 "Icily" Mrs. 
Dewey ignored the question and went on to discuss Berkshire soup, one 
of the Governor's favorite dishes. 
The fourth estate, having gleaned all the information available 
turned its attention to the formal opening of the convention. The 
first session which convened at 11:07 a.m., mercifully ended at 1:00 
40 p.m. The hall had become a veritable furnace, and the parboiled 
delegates left the stadium in order to recoup their forces for the 
36Meyer Berger, Special to the New York Times, June 21, 1948 
37Ibid. 
38.!Ei9.· 
39"'Just a Wife'", Newsweek, July 5, 1948, P• 22. 
40 
Ross, p. 95. 
evening session. 
"An uninspired affair," said Jules Abels cynically about the 
1948 GOP Convention. 41 "The richest, noisiest, the most exuberant 
quadrennial Bepublican meeting ••• since 1932," enthused Meyer Berger 
of the New York Times. 42 The gaiety and exhilaration demonstrated 
by the crowd during the first evening session would tend to verity 
the latter description. 
According to Berger, the 15,000 delegates thrilled to the 
vibrations of the organ music and the shrill cacophony of the brass 
band at the start of the session. The crowd then sat in eager silence 
during the invocation and remained that way as James Melton of the 
Metropolitan Opera Company sang a number of selections. 43 
However, the delegates lapsed into a soporific trance as Gov-
ernor Dwight Green delivered the keynote address. The "tall, silver-
haired" Illi~oisan excelled in monotony. Droned the Governor, "We 
are here to nominate the thirty-fourth President of the United 
States," (this was de rigueur) he continued, " ••• This is a people's 
convention. It is of the people, for the people and by men and women 
in the service of the people.n44 As his speech got longer and the 
hall hotter, Green soon lost the attention of his audience. (With 
oratory like this it should not be surprising.) 
41 Abels, P• 62. 
42special to the New York Times, June 22, 1948. 
43Ibid. 
44Text of the Keynote Address, New York Times, June 22, 1948. 
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As the melting RepublL:ans swabbed their faces with soggy 
ha..'1dkerchiefs, Go..,~ernor Green at last turned fror:i the microphone and 
relinquished the rostrum to Clare Boothe Luce. Smiling, and fresh look-
ing, Mrs. Luce waved to the galleries. A cameraman shouted, "Throw us 
a kiss, Mrs. Luce.n45 She obliged and then stepped forward, with 
"tensed jaw11 , to deliver the most incisive, hypnotic speech of the 
evening. An avowed anti-Truman delegate, she jabbed, poked and 
ridiculed the President until the audience quivered with delight. 
"Our people want a competent President," seethed Mrs. Luce ••• 
"Let's waste no time measuring the unfortunate man in the White House 
against our specifications. Mr. Tru:nar1' s tirne is short; his situation 
is hopeless. 
46 Frankly, he is a gone goose." The crowd roared its approval. 
While the time-honored drama of the conve:1tion was being dutifully 
enacted in the Municipal Auditorium, "the forces of two of the leading 
Presidential contenders, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio and Governor 
Thomas .t:. Dewey of New York, were fighting to improve their positions. 47 
The "stop Deivey" movement was becoming essential. On the opening day 
of the convention Taft had already sustained a damaging blow. The 
credentials committee had voted to seat the sixteen man Dewey delegation 
from Georgia instead of the Taft delegation which the Senator had assumed 
he would win. Once again, the superior o:cganizat ional ability of the 
Dewey team manifested itself. 
45James Hagerty, Special to the New York Times, June 22, 1943. 
4611Address of Hon. Clare Booth Luce", in Annendix to the 
Congressional Record, August 4, 1948, p. A4836. 
47William s. White, Special to the New York Times, June 22, 1948. 
Much has been written abcut the contrast between the Dewey and 
Taft forces, all to the glory of the former and to the detriment of 
the latter. It appeared that ClarencP B!'o'tm., Taft's manager, had 
alienated nearly everyone with whom he came in contact. While 
Herbe~t Brownell shrewdly manipulated delegates 1 Brown wallowed in 
a morass of triviality. He worried "about such mundane matters as 
hotel rooms and seats in the gallery for his friends. 'There is 
more cussing of Clarence Brown ••• than there has been heard in any 
political ruckus in recent times. 11148 Still Taft allowed him the 
reins of control. 
James Reston reported "that Harold Stassen and Senator Robert 
A. Taft, with the blessing and conniving of Col. Robert McCormick of 
the Chicago Tribune, have been playing footsy under the green baize 
table. 1149 Actually, Taft wasn't a "footsy" kind of operator. In fact, 
had the Senator from Ohio been less integrity-ridden, the steam-
roller tactics of Dewey's team would have been easier to stop. Dupli-
city was not a part of Taft's character. And his refusal to engage 
in unethical practices gave Dewey the advantage. Moreover, the fail-
ure of the "stop Dewey" coalition to select one candidate created a 
chasm too wide to breach. "There were too mnny hopefi.:.ls. Each of 
the dark horses thought he had a chance to win, and without agreement 
their strength was not tightly held. 1150 Patterson relates that "with 
48 Patterson, p. 410. 
49James Reston, Special to the New York Times, June 22, 1948. 
50"Inside Story of Dewey Victory," U.S. News, July 2, 1948, 
p. 12. 
"1' bv 
characteristic candor, Taft proposed that ever:rone unite behind him. 1151 
Stassen flatly refused. And according to a.n. article in the U.S. News, 
when Senator Vandenberg's name was mentioned both Stassen and Taft 
balked.52 "The essence of their i~nasse was simple: neither Stassen 
nor Taft hated Dewey enough to withdraw, and neither man thought he 
could get his delegates to follow if he did. 1153 "In other words," 
said James Heston, "while ••• all have the same limited objectives of 
stopping Mr. Dewey on the early ballots, actually their long-range 
objectives are antithetica1. 1154 
On Tuesday, June 22, Dewey inched closer to victory. The decision 
of Senator Edward Hartin, the favorite son candidate of Pennsylvania, to 
throw thirty-five to fifty-five votes to Governor Dewey and to second 
61 
the Governor's nomination, stopped the Taft forces in their tracks.55 The 
move was termed 11an act of desperation" by Stassen who was unwilling to 
admit the consequences cf Martin's defectiou.56 .4nd on the 23rd of June, 
Taft, equally unconvincing, was quoted as saying, "The Dewey blitz has 
been stopped. 1157 But evidence proved otherwise. 
5lPatterson, p. 412. 
5211Inside Story of Dewey Victory," U.S. Newn, July 2, 1948, p. 12. 
53 4 Patterson, p. 12. 
54special to the New York }'imes, June 22, 1948. 
55Williarn S. White, Special to the New York Times, June 23, 
1948. 
56Special to the New York Times, June 23, 1948. 
5?Clayton r.nowles, Special to the New York Time~, June 24, 
1948. 
With precision-like tactics, the Dewey team pr0ssed their 
psychological advantage. The Dewey bandwagon lurched onward, wrote 
William S. ':lhite, though every sort of roadblock was placed in its 
way •• 58 Charles Halleck** pledged Indiana's twenty-nine votes for 
the Governor of New York at the very outset of the bal1oting. An-
other favorite son, Governor Alfred B. Driscoll of New Jersey, re-
leased the thirty-five-man delegation and annou.~ced he would vote for 
Dewey after the first ballot. Senator Jame P. Kem of Missouri and 
Governor Robert Bradford of Massachusetts also cast their lot with 
Dewey.59 The strategy was working. Dewey was gr~dually eliminating 
one adversary after another. But the momentum generated in his head-
quarters created a sense of urgency in the other groups. 
Two more meetings of the opposition were held in the apartment 
of John D. M. Hamilton. The outcome, as usual, was inconclusive. 
58William s. White, Special to the New York Times, June 24, 1948. 
*White's statement is puzzling. There seemed to be no tangible 
roadblocks in view. In fact, w. H. Lawrence stated that no united 
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front opposed Dewey because it was felt such a move would be inter-
preted as a sign of weakness which, in turn, would create confusion 
among the delegates. The rranagers for Taft, Stassen, Vandenberg, and 
Warren feared a coalition would result in a stampede for Dewey. Actu-
ally, the reverse proved true. (Special to the New York 7imes, June 24) 
••J • .iiussell Sprague and Len Hall, a Congressman from Nassau, 
had promised Halleck the Vice Presidentia.l spot if he would deliver 
all the delegates from Indiana. Halleck obliged. After Governor .::arl 
Warren was chosen for the si~cond position on t:b.e ticket, Halleck was 
crestfallen. Yea:.·s later he reccu."lted the incident at a Gridiron Club 
dinner. Dewey was present ar.d c·allenged him. "Charlie, did I ever 
promise you the Vice-Presidential nominati:.m?" "No," said ;ialleck, 
"but Spr.s.gue and nall did." (Jules ..:i.bels, P• 68) Apparently the re-
jection had festered in Halleck's heart, but Dewey in typical, oily, 
lawyer-like fashion exonerated himself. 
I 
Each contender refused to y:l.1~:.d to the other. "The meeting was secret, 
but it was !:l!lnounced that the participants agreed at the start that 
they could not agree, at this time, on one candidate on whom to concen-
trate thPir strength. 1160 They dissipated their power and shot their 
ammunition like shrapnel at the Dewey camp. Few pieces hit the mark. 
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on Wednesday, June 23, the nomina-
tions began. The stifling heat plus the antagonism of the anti-Dewey 
forces caused the restless crowd to erupt in an angry demonstration 
as Senator Martin rose to nominate the Governor from New York. Chair-
man Joe Martin lashed out at the audience for its discourtesy until 
the booing finally stoppea.61 The speeches and demonstrations contin-
11 e d into the early dawn. Senator John Bricker nominated Taft. The 
nomination was climaxed by a 30-minute de:nonstration. "Then came in-
terminable oratory for Warren, Stassen, Baldwin, Vandenberg, and fi-
nally for General Douglas MacArthur, who was in Japan."62 At last, 
bleary-eyed and sleepless, the delegates slouched back to their hotel 
rooms. 
With the temperatures soaring above one hundred degrees, the 
balloting began on Thursday afternoon. The first vote took only thirty-
nine minutes. The second ballot required more time, an hour and two 
~nutes, because five states wished to be polled individually. 63 The 
60w. H. Lawrence, Special i-.o the ~w York Times, June 24, 1948. 
6111Behind the Dewey Blitz," Newsweek, July 5, 1948, p. 16. 
62 Patterson, P• 413. 
63 Rosst p. 105. 
/ 
I 
Dewey blitz was succeeding. Governor Dewey jumped from lt34 on the 
first ballot to 515 on the second. He was clearly in the lead. 
At this juncture, :i)uff, Sigler, and Clarence Brown rushed to 
the platform to ask for a recess. Chairman Jee Martin recognized Duff 
who formally requested the convention adjourn until 7:30.64 Although 
the Dewey supporters roared their protest, the New York delegation 
acceded to the plea. '::hey had reason to believe they would win on 
the third ballot with or without a recess. 
Taft, who had remained in his air-conditioned room at the 
Benjamin Franklin Hotel, called Stassen and asked him ~o release his 
delegates in his favor. The Minnesotan, steeped in stubbornness or 
ignorance, refused once again under the misguided notion he could still 
win. Without a backward glance, Taft immediately drafted a letter which 
64 
was to be read by Senator Bricker at the Convention Hall when the delegates 
reconvened. The message, dictated over the phone to James Shattuck, said 
it was plain that a majority of the delegates were prepared to turn to 
Mr. Dewey on the third ballot, ergo, Senator 7aft was releasing his forces 
65 and pledging his su:::ir:,ort to the New Yorker. ··:!hat followed was a.nti-
climactic. 
Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio read the letter announcing his 
friend's withdrawal. The gesture triggered a succession of withdraw-
als. Senator William l!,. Kr..owle.nd of California withdrew for «Jarren; 
Stassen strode to the rostrum and declared for Dewey himself; Gover-
nor Yi.im Sigler withdrew for Vandenberg. It was then su6gested that 
6411Behind the Dewey Blitz,'' Newsweek, July 5, 1943, p. 16. 
65William S. White, Special to the :iew York ,.,. ~imes, Juna 25, 1943. 
a roll call be dispensed with, but Joe Martin ruled otherwise and the 
ballot was taken as a matter of for~. 
The following is the distribution of the votes in the balloting 
for the GOP presidential nomination: 66 
TABLE II 
SUMNARY 0F 'i'HE BAU.GTS 
First Second Third 
Candidate Ballot Ballot Ballot 
Dewey 434 515 1,094 
Taft 224 274 0 
Stassen 157 149 0 
Warren 59 57 0 
Vandenberg 62 62 0 
Martin 18 10 0 
MacArthur 11 7 ,0 
Baldwin 19 19 0 
Green 56 0 0 
Driscoll 35 0 0 
Reece 15 1 0 
Dirksen l 0 0 
Like Taft, Dewey had remained closeted in his hotPl room lis-
tening to the returns on radio and television--that is, until the sets 
stopped functioning, at which time he went to a staff member's room to 
hear the convention. 67 When the outcome appeared certain, Dewey left 
for the Convention Hall to deliver his acceptance speec~. 
Described as '!placating" in tone, Dewey said, ''In all humility, 
I pray God that I may deserve this opportunity to serve our coi.mtry. 11 
He stressed that he was "unfetteJ·eO. by a single obligation or promise 
to any living person, free to join with you in selecting to serve our 
66 New York Times, June 25, 1948. 
67 Ross, p. 107. 
+- • th f. t d •168 na~ion e 1w~s w.en. an women ••• will i.am S. ';/hit e reasoned this 
last statement meant Dewey had not yet chosen his running mate, and 
was letting it be known the field was wide cpe~. 69 'rhe Governor con-
eluded his address with mechanical dreariness. "'.I'he idenls of the 
American people are the ideals of the Republican party. '1-fe have 
lighted a beacon here in Philadelphia, in this cradle of our own in-
d d u70 epen en:::e ••• Banal yE.t necessary, the ritual ended and Dewey 
headed back to the Bellevue-Stratford to select the Vice-president. 
Stassen, contrary to earlier protestations that he would not 
accept second spot, declared he was available if drafted. 71 '.Jarren 
too performed an about-face. The major factor in his sudden change, 
claimed 1;/arren, was attributed to Dewey's pr·oposal that the Vice-pres-
ident "act as an assistant ?resident 1.Jith cabinet status. 1172 In any 
event, the r::ieeting of advisers and party leaders, which lasted until 
approximately 4:30 a.~., was furnished with ample candidates to con-
sider. The leading contenders were Halleck, .Stassen and >iarren. 
Halleck, who felt he had a claim on the nomination "because he 
h d T d. t D II • d . f'tl 73 a swung ~n iana o ewey, was reJeCte sw~~ y. Stassen was 
denied the post because it was felt he was inclined "to go it alone 
68Thomas E. Dewey, "Ideals of i{epublican Party," Vital Speeches, 
July 1, 1948, P• 549. 
69William S. White, Special to the New York Times, June 25, 1948. 
70newey, p. 548. 
7lc. P. Trusell, Special to the New York Times, June 25, 1948. 
72c1ayton Knowles, Special to the New York Times, June 25, 1948. 
73"Inside Story of Dewey Victory," U.S. News, July 2, 1948, p. 13. 
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and not work well with a tear.~." although it w<::13 acknowledged he 
engendered enthusiasm in younger Republicans. ,,74 It was Warren, then 
that emerged as the compromise candidate. r;The Stassen group found 'dar-
ren acceptable. The Halleck group found Warren less objectionable than 
Stassen. 1175 
When the conference recessed, Dewey phoned :/arren at the Warwick 
Hotel and asked him to come over immediately. ':he two discussed the 
benefits of the alliance until 6:30 a.m., at which time :.1arrer:. promsed 
to give an answer by 11:30 a.m. 76 The reply was yes.· 
While the delegates at the Convention Hall played a waiting garr.e, 
Senator 1.Iilliam F. Knowland was called to the telephone. Informed of the 
acceptance, ~arren's name was placed in nomination and within less than 
an hour he was chosen as Dewey's running mate. Apparently, Martin had 
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1 d th · t• th ' 0 dl "-h .._ had mi·ssed i·t. 77 gave e e norruna ion rougn so rapi y ~1av newspapermen 
The unbeatable team of the Republican party was chosen and what 
remained to be done seemed almost fruitless. The Republicans, so sure 
of victory, were compelled to spend time and money on the routine of 
campaigning. I'he boredom they felt for these nonessentials continued 
to manifest itself throu5hout the election. Iu an October article in 
Time, this attitude of the Republicans was stated most succinctly by a 
newsnian when he said, "How long is Dewey going to tolerate I'ruman' s in-
terference in the government?" 78 
75r· "d OJ. • 
7611Selected with Care, 11 Newsweek, July 5, 1948, p. 23. 
77Ibid., p. 24. 
7811Don' t Worry About Me, 11 ~' October 2.5, 1948, P• 21. 
The President, however, had 3. vastlJ different view of the 
projected struggle. Happy with the Republican's nomination of Thomas 
E. Dewey, Truman predicted his chances of retaining the Presidency had 
improved. He was "definitely encouraged about the whole political 
situation. 1179 Having followed the GOP Convention on television, 80 
Truman opined that Mr. Dewey, who "was very much of a conservative," 
would provide an excellent target for his gibes. He said, "that the 
1948 Republican plntforo was 'nothing but the reiteration of promises 
they have failed to keep in the past.'" Furthermore, Truman felt the 
failure to nominate Vandenber('; had helped him enormously since Demo-
cratic strategists considered him the most dangerous opponent. 81 
As the month of June came to a close, it witnessed the con-
flicting attitudes of the three Presidential office seekers. Henry 
A. Wallace, dog-paddling for his life and increasingly bitter, called 
President Truman "a self-annointed angel, whose head is too big for 
his halo. 1182 And Truman, who was only too aware of Wallace's de-
clining popularity, savagely ignored him while simultaneously clap-
pl.rig his hands at Dewey's nomination. And whnt of the redoubtable 
Governor from New York? Well, he just licked his leonine-like chops 
in anticipation of the feast on November 2, 1948. With the protago-
n~sts thus squared off in battle array, Truman prepared for his visi-
tation to the city of brotherly love. 
79John D. Morris, Special to the Ne~ York Times, June 26, 1948. 
80united Press Dispatch to the New York Times, June 23, 1948. 
82united Press Dispatch to the .li.ew York Times, June 21, 1948. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DCNKEY STANDS FIRM 
Lured by a cool S250,000, * the Democrats converged on Philadel;1hia 
:i.n mid-July for their convention. The marquee of the Bellevue-Stratford, 
once again, sported a political symbol. But, this time, instead of a 
collapsing elephant, the marquee hugged to its bosom, a romping, exuber-
• A ..,, 
ant, papier-mache donkey. " ••• Less vulnerable to cigarettes and arrows 
of outraged Republicans, 111 the donkey snorted puffs of smoke, wiggled 
its ears, swished its tail and exultantly viewed the scene below throt~gh 
its large, electric eyes. 
According to a report in the IJondon ~i.nes, the donkey motif was 
carried throughout the city. Eager for patronage, one enterprising pro-
prietor tethered a donkey to a lamp-post outside his bar. A pile of 
hay was dumped on the sidewalk for grazing. Quote tl:e storyteller, "In 
1932 Herbert Hoover predicted that if the Democrats were elected there 
wculd be grass growing in the streets of New York. He has had to wait 
sixteen years, but this is surely a partial vindication."2 
*Both the Repulili.cans 3.nd Democr3.ts were given '0250 1 000 by the city 
of Philad.elpl:ia to induce them to hold their conventions t~ere. Wallace's 
party was 5iven nothing. This ~oney was not charity. Philadelphia hoped 
to recei•1e ·,~35 ,000,000 in return from the free-s9ending delegates. (Irwin 
Ross, The Loneliest Gar>mai;:m, P• 93.) 
1special Correspcndent to the London Ti~es, July 12, 1948. 
2Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, in spite of a frisky outward appearance, a funereal 
pall had enveloped the city. ''The Democrats came to Philadelphia as low 
in their minds as the Republicans were when they assembled for the Landon 
convention in 1936. Tnere was not a hopeful delegate in a carload."3 
"The J.,592 delegates ••• acti:~d as if they were attending a funeral. 114 The 
mood of pessimism, so dolefully expressed, was attributed to the fact that 
the Democrats had. ''no practical alternative to nominating for President 
the incumbent, Harry S. Truman, and they suspect that he will be defeated 
by the Republican nominee. 115 
The graveyard portrayal of the Democratic convention persisted and 
grew. According to one wag, the situation got so solemn that Philadelphia 
opened its bars on Sunday to l~ven things up. All to no avail. ''The dele-
gates drank bourbon, scotch and rye as if it were so much er.}bal~in5 flu:i.d 
--and with about the same effect." Cab drivers complained, "We got the 
wrong rigs for this convention. They shoulda given us hearGes. 11 And 
still another rran mournfully suggested the multi-colored tickets for use 
6 in the convention hall be changed to one color, "deep black." And so 
the stories went. 
But not everyone had buried the Democratic party, least of all the 
President of the United States. Harry s. Truman, in the face of almost 
perpetual gloom, had buoyantly maintained a winning outlook. Dispelling 
3Helen Fuller, ''The Funeral is Called Off," New Renubli1:, July 26, 
1948, P• 10. 
4 "Back to Truman by Default," Newsweek, July 19, 19Li-8, p. 15. 
5Editorial in the New York Times, July 11, 1948. 
6Meyer Berger, Special to the New Yol.'k T~, July 12, 1948. 
the aura of depression around him, the President had hung a talisman in 
the corridor outside his office. The object was "nothing r:iore than a 
political cartoon,''* yet 'l'rurr.an' s associates drew strength and comfort 
from it. The talisman had inspired a slogan which they repeated, "He's 
always licked in Hay and elected in r;ovember. 117 3ut the goodluck piece 
had not beguiled Truman. His opt:i.mism was based on the firm conviction 
that he had given the country a good and honest administration.8 The 
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cartoon served only as a reminder that he had the ability to win against 
overpowering odds. 
"Ifobody kr:ew better than Harry s. Truman ••• that, in American poli-
tics you can't beat somebody with nobody. He was somebody--the Presi-
dent of the United States. 119 He knew he controlled the "hard core" of 
the party and consequently never concerned himself with the Etsenhower 
boom or the draft Douglas proposal. The ridiculous a.11d mutinous spec-
tacle of' the Democrats caused him to deplore "rr.ore in sorrow tnan in an-
ger the dissension in the party because of the comfort and ammunition it 
f . h d ·h . t. 1110 urrus e ~ e opposi ion. 
*The political cartoon was considered one of the Most "derisive" 
ever sketched about Truman. The drawing depicted two huge trucks w~~:..d1 
had crashed l~ead-on. I'he trucks were labeled ".Stark" and 11~1illiµ;a,r:. 11 
They blocked the way of a tiny truck named "Truman." '.:'l:e scene re~re­
sented the 1940 Senato:-ial race in which Truman was considered a lo,st 
cause. 'l'he ca:otion under the cartoon read: "No place for a kiddie car.n 
Truman won. 
7Anthony Leviero, Special ::.o the New York Times, July 11, 1948. 
8Ib', _..!.S!· 
9,'Truman and the Stop-Truman Revolt," Newsweek, July 12, 1948, p. 19. 
10Anthony Leviero. 
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The Eisen..l-iower moverw:it ''!~1ich had been quell"'d in the p~-ist, gained 
impetus after the I<epublican Convention when the vote-getting team of 
Dewey a.nd W3.rren was announced. The anti-Truman :Uemocrats panicked, 
and in ;;heir desperation, once again, sought to draft Ike, even though 
th , h d 1 h d th ~~ . , 11 e genera~ a sque c.e e o~~er previous~y. The last-ditch stand 
of Jimmy Boosevelt, the big-city bosses, the ADf\ and the Southern rebels 
to force Ike to accept the nor.iination, however proved futile. Roosevelt, 
who had suggested the delegates join in a rebe1 caucus at Philadelphia 
on Saturday, July 10, just two days before the convention opened, to 
"seek the ablest and strongest man available 1 " finally recognized the 
f h
. 12 error o is ways. On. ?riday, July 9, General Eiser..hower had sent a 
telegram to Senator Glaude Pepper of Florida, who had planner~ to place 
Ike's name before the convention. The message read, "No matt.n· under 
what terms, condition~, or premises a proposal might be couched, I would 
refuse to accept the nomination ••• I ask you to accept my refusal as final 
d 1 h . 1 • t ... h t . 11 . 1113 an comp ete, w .ic.1 i mos" emp a ica y is. 
At this jur1cture, Ike was dropped, and the name of Sunreme Court 
Justice ililliam o. Douglas was aired as a possible candidate. But the 
Douglas movement proved even more short-lived than the Zisenhower boom. 
According to an article in Newsweek, ifayor \;/il:!.ia;:; O'Dwyer of NP,,; York, 
who was Dou6lo.s' greatest proponent, inexplicably destroyed his chance 
for the nomination. ':/ith no acve.nce notice, O'D..,,yer ann0unced in a joint 
11Editorial in the New York Times, July 11, 1948. 
1211Truman and the Stop-Truman Revolt," Newsweek, July 12, 1948, p. 20. 
l3"Frorn Tempe.st to Calm," Newsweek, July 19, 1948, !'• 15. 
cormnun:i.que with Jake Arvey tr~t 11',/e are n.ow c0:1·dnced th::i.t General Eisen-
hower is unavailable ••• It is in the best interest of our country and 
party that our demo~racy unite for President Truman. 1114 ':'he statement, 
which took many by surprise, effectively stopped the Douglas supporters. 
Yet the ~an around whom the anti-Truman forces had gathered remained un-
perturbed by the events. Justice Douglas who was fishing in Oregon, 
said, "I never was a.-runnin'; I ain't a-runnin' and I ain't goin' tuh."l5 
Still cheerful, still resolute, Truman had yet another indignity 
to suffer. This time it came from the direction of the muddleheaded, 
thoughtless Mrs. Clare Booth Luce. Suffering from an acute case of ego-
tism, undoubtedly caused by her success at the GOP convention, Mrs. Luce 
haughtily suggested a winning formula for the President. She asserted 
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he was doomed to defeat unless he chose Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt as his run-
ning-mate. "She is the only person in the party qualified to tear the 
Roosevelt mantle off ·,fallace and, by sharing it with l':r. Truman, partially 
restore it to him. 1116 '•Vhen queried by the press, President Truman politely 
said that Mrs. Roosevelt w0uld be well-qualified for the job. However, 
she declined. So ended another ludicrous episode in the 1948 election. 
On Sunday, July 11, the final absurdity of the ''stop Truman" move-
ment was enacted by Senator Claude Pepper at the abandoned headquarters 
of General Dwi-;ht D. Zisenhower. Disappointed by the refusal of Eisen-
hower and Douglas to accept the nomination, the Senator announced at a 
14Ibi· d., l' P• o. 
15Ibid. 
161'Mrs. Vice-President," Newsweek, July 12, 1948, P• 21. 
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press conference that he intended to run for ti1e presidency. Backed by 
a total of six and one-half votes fro!'! his hor.:iP. state of Florida, Pepper 
declared, ''This is a fight and I believe we can make it a winning fight, 
1,.., 
even if we are starting tardily." r 
William Ritchie, the disgruntled Nebraska Etate chairman, spoke in 
Pepper's behalf. He declared that the Senator "could have counted on be-
tween 300 and 400 v-otes •.•• on the first baJ.loti! jf there had not been a 
del&y·in the a..'Ulouncement of his candidacy. However, he went on to say, 
"If we didn't thin.1< that we had a chance to win nost of us would fold our 
tents and steal quietly away. 1118 Which is exactly what Pepper did on Tues-
day, when he withdrew from the race. 
His candidacy, described as the "hottest and funniest" story of the 
week, had never been taken seriously. However, it did afford a certain 
amount of comic-relief in an otherwise solernn atmosphere. The farce was 
carried to completion on Tuesday when one last attempt was r;iade to promote 
his cause at the convention hall. A young twenty-two-year-old girl tried 
to ride a horse into the auditorium. Stopped by a policeman, she said, 
"Everybody likes horses, eveTybody likes Pepper." Unruffled, the law:-:ian 
told her ''she should have tried a donkey. 1119 
With the last obstacle to Truman's nomination removed, the Demo-
cratic National Convention officially opened on Honda.y, July l2. The 
first session, like that of the GOP conventiont was comparatively quiet 
17 8 W.H. Lawrence, Special to the New York Times, July 12, 194 • 
19Irwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaii:cn (New Yoz-k: New'Ar:ierican 
Library, 1968), p. 116. 
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and subdued. However, in the ~vening session, the auditorium suddenly 
came alive as Senator Alben Barkley delivered his sixty-eight ~inute key-
20 note address. 
The seventy-year old Kentuckian, long a favorite of the politicos 
in ',fashington, D.C., resurrected the hopes of the Democratic Party with 
his wit and invective. "His sharp, biting phrases caueht the fancy of 
21 the delegates," and they alternately chee~ed and laughed as he denuded 
the Republican Party of its chivalrous claims. In stentorian tones, 
Barkley castigated the Republicans for oondemning the New Deal. 11 ••• Let 
us inquire what is this cankering, corroding, fungus growth, which every 
Republican orator ••• denounced with unaccustomed rancor; then, in their 
platform, hugged to their pol:tical bosom as if it were the child of 
22 their own loins? ••• It was recovery." The 3udience cheered, and Bar'i<ley 
knowing he had captured the imagination of the c.;.rowd, threw himself in-
to the speech with even more fervor. 
He extolled the record of the Democratic Party during its fourteen 
years of control, and attacked the record of the "reactionary" Eightieth 
Congress for the high cost of livine. He quoted Hugh Scott as saying 
in 1943, "It is time for the Republicans to take over. "w'e are the best 
stock. We are the people who represent the real grit, brains and back-
bone of America."23 Pouncing on thic arrogant statement, Barkley flung 
20w.H. Lawrence, Special to the New York Times, July 13, 1948. 
21Ibid. -
22Alben Barkley, "Record of Democratic Party," Vital Sneeches, 
August 1, 1948, P• 613. 
23Ibid., p. 616. 
back, "The ne·..r Republican chairman insists that it must be a government 
of the best people, by the best people and for the best people. This 
is a resurgence of the ••• doctrine that only the rich, the well educated 
and the well born are qualified to participate in government ••• 1124 Boos 
echoed throughout the chamber, 25 followed sho!"tly thereafter by laughter 
and applause when he saint "What is a bureaucrat? A bureaucrat is a 
Democrat who holds sor.ie office that a Republican wa.nts. 1126 
"Cheering to the rafters," the delegates spontaneously staged a 
28-minute demonstration at the end of the speech. 27 Led by Kentucky, the 
standards were raised in tribute and "brought to the platform for the 
28 great man to touch." The audience sang "My Old Kentucky Home" while 
the banners inscribed with 11Barkley for Vice-President" bobbed up and 
down in the hall. Visibly affected by the <le::ionstratior~, Senator Barkley 
raised his hand in acknowledgment. A number of party leaders, including 
James Roosevelt, the wayward Californian, strode to the platform to con-
gratulate him on his oratorical brilliance.29 
The reward for his performance was the vice-presidential nomination, 
25special to the Hew York 'l'imes, July 13, 1948. 
26 Alben Barkley, p. 617. 
27w.H. Lawrence, Sper:ial to the New York Times, July 13, 1948. 
28Robert Bendiner, "Rout of the Bourbons," Nation, July 24, 1948, 
P• 91. 
29special to the New York Ti~es, July 13, 1948. 
77 
or so the story goes. It seems many journalists felt the Democratic 
Party would have :preferred Alben Barkley for the presidential spot, but 
since that was impossible, they automatically handed him second place on 
the ticket. Robert Bendiner, who described the convention as desperate 
for a miracle that would give them a new leader, said the de~onstration 
accorded Barkley wac an indication of the delegates wish to supplant Tru-
man. A few of the signs which read "Barkley for Vice-President" had had 
the word "Vice" roughly crossed out.30 Presumably this was further in-
dication of the delegates objections to Tr~~an. 
W.H. Lawrence of the New York Times had this to say about it. 
"While there is no doubt now that ?·:r. Truman will be renominated on the 
first ballot tomorrow night, the Barkley demonstration was at least a sign 
of resistance by the delegates to lettine the ':!hite House dictate the selec-
tion for the No. 2 spot if it is anybody but Senator Barkley. 1131 
Truman had shown preference for Justice Douglas as his running :natea 
He reasoned, and correctly so, that Douglas was younger, more liberal and 
represented a different section of the country as opposed to Senator Bark-
ley, who at seventy, had become .oomewhat set in his philosophy, and unfor-
tunately represented the same a:rea of the United States as Truman. How-
ever, when it was made manifestly clear that Douglas would not accept the 
vice-presidential nomina.tion and that the party wanted Senator Barkley 
for the spot, Truman agreed. 11.My approva] of Barkley as a running mate 
was not a matter of sudden impul::.e," said Truman in his Eemoirs. "I had 
long respected him as one of the ablest debaters on the floor of the Sen-
30Robert Bendiner, P• 91. 
31w .H. Lawrence, Special to the New York S:'imes, July 3, 1948. 
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ate. He was a hard-working; honest politician and one of the r.1ost popu-
lar men in the Democratic Party. As a thoroughly acceptable candidate 
to the South, Barkley made an ideal partner to run with me in 1948. 1132 
On the second night of the convention a me~orial service was held 
in honor of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the nation's war dead. Due 
to "microphone distortion and inadequate preparation of delegates and 
guests" the ceremony was more embarrassing than devotional. To the mor-
tification of Mayor William O'Dwyer, who was leading the service, the 
audience of 12,000 whistled, cheered and applauded the hymns and prayers. 
Intoned the Mayor, "In the solemnity of this hour, our thoughts are of 
those who died that this great nation might live. 1133 But the hour was 
neither solemn, nor were the delegates thinking of the dead. Instead 
the crowd continued to display its ignorci~ce and bad t~ste. Mercifully, 
the memorial service ended. 
This ordeal had no sooner concluded, however, than another unwanted 
disturbance took place. The aivil rights issue, long smoldering beneath 
the surface, was unex.p~ctedly brought into the limelight. George L. 
Vaughn, a Negro deleisate from St. Louis and a member of the credentials 
committee, appeared on the platform to submit a minority report. Vaugh11 
charged that the Mississippi delegation had intended to walk out of the 
convention if Truman's civil rights plank was incorporated into the plat-
form. Ergo, Vaughn protested the seating of the delegation. rta.ising a 
clenched fist, he yelled, "Three million Negroes have left t!.e South since 
32ttarry s. Truman, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), 
II, 191 • . 
33Meyer Berger, Special to the New York Times, July 14, 1948. 
the outbreak of 'forld War II to escape this thing. I ask the convention 
t · · d t · 1134 ""h t · +- v· i o give consi era ion.... -'- a was i... aug.m was stopped in the 
middle of his sentence as bedlam broke out in the hall. ·rhe stadium re-
verberated to the ugly sound of boos and catcalls from the southern Demo-
crats. 
What foJ.lowed was quick, too quick to have solved the problem. 
Barkley pounded his gavel and derianded a voice vote. The shouts of the 
Northerners, who were eager for one, could not be heard because the floor 
mikes had been cut off. In the ensuing pandemonium, the Mississippi dele-
gation was accredited, but the uproar was not stilled. The Chairman of 
California, Jack Shelley, pushed his way onto the platfo1"m and screamed 
at the Sergeant of Arms, "You'd better not cut the mikes on us tomorrow 
when we start talki!'lg on civil rights~ 1135 There was no turning back now~ 
The next day the dreaded explosion over the issue would have to be con-
fronted. 
Wednesday, July 111-, Sen'3.tor J. Howard VicGrath announced that the 
delegates would assemblP at 11:00 a.me and remain in session until all 
business had been completea.36 The decision was greeted with enthusiasm, 
and the work of adopting the platform and voting :for presidential and vice-
presidential candidates got under way. 
The inevitable happened. The storm erupted when fou:r minority 
34"De:nocrats," ~' July ;:6, 1948. P• 12. 
36Meyer,Berger, Special to the New York Times, July 14, 1948. 
80 
amendments to the civil rights plank were introduced before the conven-
tion. Ex-governor Dan Moody of Texas, \/alter Sillers of Mississippi and 
Cecil Sims of Tennessee offered similar amendments defining the sover-
eignty of the states.37 Then a minority report from ADA leaders, Andrew 
Biemiller of Wisconsin and Hubert Humphrey, the 37-year old mayor of Mirm-
eapolis and spokesman for the group, was presented. The Northern report 
differed 11in its demand for congressional action on fair employment prac-
tices, mob violence, and equality in political participation and mili-
tary service. 1138 
The volatile speaker for the liberal plank, Hubert Horatio Humphrey, 
electrified the audience when he said, ''There are those who say to you--
we are rushing this issue of civil rights. I say we are a l:.•mdred and 
seventy-two years late. 11 He continued, "I'he time has arrived for the 
Democratic party to get out of states' rights and walk forthrightly into 
the bright sunshine of human rights. 1139 '!'h0re followed a ten-minute de;i,on-
st ration. 
Sam Rayburn immediately called for a vote on thP. ~exas amendment. 
It lost by an overwhelming margin--925 to 309. The other two southern 
amendments were also quickly rejected. With the Northern liberals firmly 
in control, the Humphrey-Biemiller report was passed by a roll call of 
651~ to 58.21;2.40 It had carried by 69 votes. "The South had been 
3711Democrats," p .. 13. 
38nonald McCoy and Richard Ruetten, ~uest and Resnonse (Kansas: 
University of Y..ansas Press, 1973), p. 125. 
39 Ross, p. 125. 
40c.P. Trussel, Special to the New York Ti.mes, July 15, 1948. 
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kicked in the pants,· turned around and kicked in the sto::iach. The Humph!"e,Y 
and Bieoiller crowd roared in triumph. 1141 But the South was to J:i.a•;e its 
revenge. 
~ond Moley 1 in an analysis o:J:' the convention, felt the Democrats 
had blundered badly in the handling of the civil rights issue. Instead 
of consulting with the Southern leaders and seekins their help in solving 
the Negro problem, the liberals had challenged them bayond endurance. 
According to Moley, both Truman and McGrath had tried to get a compromise 
in the platform whicl... would have appeased the South, but the ADA had 
fouled it up. The cor.ipromise was almost achieved "when three political 
midgets got before the convention the offe!lSive plank which was finally 
adopted." Still, r·:oley insL.r~ed, "efficient" management could he.ve kept 
42 that plan.l<. froin a vote." Perhaps. But th".!re is no conclusive evidence 
that Moley's view is correct. Truman had maintained a strict silence 
during the floor debate. And afterwards he alleged that he "was perfect-
ly willing to risk defeat in 191~8 by sticking to the civil-rights plank" 
in his platform. In fact, he emphasized, "There were people around me ••• 
who were anxious to prevent any sort of split in the Democratic party, 
and efforts were made to soften the approach ••• I would not stand for any 
double talk on this prir..ciple ••• I wanted to win the fight by standing on 
4~ 
my platform, or lose it the same way." :> 
McCoy and Reutten, uncertain of the truth, conjectured that, "The 
41 "Democrats," p.-13. 
42
"Bad Faith without Good Judgment, 11 ?-fewsweek, July 26, 1948, P• 22. 
4 ':L u . II 18-~ruman, 1-.emoJ.rs, , l c.. 
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fL'lal plank was probably stronz;er than he [ Tr:..u::r1aj wov.1d ha.ve liked as 
a presidential candidate ~onfronted wi.th the possibility of losing most 
of the South in Nmrember, despite his later stater.ient that the plank was 
44 his own." 
Though one may speculate ad infinitun on the intended motives of 
the principal actors, the results were pre&ictable. ifoen the delegates 
reconvened for the evening sessions~ Alabama's Chair::mn ~fandy :Sllis 
launched into a scathing denunciation of the convention. He said the 
eleven electors of Alabama had been cor.rrnissionP.d "never to cast their 
vote for a Republican, never to cast their vote for Harry Truman, and 
never to cast their electoral vote for any candidate with a civil rights 
:::.:rograrn such as ad6nted by this convention ••• 'de cannot participate fur-
ther ••• 1145 
Having thus s~oken, Ellis stalked out of the convention hall fol-
lowed by half of the Alabama delegation and the entire ?·lississippi con-
46 tingent of twenty-two. Furious by their defection, the galleries jeered 
as they walked "stony-faced" down the aisles, waving the Confederate flag. 
Once outside, tbe group was asked to pose for news photographers in spite 
of a rainstorm. "Show a little life!" yelled the caneramen.47 The 
delegates dutifully obliged. 
4\:cCoy and Ruetten, P• 126. 
4511Dernocrats," p. 13. 
46
'..forld News Sunr:iarized, New York Tir:ies, July 15, 1948. 
47 · Ross, p. 128. 
And back inside the hall 1 the convention continued. There remained 
only the business of nominating Mr. Truman and V:r. Barkley. The Southern 
states: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia and the remnants of the Alabama delegation, voted solid-
ly against Truman. Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia was nominated 
as thei:::- protest candidate for President. However, the gesture of de-
fiance was futile. (North Carolina was the onJ.y Southern state to cast 
any votes for 'l'ruman.)48 
The President was nominated on the first ballot just as he had pre-
dieted. The votes were 947f2 for Truman, 263 for Russell and ~ vote for 
Paul V. McNutt. The proto~ol of an extra ballot to oake the presidential 
nomination unanimous wa3 disp~[.sed with because of the intransigent mood 
of the South. Alben Barkley, however, was nom5.nated by acclamation for 
40 
the vice-presidency. / 
Mr. Tr~~an had arrived at the convention hall at 9:41 p.m., accom-
panied by his wife and daughter. But four more hours were to pass before 
he could deliver his acceptance speech. In the meantime, he sat on a 
ramp outside the stage entrance--he had fled ;>JcGrath 1 s office because 
of the heat--amiably chatting with his friends and watching the trains 
go by. "Smartly attired in white linens with two-tone black and white 
summer shoes, 11 Truman appeared unruffled by the long confinement.5° Con-
4811Effects of New Deal Victory," U.S. News, July 23, 19'-+8, P• 20. 
49',forld r~ews Summarized, and ?elix Belnir, Jr., Special, New York 
Times, July 15, 1948. 
50James Reston, Special to the New York Times, July 15, 1948. 
fident, he waited for the c&.l.l. 
Finally, at 1:30 a.m., the President and Ser.ator Alben Barkley en-
tered the auditorium and walked towards the platform, while the band 
played "Hail to the Chief." ',lith confetti and streamers flying, Chair-
man Sam Rayburn began his introductory remarks when he was unexpectedly 
interrupted by Mrs. C.E. Miller* of Philadelphia. Taking over the micro-
phone, she announced that she was happy to present the President with a 
floral replica of the Liberty Bell. With that, she "released forty-
eight white doves from a basket on the platfor:n." The birds, frightened 
by the lights and confusion, "zoomed" toward the ceiling. They dashed 
themselves against trre rafters, got entangled in the bunting and swoope1 
and dived at the people on the platform.51 Irwin Ross describes the 
event as "the clir.iactic bit of convention nonsense" which the audience 
loved.52 And a photograph of the proceedinc;s shows Truma.:'.1 laughing 
heartily at the show. ~fowever, in a :"'!ore revealins lir:ht, we have Ma.rg-
aret Truman's honest evaluation of the incident. Said she, ''The dovP.s 
were an incredible disaster. One almost perched on Sam Rayburn's head ••• 
another blundered into an upper balcony and plunged to the floor, dead 
or unconsciouse 11 Disgusted by the antics, Eargaret Truman summarized 
her version of the affair when ste wrote, "IgYioring this idiocy, my fa-
ther strode to the lectern and opened a sr.m1.l black loose-leaf book in 
*Mrs. Emmci. Guffey Hiller belonged to a liberal bloc ''that was try-
ing to convince the ~e~ocratic party and the country that peace with 
Stalin could be won bv anneaserr:ent. 11 The birds re::iresented "doves of 
peace.'' C:a.rgar·et I'r~r'la~: Earrv s. :'rur:1an, p. 13.) 
51s . _ ... pecial. ... o the Hew York ':'imes, July 15, 1948. 
52 Ross, p. 129. 
which he carried the notes of his speech."53 
The black leather folder, mentioned above, contained eighteen pages 
of notes. Truman's proven technique of speaking extemporaneously was to 
be employed, once again, in one of his most v-ibrant deliveries. Ad-
justing the microphon~s upward in preparation for his talk, the photo-
graphers howled their indignation because their view was obscured. Un-
moved by their pleas, the President said, ar am sorry that the micro-
phones are in your way, but ••• I have to be able to see what I am doing, 
because I always have to be able to see what I am doing. 1154 Then, in 
what James Reston described as a "fighting mood," Truman plunged into 
his acceptance speech.55 
Strong, assertive- and exuding a vitality that uplifteci the spirits 
of the delegates, '.l'ruman cried, "Senator Barkley and I will win this elec-
tion and make these Republica~s like it, can't you forget that. We'll 
i::.5 
do that because they're wrong and we're right, and r~1 prove it to you ••• 11 ...... 
The ?elegates, who had been in session for more than seven hours, 
rose to their feet and cheered the man who was every inch a leader. 
Losing none of his magnetism throughout the delivery, Truman continued. 
"I'll say to labor just what I've said to the farmer. They are the most 
ungrateful people in the world if they pass the Democratic party by this 
5~1argaret Truman, Harry s. 'l'ruman (New York: William Morrow, 1973), 
P• 13. 
54Harry s. Truman, "For Victory and a Great Cause," Vital Speeches, 
August 1, 1948, P• 610. 
55James Reston, New York Times, July 15, 1948. 
56Truman, P• 610. 
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year. 1157 
Then he "waded" into the Eightieth Congress and the Republican plat-
""---- form. Referring to the GOP as the party of "suecial privilege," Trll:!lan 
a .. "".'cused them of refusing to act on ·i,he housing problem, high prices and 
social legislation which would benefit tte cor:irr.on r.!an. "I wo!lder," 
mused TruJ;1a.'1, "if they think they can fool the FeopJ.e of the ]ni ted States 
c;8 
with such por1iycock as that?"" 
_Having satisfied himself with his rebu_ke of the Eightieth Congres:=;~ 
Tru.'Tlan delivered his master strok:e of the eveniag. Un:l-movm, except by 
a few close associates, he announced his decision to call a special session 
of Congress on the 26th of July. Explaining that his duty as President re-~ 
q.1ired that he use every means at his disposal to get the laws the people 
needed, he went on to say: 
On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in Missouri they 
call Turnip Day,"' I'm going to call that Congress back and 
I'm going to ask them to pass laws halting rising prices and 
to meet the housing crisis which they say the:-r' re for ••• At the 
same time I shall ask them to act on ••• aid to education, whlch 
they say they're for; a national program, civil rifhts legislation, 
which they say they're for; an increase in the minimum wage--
which I doubt very rr.uch they' re for; 9.n extension of social se-
curity coverage and increased benefits, which they say they're 
for ••• I shall ask for adequate and decent laws for displaced 
persons in place of the anti-Semitic, anti-~atholic law which 
this Eightieth Congress passed. 
57Ibid. 
58Ibid., P• 612. 
*When asked by M~rle Miller why he called the special session Tur-
n.ip Day, Truman ge,ve t'ie fo:'..l•:)wing reply. "'I'he t ..tenty-sixth of July, wet 
or dry, always sow turn:'..ps. Along in Septemb0r they'l:'. be four, five, 
maybe six inches in diar:1eter, and they're good to eat--raw. I don't like 
the!!! cooked. 11 (Flain S?ealdr:.g, p. 257.) 
They could do this .Job in 15 days if they wanted to do it ••• 
They are going to try to dodge their responsibilities, they're 
going to drag all the red herrings they ca:1 across this cam-
paign. But I'm here to say to you that Senator Barkley and 
I are not going to let them get away with it~59 
Although it was almost 2:30 a.m., the crowd broke into a frenzy 
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of applause. P.evived by Truman's courage, the delegates mar.ifested, for 
tr:e first time, a. feeling of possible victory in the election, "You can 1 t 
stay cold about a man who sticks his chin out and fir:;hts," said one of 
th t . . t 60 e par icipan s. 
The reaction of the opposition was foreseeable. No one was sur-
prised, least of all Truma..'1, when the deluge of denunciations followed 
his announcement of the special session. Dewey, who had carefully ap-
praised the situation, cautiously enunciated that it was "a frightful 
The press, having no reason to temper its statements, 
screamed that the Turnip Session ""as "a cheap political trick," "a la.st 
hysterical gasp of an expiring administration," "a yolitical maneuver 
pure and siriple, '' and "a shoddy partisan trick. 1162 And Joe Eartin, de-
scribed as a politician "equipped with ncthine:; but perseverance," warned, 
"There will be plenty o:L action •. Like the boys at Bunker Hill, we'll 
wait to see the whites of their eyes. 1163 
6011up From Despo.ir," Time, July 26, 1948, p. 14. 
61Hichael Straight, "Turnip Day in '.-lashington," Hew Republic, 
July 26, 1948, p. ?. 
62 Excerpts from Editorial Comments, New York Times, July 16, 1948. 
63Robert Allen and William Shannon, Tru!7ian }'.erry-Go-?oun£ (New York: 
Vanguard Press, 1950)~ p. 186; and "The Turnip Day .Session," :;:'ime, July 26~ 
1948, p. 15. 
But while the opposition raged and the members of bis own party 
fretted about the outcome of his audacious ~ove, Truman, ensconced safe-
\ ly in the White House, chortled delightedly at the storm he had created. 
'· 
"I called a special session of the Congress, 0 wrote the President in his 
diary. "My, how the opposition screams. I'm going to make them rr.eet 
their platform promises before the election.•! And the- next day, even 
more }ileased by the reaction, he wrote, ":Sditorials, columns and car-
toons are gasping and wondering. None of the s~art folks thought I would 
call the Congress ••• I don't believe the USA wants any more fakers ••• so 
I'm going to make a common sense intellectually honest campaign. It will 
b lt d . t · 11 . 1164 e a nave y--an, i wi win. 
He was not alone, however. Another man, equally delighted and un-
perturbed by the fm·or, was Clark Clifford. Truman's handsome assistant, 
who had been informed of the move 24 hours prior to the announcement, 
approved the.Presidential gambit. Said Clifford, "We've got our backs 
on our own .20-yard line with a minute to play; it has to be razzle-dazzle" 
all the way.65 And what could be more "razzle-dazzle" than the Turnip 
Session? "Not since 1856 had a President called back Congress in an elec-
66 
tion year." 
Admittedly a political move, the action of the President neverthe-
less succeeded in drawing attention to his cmnpaign target, the E:Lght-
ieth Congress. It was a "brilliant maneuver," placing the Republicans 
64 Hargaret Truman, pp. 14-15. 
651'But Truman Rides Again," Newsweek, July 26, 1948, P• 21. 
6611The Turnip Day Session,"~' July 26, 1948, p. 14. 
' 
squarely on the line of fire. It focused attention on tssues--housing, 
inflation, and civil rights--important to Americans and calculated to 
arouse their ire. The GOP had to produce effective legislation in order 
to win the confi'1ence of the Americ£.n public. "In 1948 A:nericans were 
alert and politically wise," consequently it bf'hooved "both parties in 
the special session to subordinate politics to service on behalf of 
G...., 
America's needs." r The problem of the GOP was real. How were t!l.ey go-
ing to do it ;~.thout helpine Truman? 
If they adjourned the session as soon as it net--which some Repub-
licans advocated--the GOP w·ould be considered too negative. If the party 
passed constructive legislation Truman would get the credit. "Only one 
r~sponse rer!l.ained: listen to Truman's demands, denounce the!!! as polit-
ically inspired, enact a fe• . ., neasures to coi.lbat prices, and go home as 
"bl 1168 soon as possi e. This they did. 
Angered and frustrated by their position, however, the GOF contin-
ued to rail against ·+ l.v • 11vir. Truman challenged Congress to accomplish 
in 15 days what the Democratic Party had failed to do in 15 years," said 
Representative George H. Bender of Ohio. "Now of course our President 
did not believe this would be done. 1169 (This was true.) "He is a realis-
tic politician, and he is playing what some people mistakenly believe to 
b t l •t. ,.70 o smar po 1 ics. · (This was false. It \·;as sn:art politics.) 
67Michael Straight, P• 7o 
68 ( James T. Patterson, Hr. Re~ub1ican Bosten: Houghton Hifflin, 19?2), 
P• 420. 
69George H. Bender, in Appendix to the Congressional Record, August 7, 
1948, P• A5285. 
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Eleanor Roosevelt, less inpr1Jssed by the histrionics ·of the sit-
uation, d~fended Truman's decision to ca-.ii .... the s ci· J · .• pe a._ sessJ..on. She 
stated that it was unimportant whether he recalled Cong~ess for poli-
tical motives or not. Work had been left undone, and this was impor-
tant. Said Hrs. Roosevelt, "It must have taken courage for the Presi-
dent to appear before this Republican-doffiinated Congress in person ••• So, 
it would seem that he r~ally has a sense that certain things are of para-
71 mount .importance--important enough to tell them to Congress face to face." 
The two-week session proved fruitless. The only constructive pi8ce 
of legislation to pass Coneress was a $65 million loan for the construe-
tion of the JN building and "some curbs on consumer and bank credit." 
1-ile reluctant "turnip planters" deliberately blocked all other effective 
legislation. Their attitude was typified by Herbert Brownell, Jr., when 
he said: "The Republicar; platform calls for the enactment of a program 
by a Republican Congress under the leadership of a Republican Presidento 
0 h b d t . 1172 bviously t is cannot e one a a rump session •••• He should have 
added, and won't be done at a rump session. 
By deliberately bringing up the issues of anti-poll tax, anti-
lynching and anti-discrimination, the GOP hoped to provoke a filibuster 
by Southern Democrats which would distract attention from Truman's de-
r.ia:nds on Ccngress and sow dissension in the Democratic ra.nks. 73 They 
7111 1 · u · · t · El R lt · ~ di· +o tl e Con 1'e vin _rice, ci ing er .... 1or ooseve , in r•nuen x " i -
gressional Record, August 4, 1948, p. A4842. 
7211Session Strategy," Newsweek, August 2, 1948, P• 16. 
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succeeded. Newsweek, which de.scribed the !.'ilibuster as the strangest in 
history, said "There was no ranting, no raving, no horseplay, no preach-
. h"t 1174 ing on w i e supremacy. However, the renarks entered in the Congr~-
sional Record cler.irly reveal the issue of ''white supremacy," and demon-
strate the unreasonable fears, unabashed bigotr~r and ignorance of the 
members of Congress. ':'he following remarks T.ade by William Lewis of Ken-
tucky sadly testify to the existing discrimination~ Here are his words: 
I have absolutely no prejudice against the Negro race ••• but 
I am opposed to Negro children CJld white children attending the 
same schools, using the same playgrounds and recreational centers. 
The succeeding pathetic remark warrants no comment. Lewis con-
tinued: 
In traveling by train I believe the Negroes should ride, sleep, 
and eat in separate coaches'from the white peopl~. Imagine, if 
you please, a colored ~an sleeping in a lower berth in t~e same 
coach just opposite a white woman in easy ar:!1 1 S reach of each '7c; 
other. Does not such tend to encourage amalgamation of the races?'--' 
And Representative ':l.:·f. ifneeler of Georgia had this to say about 
the civil rights program: 
In spite of all the hypocritical statements to the contrary, 
there is no gainsaying the fact that the pushing of the civil-
rights prog:rar.1 has and will continue to hurt the Negro in this 
country. The Negroes themselves do not want the civil-rights 
program.76 
By what circuitous path Wheeler arrived at this conclusion is un-
known. But what is known is that the Southerners knew they could curb 
7411Pardon Ey Filibuster," Newsweek, August 9, 1948, P• 17. 
75William Lewis, in the Appendix to t!?.e Congressiona.l Record, 
August 5, 1948, p. 4887. 
?6w·11· ·n 1 · th A d" t th Congressional Record, i _iam ~nee er, in e ppen ix o e • 
August 6, 1948, p. A4974. 
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any legislation on civil rights during the ':\ll'nip Session, and did. 
Truman himself had forew.s.rned the nation that the Republicans 
would do nothing, but he had insisted he was going to call their "bluff.'' 
He justified his stance by saying the American people should be '.?lade 
aware of the Republicans' calloused indifference to their needs.77 The 
methods employed by the GOP at the Turni~ Session verified Truman's po-
sition. As far as the President was concerned, the specia.l session had 
exceeded his expectations. After Congress adjourned, he took the occa-
sion to denounce it as the "worst" Congress ever assembled. His weapon 
for the forthcoming campaign had been effectively honed. 
On Saturday, July 17, the States' Rights convention was held at 
Birmingham, Alabama. But it was a divided South that struggled for po-
litical realignment. With the exception of the Alabama, Mississippi and 
South Carolina contingent who had bolted from the De~ocratic National Con-
vention in Philadelphia, the delegates were cor:ipo.sed primarily of "po-
litical outs and political has-beens. 1178 In fact, the absence of the 
most important Southern leaders like Herman Talmadge of Geore;ia, Gover-
nor Ben Laney of A:rkansas and Senator Byrd of Virginia, to name a few, 
was noticeable. 
. The defection of the Southern delegates from the Philadelphia con-
vention was viewed with sorrow by many in the South. According to Jules 
Abels, the Atlanta Journal r.iourned the split in the party over an issue 
77 'T'ruman '· v · ... I 208 _ ~e~oirs, i , •• 
7B,'Tumult in Dixie," Time, July 26, 1948, P• 15. 
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which they felt could have easily been adjusted .. 79 'Even within the three 
states of Alabama, Hississi:ppi and South Carolina, factions were fishting 
for control. Only in Hississippi were the majority for the break. In 
Alabama and South Carolina a considerable nunber opposed the rift. And 
from the states of Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, 
Texas, and Louisiana, there was little or no official representation at 
B. • ham 80 irming • 
Nevertheless, what the rebellious delege.tes lacked in political 
prestige, they r:iade up for in unbridled enthusiasm. Congregating in Bir-
mingham's red-brick municipal auditorium for their one day convention, 
the Dixiecrats shouted rebel yells and snake-danced under a portrait of 
Robert E. Lee. The spectacle warmed the cockles of "Alfalfa :Sill" ~·~ur-
ray's heart. Sitting in the front row of the convention hall, Oklahoma. 1 s 
"doddering" ex-Gmrernor proudly proclaimed, "I'm the man who introduced 
Jim Crow in Oklahoma. ,,8.l 
The k~ynote address was delivered by the for~er Governor of Ala-
bama, Frank M. Dixon. His message, cloaked in typical Southern rhetor.tc, 
was greeted with tumultuous ap:;;lause. Ct-stigating the civil rights pro-
gram of the Democratic Party, 
the attempt to mongrelize our 
Dixon challenged: 
82 people." 
790 + :- t" 'U"" 0.L ..1.~·e Jaws of Victorv C:·rew York: 
"':'he South will fight 
Henry ~olt, 1959), P• 960 
8011Two Party Headway in South," U.S. News, July 30, 1948, P• 22. 
8111Tu.mult in Dixie, 11 p. 15. 
8211war Between the Democrats, 11 Newsweek, ,July 26, 1948, P• 21. 
Longing to believe they could turn back the clock of time, the 
delegates screamed in a frenzy of wild hope, "'.-Je want Dixon, 11 "Dixie 
wants Dixon," and "To hell with Truman." The demonstration lasted for 
twenty minutes. Then the Dixicrats unanir.ious1y chose Go,rernor J. Strom 
04 ';l.• 
Thurmond of South Carolina for President and Governor Fielding L. Wright 
of Mississippi for the vice-president. The two standard-bearers adopted 
for their platform the declaration: "We stand for the segregation of the 
d th . 1 . t . t f h ,,83 races an 1e racia in egri yo eac race.· 
Suffering from no illusions that they would win, the Dixiecrats 
sought only to keep the South's electoral votes from going to Truman or 
Dewey. They reasoned that if no presidential candidate received the ma-
~ority of votes required to win, the election would then be thrown into 
the House of Re1)resentatives where the South would hold the balance of 
811. 
power. In this event, Thurmond might have a chance. "As Senator James 
Eastland of Mississippi expressed it, 'I'Torthern Democrats would still pre-
fer a Southern Democrat to a Rapublica.n, and Republicans would prefer a 
s-
Southern Democrat to a Northern one.'" ::J Furtherr!'lore, the South would 
be able to "barter for legislation to help them maintain the old way of 
11 . "86 ving •••• :Emile B. Ader contended, "The plan was far-fetched but not 
impossible of implementation. 1187 However, most agreed their chances for 
achieving this goal were remote. 
82 "War Between the De:nocrais," Newsweek, July 26, 1948, P• 21. 
84Emile Ader, 11\fny th~ Dixicrats Failed," The Journal of Politics, 
August, 1953t P• 357. 
86 "Two Party Headway," p. 2?... 87Ader, P• 357. 
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CRAFTER VI 
THIRD F A...T?rY CrL4.LL::::.NGE 
WALLACE--SAUL OR PAUL? 
Henry Agard ':Jallace was, and still remains, a conundrum. The ex-
vice-president and leader of the Progressive Party was viewed by some 
as a prophet of freedom and by others as a misguided zealot for commu-
nist ideology. ':lallace nevertheless had a substantial following during 
the 1944 Democratic Convention. So much so, in fact, he nearly captured 
the prize which would have sent him to the White House in 1945 instead 
of Harry S. Truman. According to :·'.a.rgaret Tru.rnan, 'fallace' s popularity 
was so evident that "Zven the convention hall organist capitulated to 
the ';fallace crowd and played 'Iowa, That's '.!here the ':'all Corn Grows,' 
the Iowa state song, so many times that it's a wonder his fingers didn't 
1 sprout kernels." In spite of the gallery's enthusiasm for ',fallace, 
the final count was 1031 for Truman and 105 for '}allace. The fight had 
been a difficult one. On the first ballot the count for ':lallace was 
429!'2 and 319;/2 for Truman. Judging from the pandemoniun in the convention 
hall, Truman's victory had not teen easily attained. The ultimate re-
sult, however, was not just a new vice-president but the alienation of 
a former New Dealer. Wallace was deeply resentful that he had bP.en re-
.moved as ?.D.R.'s successor. The disavowal gave impetus to his crusade 
~garet Truman, Harry s. ':'ruman (New York: William Mor?'ow and 
Company, 1973), P• 178. 
which some felt was not so much a conquering as a punitive expedition.2 
Karl M. Schmidt gives the following reasons for Wallace's defeat ... 
The party bosses--the machines, and the conservatives of the 
South could not stand Hr •. './allace who in the popular mind em-
bodied the New Deal and racial equality. So they turned to 
the colorless Truman who has never upset anyone's prejudices. 3 
There is a modicum of truth in Schmidt's statement. Wallace did 
disaffect the South by his insistence on racial equality, but so did Tru-
man as evidenced by the formation of the Dixiecrats. ~he party bosses--
Edward J. Kelley, :Sdward J. Flynn, Edwin W. Pauley, George Allen, Frank 
'llalker and Robert Ha.rinegan--did repudiate Wallace, but again for reasons 
consistent with their idea of freedom. But Schmidt would have been wiser 
in using an adjective for Truman other than "colorless'' because this was 
one appellation that definitely 'did not fit the man. 
The few biographies written about 1·/allace have been penned by men 
who felt an affinity for the "crusader'' and consequently have rationalized 
away every flaw and defect in the man and in his inability to head a sue-
cessful campaign. \411.ereby, some of the factors attributed to his defeat 
are rapidly acceytable, others have an aura of unreality about them. On 
the other hand, the press frequently veered in the opposite direction and 
castigated the man unmercifully. But it is interesting to note .that 
21•/illiam Harlan Hale, "';/hat !fakes 'dallace Run?, 11 Harper's, March, 
1948, P• 242. 
*Schmidt, a devotee of Wallace's and a one time leader of a stu-
dent group at Colgate University, New York, for "Republicans for 'dallace," 
is an admittedly biased witness. 
3.. A. ' ' 11 • • t · C d 1048 ( N Y k henr . • ·ia. ace. · uixo ic rusa e _, 1 ew or : 
~~--~~~-....------,.--------~----~--------~ versity Press, 1960 , p. 4. 
Syracuse Uni-
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whether they were for or against him, all writers seemed to exempt Wallace 
from any but the purest motives in his projected plans for America. Per-
haps if '.:fallace had not had a penchant for quoting from the 3ible people 
would have been less ambiguous in their evaluation of him and not quite so 
awed by this supernatural interest. 
There seems to exist a generally accented view that ·dallace was 
totally selfless in his approach to politics; that he exuded a prophet-
ical, Jeremiah-like message from God. "Like Sa.int Paul after ::::lamascus 
it became an obsession. with him to preach the gos~el of peace and good-
will to all men. He was a man driven by conscience and conviction, so 
much so that his concern for :::iolitical realities was often obscured by, 
the cause itself ••• ':lallace was a paragon of virtue. 114 !{e is :?Ortrayed 
as quixotic yet sincere, Christian but naive. Perhaps this is true. 
However, one might rightfully question the altruistic motives L~puted to 
Wallace. After all, being able to quote fror.i the Bible does not automa-
tically transform an individual into a Christian. !-!any a dedicated apes-
tle of retribution has been well-versed in the Eosaic law. Is it not 
possible that under a missionary type of zeal, 'lallace attempted to foist 
his will onto an unwilling populace under the mistaken notion that his 
way was the right w3.y? To anthropomorphize Ghrist and his teachings is 
no·t new. Wallace's statement, "I believe in God, I believe in progres-
sive capitalism, 115 raises the qu1?stion, which God? and what form of cap-
italism? Rather than proclaiming himself the messiah and rejoicing in 
4Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Prophet in Politics (Io• . ;a: 
Iowa State University, 1970), p. 163. 
5schmidt, p. 45. 
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the eggs thrown at his head while campaigning, it '.•muld be more to the 
point to mention his intolerance of the four C's! communism, Catholicism,* 
capitalism and colonialism.6 Furthermore, since he was aligned in philo-
sophical theory with many of his contem::_:ioraries, would it not have been 
possible to contribute to the betterment of the nation by working within 
the system? He knew he was doomed to failure if he formed a third party. 
Hence why continue on a course which could only sow discord and confusion? 
Was it for the purpose of self-aggrandizement and stubborn adherence to 
his own ideas? Or was it to voice an alternative to the foreign policy 
of the United States? 
The creation of a third party had apparently been festering in the 
minds of a number of people and organizations for a long time. Vito ~fare-
antonio claims to have seen the need for a devil's advocate in the Amer-
ican political structure since the thirties. He had hoped for a Farmer-
Labor party to contend with the Democrats and Republicans in 1940. By 
1946 he viewed the creation of a third party as a 11political necessity" 
since there appeared to be no difference between the major parties.7 
Eugene Dennis was another advocate of a third party in America. 
Speaking at a meeting of the Communist Party in 1945 he said, "The 
American people must have an alternative to the two-party strait-jacket; 
*There see~s to be disagree~ent on this ~oint of· intolerance. Accord-
ing to an article in ':'ime ';/allace thought of becoming a Catholic before 
he joined the Episcopal Church. 
6schrnidt, p. 48. 
?Alan Schaffer, Vito Marcantonio (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1966), p. 182. 
they must be in a position to have a choice in 1948 other than between 
8 a Truman and a Dewey or a Vandenberg." He saw the basis of the third 
party in the blacks, labor unions and progressives such as Wallace. 
While the climate for innovation was being created by such r:ien as 
Marcantonio and Dennis, 'dallace himself still remained within the ranks 
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of the Democratic Party. Although he had lost the vice-presidential elec-
tion he nevertheless received the appointment as Secretary of Commerce*--
albeit with some of the authority taken away. Curtis MacDougall, claims 
Wallace received the nomination because of his loyalty to F.D.R. "Grace 
Tully and Samuel Rosenman have opined that getting Jesse Jones out of the 
cabinet was more in Roosevelt's mind than getting Henry \/allace in; the 
reason being that F.D.R. was convinced ••• Jones opposed his third and fourth 
terms. 119 In any event, \lallace still maintained a position of some impor-
tance in the vortex of political life. 
However, on September 12, 1946, Wallace gave a speech at Ea.dison 
Square Garden in which he denounced U.S. foreign policy. (The speech had 
been read and approved by Truman.) The repercussions were swift and level-
ing. Actually, by the standards of 1974, the speech was mild. But in the 
light of Russia's aggressive actions in the forties the speech was consid-
8David Shannon, The Decline of American Cor::munism (New York: Har-
court, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 114. 
*',Jallace' s confirmation as Secretary of Commerce passed only be-
cause of a com:?romise. The Federal Loan Administration was r~::ioved from 
the Commerce Department jurisdiction. Fred Vinson was appointed and con-
firr:ied as the new ?ederal Loan Administrator thereby stripping ·.1allace 
of authority over lending agencies. 
9Gideon's Arrn;y:, 2 vols. (New York: Marzailin and Munsell, 1965), I, 
12. 
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ered unpatriotic and uncalled fer. Here are c:t few excerpts from the talk: 
(Domestic issue) 
First we have prejudice, hatred, fear and ignorance of cer-
tain races. The recent mass lynching in Georsja was not merely 
the most unwarranted brutal act of mob violence in the United 
States in recent years; it was also an illustration of the k~nd 
of prejudice that makes war inevitable. 
(Foreign issue) 
We most earnestly '.vant peace with lbssia ••• but we want to be 
met halfway. 'Je want cooperation. And I believe that we can 
get cooperation once Russia understands that our prir.:ary objec~ 
tive is neither saving the British l'~mpire nor :purchasing oil in 
the Near East with the lives of American soldiers. 
But whether we like it or not, the Jussians will try to social-
ize their sphere of influence ••• 10 
The really unfortunate part of ':lallace' s speech was the timing. 
Secretary of State James Byrnes was in Faris attempting to outline Amer-
ica' s position in foreign affr.irs. The speech did not agree with U.S. 
policy hence it placed Byrnes in an untenable position. The Secretary 
of State was staggered by the implications of 1:/allace' s speech and ren-
dered an ultimatilm to Truman. Apparently it was an either-or threat. 
Wallace resigned. According to Truman in his r-:emoirs, Byrnes offered to 
resign if it would help Truman in his policies. However, Tr~~an responded 
by telling "Byrnes he was doing an excellent job and that he would continue 
t t h . 1111 o suppor im. 
It was foreien policy then, not domestic issues, that caused the 
permanent rupture between 1.fallace and his former colleagues. He moved 
to a farm in New York after his dismissal where he eagerly plunged back 
into scientific farming and journalism. His dissident views ~·ere to con-
10 MacDougall, pp. 65-66. 
11 ( Harry s. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1956), 559. 
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tinue reaching the :public as ne took over the editorship of the New Re-
public. Here he was able to express himself unfettered by the annoying 
shackles of diplomatic protocol. 
Typical of his editorials was one which appeared in the i''ebruary 
1947 issue. In this article Wallace castigated the United States for its 
unwillingness to share atomic secrets. "What one fool can do, another 
can ••• We can realize that we never had a secret, or if we did have one 
temporarily, it is no longer ours." Though time was certainly to prove 
Wallace correct when he said, "we are clutching ••• a secret that is not a 
12 secret," nevertheless his pharisaical air i~ked Congress. In August of 
1948, when Wallace was actively running for the presidency, Norris Poulson 
of California stated in simple terms the antagonism register~d towards 
Wallace's attitude. He said, "Candidate Wallace talks about peace with 
Russia as if he and his followers are the only ones who are for it. 1113 
Perhaps this attitude more than anything else galled Americans. 
Although the New Renublic doubled in circulation when \Jallace 
joined the staff his interest in the magazine was short-lived. "At this 
stage in his career, Wallace found weekly journalism too confining ••• He 
rarely read through the magazine, took little interest in the editors, 
14 frequently forgot their names." However, his interest in and desire 
fo:r politics had not deserted him. '."/allace automatically gravitated to-
12Henry \'lallace, "Whose Atomic Secret?" New Republic, February 17, 
1947, P• 26. 
l3Norris Poulson, in the Appendix to the Congressional Record, 
August 7, 1948, P• A5220. 
14r . R Th L l" t c . c~ y k rwin .oss, e one ies amoaign. new or : New American Li-
brary, 1968), p. 145. 
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wards the political arena. ~hough a Democrat in name, he was gradually 
surrounded by cb~munist and non-comnunist sympathizers who saw the hero 
they needed in order to form a third party. 
Encouraged by such diverse people as "Beanie" Baldwin, a former mem-
ber of the Departnent of Agriculture; Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary 
of the Interior; Philip Murray, CIO president; Mrs. Anita r~cCormick Blaine, 
daughter of Cyrus McCormick and liberal philanthropist; et al., Wallace 
began to see himself more and more in the role of peace~aker. There 
seems to be little doubt that without the constant support from this 
coterie of enthusiasts (Murray and Ickes withdrew their support) Wal-
lace would not have sought an independent role within the political struc-
ture. 
The PCA, Progressive Citizens of America, was particularly influen-
tial in starting the drive for a third party. The NC-PAC and the ICC-ASP, 
respectively known as the National Citizens Political Action Committee 
and the Inqependent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Pro-
fessions, had merged to form the FCA which in turn eventually became the 
nucleus of the Progressive Party. Unfortunately for Wallace the base of 
the movement became dominated by a hard core of left-wing radicals. The 
strong Communist influence caused many liberals to cut themselves off 
from the group and form one of their own. Thus the ADA came into exis-
tence. 
Unlike the FCA, the Americans for Democratic Action supported the 
two-party system and excluded Communists from their group. ?·:rs. Eleanor 
Roosevelt, ',Jalter Reuther, and Chester Bowles were just a few of the fa-
mous names in this libaral association. Their function was primarily one 
of constructive dissent. Though they disagreed with Truman in many of 
his domestic policies the ADA was nonetheless careful in criticizing 
foreign policy. Like so many others, fear of Communist domination of 
the United St~tes loomed large and horrifying. 
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While the advocates of the third party jockeyed for the support of 
labor leaders and left-wing liberals, 'dallace toured Western Europe mak-
ing a series of condemnatory speeches about United States policy. He 
assailed the Truman Doctrine and fulminated against the stockpiling 
of atomic bombs, insisting they be destroyed. His activities created such 
a furor, Congressman J. Parnell Thomas urged 'i!allace be indicted under 
the Logan Act of 1799 for engaging in activities contrary to the national 
welfare of the United States. Nothing was done about this suggestion. 
~ut even prior to ~:lallace' s departure for Europe it was recorr.mended by 
Forrestal at a Cabinet meeting that Uallace's passport be revoked. Tru-
man objected to the idea and, in fact, extended the ''olive branch" to 
both ~allace and Claude Pepper, the recalcitrant rebels of the Democra-
tic party via a national radio broadcast. 
Senator Claude Pepper's comment to the press concerning Truman's 
overture was as follows: ''The President certainly was right. I have 
been in the Democratic party ••• for a long time and I have no idea of get-
ting out of it. We Democrats differ with each other ••• but we don't leave 
the ancestral home. 1115 
Wallace's comment, however, was as esoteric as usual wt9n he was 
interviewed in London. "I shall be campaigning in 1948 with all my power, 
l5MacDougall, p. 134. · 
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but I will be campaigning for the ideals of the free world and the men 
who best express these ideals. I hope, but I cannot guarantee, that they 
will be on the Democratic ticket. 1116 Once again, we hear the oft re-
peated statement that he was a Democrat and wished to remain one as long 
as the party held itself aloof from corruption and adhered to Christian 
ideals consistent with his world view. Time wm~ld tell if any party was 
pure enough for Henry Agard ',fallace. 
In :.ray, after his return from Europe, 1.fallace toured the United 
States, speaking to nearly a quarter million Americans. His trip was 
sponsored by the New Republic and the PCA. The speaking engagements were 
enormously successful. :'he format, much like his presidential campaign, 
was theatrical, obvious, and entertaining. '.L'he tour served a double pur-
pose. It kept Wallace before the public eye, and what was even more im-
portant to Wallace, it gave him the sounding board he needed to continue 
to harangue the people about the issue of peace. By this time his anti-
war stance had reached such a stage that, "He must paint America's poli-
tical rulers as unrelieved black, thereby letting the opponents of those 
rulers stand out in white. 1117 When asked why he never said anything crit-
ical about Soviet policies, Wallace answered, "He didn't see how by him-
self he could affect Soviet policies ••• But he could affect American pol-
18 ic-ies, ergo, criticism must stay at home." 
According to Jules Abels ',fallace finally admitted in 1949 that the 
16,t D 1, :.ac ouga ..... , P• 134. 
17Hale, p. 247. 
18Ibid. p. 247. 
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Communists had taken over the Progressive Party. It was at this time 
that he severed al1 affiliation with them. But, in spite o:!.' this, he 
still rejected the charges that individuals within his party had commu-
nistic leanings.19 Why the blind spot? No one knows. But he perpet-
uated his self- deceit unflinchingly. "He blar:!ed U.S. Ambassador Laurence 
Steinhardt and U.S. policy for the Corrnnunist coup in Czechoslovakia," and 
referred to Jan Viasaryk' s suicide by casually saying "ifaybe he had cancer ••• 
His way of solving the Berlin crisis was to give Berlin to the Russians. 1120 
And so it went. With such an exaggerated propensity to paint the U.S. 
in Machiavellian tones, it should be no surp1•ise that '.o/allace withdrew 
from the Democratic Party and announced his intention to run for the pres-
idency under the aegis of the New Party.• 
The mixup of \lallace' s formal announcement concerning his candidacy, 
symbolized to a staff writer of the :Jew Re-::ublic the ineptness of the 
Wallace machine. On December 29, 1947, several hours before Wallace's 
radio broadcast, Robert V. Kenny, co-chairman of the PCA, released news 
of Wallace's decision to run hours before ':lallace came on the air. 21 
Though some may see in this first misstep an omen of impending 
l9Jules Abels, Cut of the Jaws of Victorv (New York: Henry Eolt 
and Company, 1959), p. 109. 
2011rowa Hybrid," Time, August 9, 1948, p. 19. 
*"From the first ~fallace h~d called it the 'New Party'. The dele-
gates were asked to approve 'Frocressive Party' and they did so with un-
bridled enthusiasm." ("Behind the Wallace Scenes," Newsweek, August 2, 
1948, P• 18.) 
21Hale, 241 p. • 
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doom, such an interpretation of the event verges on the superstitious. 
Equally careless blunders had been committed by Truman's and Dewey's co-
harts without lasting damage. However, it had been acknowledged by no 
less than Wallace himself that he definitely lacked political acumen. He 
was just not interested in political organization and was willing to leave 
all party r.:aneuvering to chance, his friends, or even to stranr;ers. 22 His 
eye was always cast on some rr:ystical horizon. Consequently, it was in 
keeping with his personality when he concluded his opening address for 
the presidency in the following terms. 
We have assembled a Gideon's Army, Enall in n~~ber, power-
ful in conviction, ready for action. We have said 'vith Gideon, 
"Let those who are fearful and trembling depart." For every 
fearful one who leaves, there will be a thousand to take his 
place. A just cause is worth a hundred armies. ·-1e fac~ the 
future unfettered, unfettered by any principle but the general 
welfare. 'de owe no allegiance to any e;roup which does not 
serve that welfare. By God's grace, the people's peace will 
usher in the century of the common man. 23 
As might have been expected, the reactions to 1.fallace' s announce-
ment varied from the critical, to the delighted, to the indifferent. The 
dominant opinion was that 1fallace' s candidacy would split the Democratic 
vote and thereby ensure a Republican victory. Others felt it would spell 
defeat for liberal legislative objectives. David Lawrence, a nationally 
known columnist said the action ·.-1as "relatively inconsequential in a po-
litical sense," and warned, "Repu'blicans \vho think it is going to draw 
any large nUr.1ber of Democratic votes from Truman may be exulting a bit 
pre~aturely!124 President Truman made no comment at all. Gideon's army 
22sc~~idt, P• 52. 
23"! Shall Run in 1948," Vital Speeches, January 1, 1948, p. 173. 
2\acDougall, II., 283. 
107 
was on the march. 
Once the wheels of the New Party had been set in motion, attention 
was immediately focused on the choice of a vice-presidential candidate. 
The selection of a running mate for ~allace was restricted for a nu~ber 
of reasons. Since no one expected ':/allace to win, few men of promi-
nence were willing to jeopardize their careers for a one night stand. 
Although Senator Claude .Pepper's name had been bandied about as a pro-
spective candidate this avenue was autor.iatically closed when he refused 
to leave the Democratic Party. It has been intimated that his wife had 
t d 1 t d •th h' d . . 25 a grea ea o o wi is ecision. 
O. John Rooge, a lawyer from New York, was not seriously considered 
for the position even though he wanted it because he was from the sal!ie 
state as Wallace. Further!".lore, he was not well-known. And apparently, 
Dr. Rexford Guy Tugwell, onetime Roosevelt brain-truster, was disqualified 
before he could shake his silver-haired head no. It was Glen Taylor they 
wished to pocket for the job. He had see~inely always been the party's 
choice for filling the vice-presidential slot. 26 
Taylor appears a somewhat tragic figure in this crusade for "peac<c.·, 
prosperity, and freedom." Unlike ',fallace he had !:ad few advantages in 
life. Neither education nor money had been doled out to him. At fifteen, 
the sum total of his formal education had come to an e~1d. For years after 
that Glen Taylor's life consiste1 of a series of b0okin3s in cheap theatre$. 
This is where he gained the title "singing cowboy." Frequently he slept 
in a truck and ate jack rabbit for dinner. And all the while he lived 
25MacDougall, II, 307. 
26Schmidt, PP• 41-42. 
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this itinerant existence, he read and studied. With his background of 
experience it should not be surprising that his political philosophy 
coincided with the ?Iew Deal. He was a man of the depression era who had 
known Guffering and out of his suffering arrived at a liberal point of 
view comparable to ':lallace' s. But the road which led him to this quixotic 
partnership was long, twisting and diverse. And the car.ipaign of 1948 was 
for him his swan song in political life. 1fallace could afford to be chiv-
alrous, Taylor could not. 
Taylor's entry into politics was a direct result of his theatrical 
experiences. Having witnessed a gubernatorial campaign he decided politi-
cians and actors had a lot in common. "He reasoned, 'They're little rr.ore 
than amateurs who spend only part of their time before audie~ces. Hhy 
shouldn't I, a full-time professional performer, be able to do as good 
or better a job? 11127 ':lhether his reasoning was correct is inconsequen-
tial. The important point is that he acted on his assumption. 
It took him from 1938 to 1944 to win an election. Since he accom-
plished the feat without benefit of help from the Democratic Party in 
Idaho, he operated as an individual agent. ~aylor felt no compunction to 
curry favor. His voting record was almost unanimous in SU!Jport of New 
Deal measures. It had been estimated that he voted "pro-Administration" 
ninety-four !Jercent of the time.
28 
Although the high percentage of votes cast for Democratic legisla-
tion would indicate an almost slavish loyalty to the party, apparently 
27Schmidt, P• 57. 
28 MacDougall, II, 308. 
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the opposite was true. The r.>mator sincerely felt the Democratic Party 
was the party of the ~eople. However, as the Truman era and the entrance 
into the cold war became a reality Taylor decided the United States was 
becoming a militaristic nation and like 1.-lallace defected from a politi-
cal machine which he thought was wrong. His decision to e.ccept the vice-
presidential candidacy, nevertheless, had not been an easy choice for him 
to r.iake. It meant political suicide. As he hiriself admitted, his sena-
torial position had been the best job he had ever had. Yet, in spite of 
the danger to his career he joined ';/allace' s third party and started on 
the disastrous road to oblivion. 
Thus, two men, like-minded in their political views, yet diametric-
ally opposed in their personaJities and background, forged a New Party 
for a better·world. "The difference," according to Helen ?uller of the 
New Renublic was, "that '.!allace Progressives demand the better world right 
now; the :Jemocrats will settle for getting it soon; the Republicans think 
they had it twenty years ago; the Dixiecrats want just what they had a 
20 
full century back." ,. Armed with belief in a "better world" and coupled 
with the moral conviction of t!'leir rightness, '..fallace and ':.1aylor plunged 
ahead into theiY- c<:rr:;aicn :'or peace. 
One of the irii'iediate problems confronting the Hew Party was the mat-
ter of getting on the ballots of the forty-eig:r..t states. In order to r;:i..ve 
the American people a "choice," the org:rnizational footwork had to be com-
pleted before the filing deadlines which varied from state tc state. The 
work involved in accomplishing this task ranged from the heroic to the 
29Helen Fuller, "For a Better World Right Now," New Ret)ublic, 
August 2, 1948, pp. 11-13. 
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absurd. The legal requirements in so~e states created an almost insur-
mountable obstacle. i~ore than one state required nor,inating petitions; 
others required nomination by convention; some required only formal organ-
ization and filing of a slate of electors; and in South Carolina the only 
requirement was to print and distribute ballots at the polling places. 
These various legol barriers, added to the pressure of forming a third 
party organizational structure in some states, complicated matters for 
Wallace. 
New York a."ld California, however, were exceptions. Due to Vito 
Marcantonio' s American Labor Party 1.lallace was assured of having his 
name appear on the ballot in New York. And California had been delivered 
to Wallace with the help of Hugh Bryson a..'1.d other active groups who got. 
15,000 more valid signatures than were necessary. In r:ebraska, on the 
other hand, his partisans failed to meet the requirements. All that was 
needed was that 750 delegates sign a new party filing petition. Apparently 
devotion to the cause was lacking because only 283 delegates showed up. 
The Wallaceites lost Nebraska by de.fault. However, it would be unfair 
to consider Nebraska the norr.i. In the majority of cases the r'iew Party 
encountered unreasonable opposition, if not outright hostility. In 
Illinois, Oklahoma and Ohio* the attempts made to keep ':Jallace off the 
ballot verged on the extreme. The fear of co~~unist infiltration in gov-
ernnent introduced bizarre elements into the struegle. In some instances, 
petition solicitors were stopped by the police and searched. 30 The press 
*In Ohio the Progressive electors were on the ballot without party 
designation. Citizens were required to make 25 ~·s to cast a vote for 
Wallace. '.L'hus Ohio was rigged so that it would be almost impossible for 
Wallace to win. 
30~Ia.cDougall, II, 436. 
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bombarded the public with the ''Red" menace and occasionally the ',fallaceites 
were beaten. In spite of this antagonism the third party managed to get 
on the ballot of forty-five states•--the party did not qualify in Illinois, 
Oklahoma and Nebraska.31 
An interesting aside in the battle of the ballots was the mutual 
aid extended between the Dixiecrats and the Progressives. Although the 
two parties were totally opposed in their civil rights views they were 
forced to accommodate one another in order to get on the ballot and crip-
ple the Democratic Party. A mutual foe had caused two alien factions to 
join hands. 
In order to conduct a nationwide campaign it takes more than enthu-
slasm and getting on the ballot, it takes noney. From the very beginning, 
this problem did not cause any major obstacle to \fallace' s campaign. Not 
only did he have the financial assistance of many well-heeled friends*•--
Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Dan S. Gilmore, Lillian Hellman and, of course, 
Mrs. Anita ~:cCornick Blaine, to m.me just a few--he amassed large contri-
butions from fund raising techniques employed at ~olitical rallies. Re-
porters were aghast at the tactics so blatantly used to enlarge the r{ew 
Party treasury. According to eye witness reports, the rallies resembled 
an old time revival rieeting. Newsoen were "dazzled by the willingness of 
3l!IT"; ~ T'LJ ;1 •T ' >.T b 1 1 c49- ,,,.. nunn"""ng own, .. ewsweeK, i~overi er , ... ; ·~, P• _o. 
*There is a discrepancy on the number of states on which Wallace's 
name Rppeared. Some authors list only 44 states in their final tally. 
**It is interesting to note that ·.fallace contributed only $1,000 
to the campait;n in Sr1ite of the fact that he was independently wealthy. 
(Schmidt, P• 158.) 
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crowds not only to pay admission to hear ~'/allace but to empty their pock-
ets for his cause once they were inside the hal1. 1132 
William Gailmort • "A sUC>.ve, fast-talking Neiv Yorker who had been 
an Ort~1odox rabbi before becoming a radio cor:ir:ientatort 1133 was primarily 
responsible for the successful financing of the party. The road shows 
followed a regular forr:iat. ?irst there was the invocation, the singing 
of the national anthem, the warm-up speeches generally followed by a fa-
mous entertainer like Paul Robesont and then Bill Gailmor, show-man par 
excellence. According to Cabell Phillips, Gailr:ior was a master pitchman. 
He had the ability to work the crowd into a frenzy of devotion and then 
34 climaxed his appeal by asking for money. The following excerpt is 
typical of Gailmor's oratorical a9proach: 
Show :ienry ·./al lace, who's waiting just behind that door there 
to come out and talk to you, that :;·ou ar~ really behind hir.i. 
Everybody reach into your pocket and pocketbook and ~mll out 
a dollar bill. Just a plain dolb.r bill. Just a plain ordinary 
buck that you might spend for a beer on the way hor.ie tonight. 
Wave it in the air so we can see it. ~hat's the stuff! ?ine! 
3-e-everybody! ••• Okay, ushers, grab 'em quick before they change 
their minds ••• ! 1135 
32Irwin rtoss, ':'he Loneliest Camnaip;n (New Yqrk: New American 
Library, 1968), p. 154. 
•
1:/illiam ~-'.are;olis, later known as ':lilliam Gail!'llor, had been a rabbi 
until a com:mlsive neurosis drove him to seek medical treat.r.1ent. He stole 
c8:!'s and drove th.er:: at brealrneck speed. When he was arrested, instead 
of a jail sentence, he sought medical hel:p. After the 1943 ca:npaign he 
wrote a column on r.iental hygiene for the New York D,,.ily Corrcass. OfacDou-
gall, II, 380.) 
33 4 Ross, p. 15 • 
34The Tru!:ian Presidency (New York: EacHillan Company, 1966)t p. 204. 
35Ma.cDougall, II, 379. 
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As carnival-like as these proceedings may have appeared they were 
highly suc!;essful judging from the final figures in tI'.e party treasury. 
On October 22, 19lt8, the :Jew York ~i:-:~es stated t:rn.t thG Progressive ?arty 
was in the red. However, on the following day in the same paper, Ralph 
Shikes, 'lal1ace's public relations director, stated, "The ':/ashington 
writers apparently obtained their result by subtracting the $772,607 
in contributfons listed by the ·:allace forces from the listed Sl,092,377 
in expenditures to October 18. They had overlooked, he said, a third fig-
ure reported to the Clerk of the House of Representatives ••• S327,295 
listed as 'refund on expenditures.' i:r. Shikes said that money raised at 
public meetings from ticket sales and general collections was not included 
hl the contributions re:9ort, but as 'refunds' againnt the expenses neet-
ings. 1136 ThuG the Fart:r was not in the "red" but clearly free of all debt. 
And according to Table 2 :i.n the a?pendi.x in Schmidt's ·:Juixotic Grusade 
there was a sci.rplus of 520,176.58 at the end of the 1943 car.rpaign. 
Not everyone faired this well. In the same edition of the iiew York 
Times, the CIO's ?o1itical Action Comnittee adr.itted they were S?l,788 in 
the red. The PAC was backing Trurr,an. 
Clearly, finances did not har.1:!Jer the ':/allace party. The "naid-ad-
missicn, Yoluntary-contribution rally11 rernained in use to the end of the 
cn.mpa:i.f:n so successf1.;.l wc:-;.s it in soJ i:itinr; r::oney. 
11'lhen the old parties rot, tr'e people have a right to be heard throui:;h 
a New Party."37 Thus spoke ':lallace in explaininr, his rationale for ere-
36r~ews itef'E in the :\ew York 'I':'..'.:'es, October 23 and 24, 1948. 
37,,I Shall Run in 1948," Vital Sneo.c':es, <Tanu3.ry 1, 1948, p. 173. 
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ating a third party. And on another occasion he said, ''The basic politi-
cal reality in the united States today is one-party rule. ~here is no 
real difference between the Der.iocratic and Republican parties on the im-
portant issues confronting the American people. 1138 Whether t:lis was an 
outgrowth of his thinking or a deliberate device used to advance his po-
litical views is uncertain, but it was the basis of his strategy used in 
his campaigns. 39 How accurate was ';/allace's cor.r0arison 'Jetween the Pro-
gressives and the Democrats? 'fore the distinctions as clear as he be-
lieved or was ':lallace merely engaging in verbal brickbats? 
According to a July article in the New Rermblic, the program of the 
New Party on domestic issues was on record for, "the comrilete abolition 
of segregation and discrimin&~ion; continued price support for farmers; 
broadened social security ••• and the nationalization cf the railroads and 
aircraft industry. 1140 On the international scene the platform could be 
capsulized by saying the U.S. would adopt an attitude of friendship toward 
the Soviet Union. 
The unfortunate part of ~.lallace' s domestic program was that it did 
not differ from the Democrats in any substantial way save for nationali-
zation of industries. In fact, the civil rights issue had become impor-
tant to all the parties, whether they wanted it to or not. That 'Jallace 
chose it as a dramatic political [ambit, declaring himself the father of 
3SHenry A. '.:!allace, 11':/hy a Third Party in 1948?" Annali:: of the Am~~r­
ican Academy, Se:i'tember, 1948, p. 10. 
39Roy V. Peel, "'I'he 1948 Preconvention Campaign," Ibid., P• 78. 
4o,'The New Party's Future," New Renublic, July 26, 1948, P• 18. 
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humaneness, caused skepticism in his opponents. 
In September, 1948, iforroan Thor.ias delivered a s:peech in Buffalo, 
New York, in whic!'l he said, "I !'!'lust confess also to an excusable irri-
tation at reading Henry ·:lallace' s boasts that he, a Presidential candi-
date, for the first time ••• held non-see:;regated r:ieetings in a political 
campaign in the South. ':le Socio.lists have repeatedly done that very 
thing without, perhaps unfortunately, tb.e publicity :'.r. ',/allace h'ls re-
ceived. 1141 
Norman Thomas, however, was not alone in his disdain for the bib-
lical firebrand. Jules Abels relates a story.which took place in the 
ifashington National Airport. Georee ':leaver, a black, h3.d apparently been 
denied a service at the airport and when he appeal~d to Wallace for help, 
1tlallace replied he was bound by Virginia law. It was Averill EarriF..an 
h t t t th d . . . t• 42 w o pu a s op o e iscrimina J.on. Abels recites a n~~ber of other 
incidents dredged up by the De7:ocratic party citing 1.fallace's prejudice. 
Whether these stories have all been documented for their authenticity is 
a moot point. But that ':Jallace used the racist issue for a grandstand 
play seems fairly certain. 
Ee;gs, tomatoes, peaches, lemons and other assort;:d objects thrown 
at 1.-/allace have been counted ad nauseum.• The litany of the barrage 
would stock the neighborhood grocery. Yet the onslaught see~ed only to 
42 
Abels, p. 208. 
*"A reported total of 130 eggs, to::iatoes and otter r.iissiles were 
thrown during the presidential ca':lpaisn (not including t'b.e final week.) 
Of these 84 egcs, 40 tor.iatoes, 4 peaches, 2 ler.1ons, l orange and 1 bun 
were air.1ed at Henry 'fallace ••• One egg and 5 tor:iatoes were t::ro'-m at 
Governor ':'homas z. Dewey. !lo hits. One pop bottle '!las thrown at Presi-
dent Harry Tru~an during his ~arade in Indianapolis. It landed in the 
street, 35 feet away." (Time, :;over.iber l, 1948, p. 21.) 
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stimulate 1.fallac~ to seek an even r.iore diverse assortl'!lent of ::>roduce. 
Self-righteously jubilant after the riot in Horth Carolina, Cla.rk Foremar.., 
the Progressive Party Treasurer said, ":'his is what we want. 1143 And per-
haps it was what they wanted. Yet '.lallace later adTiitted that his trek 
down south may not have been the most prudent !'!'love to r.1ake. "A dozen 
Negroes in Birmint;ha:n, Alabama, picketed a '.hllace audience 1.·rith placards 
reading, 'The colored people want education no agitation' ••• Tuskegee In-
stitute is the largest !:egro college in the world. An Alabarw. institu-
t . t .,, "44 ion, no i-:oscow •••• 
As deplorable as the crowds acted during 1.lallace' s southern inva-
sion, it is possible that he found the news coverage desirable. Accord-
ing to a number of writers, the thrust of the ':lallace r.ove:nent had lost 
a great deal of its force. The international scene had dealt ·i'allace a 
sustaining blow. As he and Taylor rampaged across the country in a pre-
convention campaign preaching co-existence with Hussia, Czechoslovakia 
was taken over. ':'his obvious act of aggression on the part of the Commu-
nists did little to enhance ·.Jallace' s image with t:'.J.e Aoerican public. The 
successful coup, plus the handling of the Palestine problem by ?ruman fur-
ther weakened r:!allace' s progre.r:i. And to coripound his problems te wr::ite 
an open letter to Stalin in !-:ay \'1'1ich antagonized the populace. These 
events caused a number of defections in the 'lallace ranks. l·:any hitherto 
pacifists ware rapidly becoi!ling disabused of their utopian drea".ls of liv-
ing at peace with the Soviet Univn, ergo, it was important for ':lallace 
to focus en domestic issues like the civil rights move::ient. 
4
3 11 Wallace and Grand.stand," r-:ewsweek, September 13, 1948, p. 25. 
On July 23, 1948, the third national convention was held at Phila-
delphia. It was unique in character. Because a great deal of vitality 
had been drained from the party due to world events, the delegates faced 
a formidable task. "The chief probl~m was that of attempting to regain 
lost ground--of renewing public interest, of reviving failing spirits cf 
party workers, and of countering the press attacks that had proved so 
damaging during the spring. It should come as no surprise, then, that 
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the Philadelphia convention ultimately became a propaganda battleground 
more than anything else. 1145 But how successful were they in their attempt 
to rebuild the prestige of the Progressive ?ar-ty? Did the downhill trend 
as evidenced by the polls continue unabated, or was Wallace able to re-
vivify the image of the Party? 
"All the lines had been written long in advance, scene by scene, 
act by act. The followers of Henry A. ·dallace, including some 3,200 del-
egates ••• had no function except to recite them. The Corn.~unist Party was 
the principal author of the drama."46 Thus spoke a journalist in the 
Newsweek magazine. And on the same day the following statement appeared 
in Time. "Henry ';Jallace, the Iowa horticulturist, emerged last week as 
the centerpiece of U.S. Communism's most authentic-looking facade ••• It 
was a sad parody of a political convention ••• the enthusiasm was turned off 
and on by the convention bosses as though they were flipping a switch. 1147 
How true were these allegations of Communist control? 
45schmidt, P• 178. 
4611Behind the Wallace Scenes," Newsweek, August 2, 1948, P• 18. 
4711The Pink Facade," Time, August 2, 1948, P• 12. 
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Norman ':.'homas, ~,,.ho wrote a syndicated column for fourteen papers 
covering the Republican, Democratic and Progressive ?arty conventions, 
had some amusing and insiehtful cor.ir:ients to make about 1.lallace' s party. 
Thomas noticed, "The delegates were abnorr.ially sensitive to the color red. 
The Pennsylvania rtailroad ordinarily designated its special trains by 
color. Ta~:ing no chances on having their delegates ride a 'Red Special,' 
the Wallaceites gave the trains ••• such names as 'Comr.ion !fan Special' and 
'World Peace Special.' Delee;ates' badges were blue, green and white ••• 
Further, when Vito Marcantonio found that his Rules Committee was sched-
uled to meet in the Pink Room of the Bellevue~Stratford, he hastily had 
48 the meeting transferred to the Green Room." Perhaps '.'..'homas made too 
much of the color symbol, however, there did seeu to exist a super-sensi-
tiveness to the color red. 
:Sdward L. and Frederick a. Schansmeier view Norman Thomas' opposi-
tion as a matter of sour grapes. Accordine; to them, it was not mor9.l con-
viction but fear that the Socialist P-3.rty c;rould be supplanted by the Pro-
gressive Party that drove Thomas to speak out aroainst ':/allace. ~fuen Leo 
Isacson won a special election in !Tew York it appeared the Progressives 
would. inherit the radical vote. Therefore, ;,:orr:ian Thanas "air.ied his 
shar!Je.st campaign barbs at Henry \lallace in an effort to salvage his own 
"'b" t ~\.. "49 ev 1ng s reng.,~1. 
It is difficult to im~ute such motives to Thomas since only he knew 
what kindled the flame of opposition. In an article etltitled, "Do Left-
48!1' C'"I • ..... .• arry I: ..1.eisCrL"llan, r;orman Thomas (New York: ·-!. ·,;. Iio:?:"ton and Com-
pany, 1964), p. 231. 
~ ' 1Pronhet in Politics (Iowa: Iowa State !7r.iversity Press, 19701, 
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Wing Parties Belong in Our System?" Norman Tho::ias stated his beliefs 
clearly. "If Henry '.fallace had been the kind of r.ian that thousands of the 
good people who support him believe him to be; if the control of his new 
party had not been so largely in the hands of the expert Communist minor-
ity, riost Socialists--emphatically I, for one--would h:i.ve supported him ••• 
Henry h7allace in Arierica will not succeed ;.ihere Jan :'.asaryk in Czechoslo-
vakia failed. 1}hat is involved is not prir'larily the econonic theory of 
Communism but its practice of bad faith and its control from ;.:oscow."50 
If the press was ganging l.4p on Wallace apparently there was a com-
mon base for criticism--Communist infiltration in the third party. Jo-
seph and Stewart Alsop, Pete Akers, Rebecca ;Jest and a host of other re-
porters wrote in the same r:ianner as rlorrian Thornas--some in even more vitri-
olic tones. One wag referred to the Pror.;ressive Party as the "mongrel 
party." 
At a press conference in the Bellevue-Stratford ballroom '.iallace 
was baited unmercifully about the Guru letters.* He adamantly refused to 
answer the flurry of questions. But even before the conference becan, 
~fallace belligerently announced "that he would not repudiate Corr.munist 
support" and added by tellinc the !1.ews!'.!'len to save their breath. 51 Clearly 
50Annals of the Ame~ican Academy, Septerber, 1943, P• 23. 
*I'he batch of letters were allee;edly written ·dhen :'.enry 'lallace was 
a member of F .D.R.' s cabinet. H was clai::ied ·:/al lace had sought advice 
from the head of a mystic cult--::r. :acholas Roerich who had e::iigrated 
to the United States fro!!! Russia. '.1allace never denied the authenticity 
of these letters. 
51 James A. Hagerty, Special to the New York Times, July 24, 1948. 
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the convention was off to a tad start RS fa~· ~.s the fourth estate was con-
cerned, and when t~e smoot:., efficient staff of left-wingers ground out 
the rules of the party the press was soured completely. 
1\lthough television '.·ms quite limited in 1948, the radio and rress 
coverage of the convention revealed to an astonished public the politi-
cal mac!iinations of the leftist-minority. Vito Marcantonio, as usual, 
worked untiringly durin~ the convention. He and his staff wrote the key-
note speech for Charles Ho·.-1ard, a black lawyer fro::n Des l'·:oines, who ha.d 
once been suspended by the Bar Association for misusinc funds.
52 
In the 
speech Howard accused the U.S. of thwarting p~ace with Russia.53 
In addition to his other activities, I·~arcantonio took ch~1rge of the 
Rules Committee, along with :'.{uch Bryson and John Abt, a smooth talkinr: 
lawyer fror,1 New York. :'ogether they devised a rule whereby t!le leftists 
would have solid control of t~1e party. 'I'he · ..:oi·se was yet to co::te, hmvever. 
Rexford :'ut,1vell, the nominal chnirrnan of the platform cor.imittee, 
thou~ht the party s'.1ould go on record for a European recovery plan. He 
was trounced. Lee Pressman, forr.ier CIO lawyer who had been fired because 
he was a Communist, took charge. :iith the assistance of beagle-f3.ced Harry 
Bridges, Fressm:=m rammed hor.ie his ::_:ilatfortil. 'I'he Earshall Plan was repudi-
ated and the stan~lard verbiage of Communist beliefs was written into the 
program. There were further tussles over Puerto Rico and l·'.acedonia, but 
it \·Ias t!le Verr.ont Resolutior. whic'.l seerned to spell doom for the starry-
eye:d idealists at the convention. According to an article in ~ime maga-
-2 
'./ "The Pink Facade,u P• 12. 
53 Abels, !J• 117. 
zine, "A small, bespectacled 1lermont farmer na.:::ed James Hayford rose to 
present an idea. He wanted an amendment stating: 'Although we are crit-
ical of the foreign policy of the U.S., it is not our intention to give 
blanket endorsement to the foreign policy of any nation. 11154 
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If the report is accurate, what followed was pathetic. The "chubby" 
convention chairman, Albert Fitzgerald, president of the United Electrical 
Workers, gaveled the audience into submission, and with the help of Lee 
Pressman, the amendment was voted down. "When this rather innocuous pro-
posal was defeated, the hammer and sickle was for all intents and pur-
poses unfurled before an amazed gallery of onlookers."55 
On the lighter side--this can be taken literally and figuratively--
were the delegates. Helen Ful:i..er observed that "the average delegate was 
about twenty years younger and thirty pounds lighter than his Democratic 
or GOP counterpart. 1156 They were novices in the political game. They 
carried olacards which read ''Why Tarry with Harry" and "Fooey on Dewey. 11 
They dressed informally and brought their children to the convention with 
them--it was estioated the average age was thirty. They ate ice cream, 
walked or rode the trolleys instead of taking taxis. Cab drivers dubbed 
it the "walking convention." But most fantastic of all, the delegates 
listened to the speakers. 
Philadelphia recognized their impecunious position--it was hard not 
to since many delegates lived in trailers or pitched tents in the parking 
54"The Pink Facade," P• 12. 
55Schapsmeier, p. 183. 
56 Helen Fuller, P• 11. 
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lot across from the conventi::m ha.11. Prices were lowered accordingly. 
Hot dogs and Coca Cola sold for five cents less than they had for the two 
previous conventions. Hotels and restaurants res?onded in like manner.57 
To some observers the roll call of the states' nominations was far-
cical. Everyone knew who the presidential and vice-presinential candi-
dates were--they had both been ca~paigning since December 29, 1947. The 
time-consuming routine was tiring and nonsensical. Yet '.lallace insisted 
upon following the traditional format of the Democratic and Republican 
parties, and refused to appear on the floor of the con•1ention "hall until 
he had been officially chosen. The masquerade was to be carried out to 
the last act. 
The apex of t1'1e three d.Jy convention was the big extravaganza stat;ed 
for Saturday evening at Shibe Park, home of the Philadelphia Athletics. 
The production faithfully adhered to the regular Gailmor touch. Over 
30,000 people paid from 65 cents to J2.60 for seats in order to cheer for 
their candidate. After the usual warn-up, Wallace was ffDOtlighted as he 
circled the field in an open car, waving as t"he crowds went wild. 
:•lhen the emotional frenzy had subsided, 'lallace launched into his 
acceptance speech, ">!y Co:".lmitments." The first section contained the 
usual conder.r:1.ntory statements aimed at the opposition. The following cor::-
ments typified ·rallace' s attitude to·.'lards the other !Jarties. "A party 
fou:ided by a Jefferson clisd in the ar!':'ls of a r:.'ruman ••• ':'r.e :ia1~ty of a Lin-
coln has been reduced to the party of a "Dewey. 
But we here tonig~1t--c-:e of the ~-rogressive Farty--d.edicate ourselves 
5? ~!acDougall, II, 1+85-88. 
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to the complete fulfillment of Lincoln's promiGe; we consecrate ourselves 
t d . t. "58 o a secon emancipa ion •••• 
In his concluding re!".larks ':lallace went on to acknowledee his commit-
ments made to the American people. A cursory glance at the speech would 
indicate that he "cor:Jmitted'' himself to some eminently vital issues ap-
proximately twenty-five times. Here are a few excerpts from the text. 
I tell you frankly that in obtaining the nor.iinntion of the Pro-
gressive Party--a nomin~tion I accept with pride--I h~ve made 
commitments ••• I have na.de them freely ••• I repeat them with pride: 
I am committed to the policy of placing human rights above property 
rights ••• I am committed to peaceful negotiations with the Soviet 
government ••• I am conmitted to stopping the creation of fear ••• I 
a"!l committed to a program of progressive capitalism ••• And I am 
com.~itted to accept and do accept the sup~ort of those who favor 
the program of peace I have outlined b~re; the sup~ort of all 
those who truly believe in denocracy.~~ 
Judging from the elatior. \lallace experienced after the Shibe ?ark 
rally, he must have felt his chances for winnin:T. the election had been 
vastly improved, or at the very least, that he and his party would def-
initely destroy the Democratic machine. Accordine to !'!acDougall, '.lallace 
jubilantly exclairaed to Rexford ':'ugwell when they returned to the Bellevue-
Stratford, "':le're on the march. We're really rolling now. Rex, how does 
it seem to be the next Secretary of State of the t'nited States?1160 
Whether this was pure bravado or actually represented 'Jallace' s 
appraisal of the situation is irrelevant. The homely truth was that Henry 
Agard :~allace was marching on the road to ignominious defeat. 
58Henry Agard Wallace, "My Commitments," Vital Speeches, August 1, 
1948, PP• 620-23. 
59Ibid. 
60 MacDougall, II, 533. 
CHAPTER VII 
YOU TAKE THE HIGH ROAD 
AND I'LL TAKE THE WW ROAD 
While the professional pollsters, Gallup, Crossley and Roper, 
unhesitatingly predicted Truman's defeat, Leslie Biffle, Secretary of the 
Senate and close personal friend of the President's, compiled his own 
figures from a chicken poll he took. Properly accoutered in overalls, 
Biffle the chicken peddler, rode around the country• in a spring wagon 
asking the people how they felt about Truman. The response: over-
whelmingly positive. Said Biffle upon his return, ''Now listen, Harry, 
you don't have to worry. 'l'he common people are for ya. 111 
The journalistic world, however, viewed the analysis different-
ly. "Men of little or no experience in the earthy art of politics--
ha\·e been telling Mr. Truman that the political experts are wrong, 
that he has the popular support to make him a win .. "ler ••• " Unfortu-
nately, he has come to believe them. "He exudes confidence. 112 
*According to Jules Abels, West Virginia, Kentucky, southern 
Ohio and Illinois were the states Leslie Biffle covered. He left by 
truck on August 1 and returned three weeks late~- to report his find-
ings to Truman. (Out of the Ja•;3 of Victory, p. 163.) 
1Merle Miller, £..lain Speaking (New York: Berkeley Publishing 
Corporation, 1973), p. 262. 
2"The Truman-Barkley Team," U.S. News, July 23, 1948, p. 42. 
The approach adopted by President Trum3.n and Governor Dewey 
in the presidential campaign sharply reflected their attitudes. 
Dewey, over-confident an::J. reassured by the polls, "chose the high 
road fnr his campaign. 113 He was "suave, polished in oratory, and 
cool in his bearing. 114 Truman, also serenely confident of victory, 
"chose the low road. 115 Knowing that he was the underdog, the Pres-
ident took the offensive and gave "homey, explosive, att3.cking 
,,6 speeches.· 
The vice-presidential candidates emphasized the contrast 
even more. Barkley, the 70-year old southerner, delivered his 
speeches in somewhat ponderous tones and ''old-fashioned" rhetoric. 
Whereas Hr. ':larren, the 57-year old Californian, was casual. dis-
7 
arr:Jing and witty. 
Although both the presidential candidates displayed a victor-
ious air, t1:1ere was no doubt that Truman was faced \vit'.1 the greatest 
number of problems. In a dismal forecast, the U.S. l·ie,1s and 'lorld 
~enort listed wh3.t it felt would be the reasons ':'ruman would go 
do·.vn in defeat. The diagnosis was disheartening. ~here were 
six major items which spelled doom for the De~ocrats. They were as 
follo'..;s: 1) He::iry A. ·dalle>.ce's break from the ps.rty, 2) the States' 
3Cabell Phillips, I'he '1.'ruman Presidency (New York: 'I'he 
Nad·:n1an Conpany, 1966) , p. 225. 
4 
"Truman-Barkley Team." 
5Phillips, p. 225. 
611Truman-Barkley Team" 
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Rights' revolt, 3) lack of c::8ney for campaign purposes, 4) a crack-
up of city machines in Chicago, Jersey City, and New York, 5) the 
division of the labor vote, and 6) the wish for a political change.8 
To what degree these adversities were to effect Truman's campaibn 
remained to be seen. 
Yet, not everyone in the fourth estate wrote Truman off. 
There still existed a few stalwart free-thinkers within the system 
who cautioned against a too simplistic evaluation of the election. 
Robert Bendiner, for example, had this adYice to give all prognosti-
caters: " ••• get rid of the idea that the 1948 election is wrapped 
up and ready for delivery to Governor Dewey." He insisted that the 
farm vote would not necessar:i.J.y go to the Republicans. "High food 
pric~s, to begin with, do not make for that unrest among farmers that 
prompts them to call for a change." Furthermore, said Bendiner, 
" ••• the apparatus of the labor movement is at Truman's disposal 
right now. 119 And indeed it was! 
One of the strange aspects of the 1948 election was the in-
ability of the news media to interpret correctly the material they 
had gathered. For instance, the U.S. News and '/>/orld Renort stated 
in a July article that the labor unions would spend millions on the 
D ~· . 10 emocrawic campaign. And again, in September the magazine reit-
Dewey's Victory Chances," U.S. News, September 17, 1948, 
9Robert Bendiner, "Don't Count Truman Out," N~, September 11, 
1948, P• 282. 
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lO"Big Election Drive by Unions," U.S. News, July 23, 1948, P• 53. 
erated its assertion that 12bor would make an all-out drive for Tru-
11 
man. Yet, oddly the findings were distorted to such an extent 
that Truman was given little hope of winning labor's vote. The staff 
writers reasoned that the union leaders did not actually trust the 
President, therefore, the campaign kitty would be concentrated on the 
candidates for Congress, not on Truman. 'tlhether this was wishful-
thinking or deliberate garbling of facts is u..'1known. Nevertheless, 
the myth of Truman's unpopularity persisted as the presidential can-
didates prepared themselves for the final onslaught in the election. 
In order to win the workingmen's votes,_ Truman delivered his 
kickoff speech on Labor Day in Detroit, Michigan.12 Following his 
successful June formula, the President turned this first skirmish 
into a "mini-whistle-stop tour" which began at 8:15 in the morning 
and ended with a rear platform performance at 11:55 in the evening. 
From Grand Rapids, Michigan to Toledo, Ohio the crowds turned out in 
droves, much to the astonishment of Truman's critics. Reporters were 
dumbfounded when the entire population of the city of Hamtramck re-
sponded to the President's brief visit. There were 15,000 at Pon-
tiac and 35,000 at Flint, Michigan. And in the Republican strong-
hold of Grand Rapids, 25,000 spectators turned out to cheer the 
President in the pouring down rain.13 The press, taken off guard, 
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1111Political Plans of Uniou," U.S. News, September 10, 1948, P• 43. 
1211From Skirmishes into Open Battle," Newsweek, September 13, 1948, 
P• 17. 
1-\iargaret Truman, Harry S. ~ruman (New York: 
and Company, 1973), p. 20. Irwin rtoss, :'he Loneliest 
(New York: New American Library, 1968), P• 177. 
'•lilliam Morrow 
r • ._,,=:rr:na.ign 
blandly attributed the crowc".s to the nove1ty ,,, · n · d t --· ~ seein~ u ~resi en • 
The highlight of the da~1, ho\vever, ·was at Detroiti f·!ic~igan. 
Here Truman delivered his major address in Cadillac 3aua:·e to a 
crowd cf 175,000. Said Truman, "As yo'.l know, I speak pl2jnly some-
times--in fact, I speak bluntly sometimes and I am going to speak 
plainly and bluntly today. 1114 If you elect the Re~utlice.n reac-
tionaries, '' ••• you men of labor can expect to be hit by a steady 
barrage of body blows ••• I would !ear not only for tI12 •m,~es and living 
standards of t}!e American workins mar., but even for our democratic 
. t . I- t . "' "' 1 ' d f + • "l5 ins 1 ... u ::.ans o ... ;ree aoor an.. ree en .. erpris~. 
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In a :lirect appeal to the housewives of Americet he wr:1s comnassion-
ate. "My sympatby is with those test of busine.ss ms.nat:.;ers, the wives 
and C'lothers of t~:is nation. Think how they ho.V": to maJ:<) the pa:l 
envelopes stretch wit!1 each rise in . ,,16 oricec. 
The speech ended on a cautionary note. "Do you 11ant to carry 
the Taft-Hartley law to its full implication and totally enslave the 
working man, white-collar and union man aliks ••• ? Lab'.):r had always 
had to fight for its gains ••• I know that v:e're goinr;; to ':;·i:!'l this 
crusade for the right ~,l7 
The audience reaction was spontaneous a:1d enthusiastic. 
Parroting the now famous injunction to "Pour it on, :1a.-cr:r, '' the 
crowd roared its assent as wave after wave of appl.ci.use filled 
14Harry s. Trur.ian, "Labor Hust J:Iave a Friendly Administration," 
Vital Speeches, September 15, 1948, p. 712. 
15Ibid., p. 713. 
16Ibid., p. 714. 17r, 4 .:I o .... {..;.. 
Cadillac Square.
18 
Even the "lukewarm labor leaders," AFL's William 
Green, CIO's Philip Murray a.'ld Teamsters' president Daniel Tobin, 
. 19 vere impressed.-
Not surprisingly, however, the Republicans viewed the initial 
success with scorn. Employing the GOP strategy of aloofness, Dewey 
"disdainfully" held his fire against Truman's charges. Instead the 
Governor assigned Stassen the task of rebuttal when he asked him to 
20 deliver the GOP's kickoff speech on September 8. 
With a crowd of only about 3,000, Stassen spoke at Detroit, 
Michigan, just two days after Truman's rally._ His speech, designed 
for the sole purpose of defending the Taft-Hartley bill, lacked the 
vitality and spark of his opronent. Addressing his meager audience 
Stassen said, "It is clear that your special visitor of yesterday 
came ••• as a complaining candidate for election and labor's vote ••• 
He used a day set apart for all Americans to honor American labor, 
and instead dishonored labor with an ••• appeal to set class against 
1 1121 c ass ••• Stassen stressed the "visitor's" (he rc!'used to use 
Truman's name) attempt to create disunity. He compared the Presi-
dent with Henry Wallace. Both men, said Stassen, "were in agree-
ment on the erroneous misconceived appraisal of postwar America. 
H~ followed Wallace. \:allace followed those who had no faith in 
18Phillips, P• 232. 
l9Margaret Truman, p. 20. 
2011From Skirmishes into Open Battle." 
21 Harold Stassen, "People Want a United America," Vital 
Speeches, September 15, 1948, p. 714. 
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in America. 1122 
The last statement is noteworthy. A peculiar ploy that deve-
loped during the 1948 election was the attempt to identify the oppo-
sition with the Communist party, thereby discrediting them in the 
public eye. Stassen's effort to equate Truman with 'dallace was just 
one of many instances when the GOP tried this technique on Trurran. 
Dewey himself used this approach. In an article which appeared in 
the American Federationist, Dewey said, " ••• the Soviet dictatorship 
has made the Russian unions creatures of the state, instruments to 
terrorize and keep enslaved the Russian workers. With these awful 
lessons before us, we must zealously guard against any ••• efforts to 
i~e the American labor movement a political company union ••• It is 
with men who share that philosophy, not with those who accept a 
foreign ideology, that we will work in 1ifashington. 1123 Few voters, 
however, were duped by these tactics. 
Disgruntled by the almost half-empty hall, Stassen later 
"charged that workers had been coerced into attending the rrurnan 
rallies, that Jar.ies Hoffa, head of the Teamsters in Detroit, had 
ordered union members to attend or be fired."
24 Jules Abels, an 
obvious Dewey fan, recites this incident as though it were fact. 
The Republicans must indeed have had a low opinion of the American 
2311Thornas ~. Dewey Speaks to Labor," American Federatio~, 
September, 1948, P• 30. 
24 Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory, p. 169. 
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people if they thought 175,000 persons could be herded like so many 
frightened sheep into Cadillac Square. 
A whisper of concern escaped the lips of Republican National 
Chair~3.D. Hugh Scott when he warned his party that overconfidence 
could lose the election. But the voice was swallowed up in the re-
morseless predictions of the pollsters. In the September 20 issue of 
Newsweek, Gallup gave 48~ per cent of the vote to Dewey, 36~ to Truman, 
5 to Wallace and 10 undecided. Elmer Roper said Dewey was a shoo-in, 
consequently he was going tc stop polling. His last forecast was: 
Dewey 44.2 per cent, Truman 31.4, Thurmond 4.~, Wallace 3.6, others 
and undecided 16.4. Crossley predicted that Dewey would win by a 
large margin and that Truman could only be certain of carrying nine 
states. 25 The public-opinion experts, however, were having a hard 
time convincing the President that he was going to lose. 
"I am just starting on a campaign tour that is going to be a 
record for the President of the United States. 1126 Thus challenged 
Truman as he prepared to take off for his first transcontinental 
tour on September 17. With only a brief weekend rest on his yacht 
Williamsburg after his hectic Labor Day junket, Truman revivified 
and raring to go proclaii:ied, "I'm going to give them hell. 1127 
"I had warned my staff and the reporters who prepared to 
make the trip with me that I was going out to win the election," 
2511Dewey by a Strawslide," Newsweek, September 20, 1948, P• 28. 
2611Campaign Kickoff,"~· 
2711liell on 'wheels," Ibid., September 27, 1948, p. 17. 
\ 
said Truman in his Memoirs. And he meant i::. Brisk, vibrant and 
looking every inch a champion, the President dressed in a trim 
double-breasted tan suit smilingly waved goodbye to his friends. 
As Barkley shouted gaily, "Mow 'em down, Harry!~· Truman responded 
with equal gusto, "I'm going to fight hard." It was "V-T" day--
Victory for Truman.28 
The 9,500 mile trip was a replica of his June performance, 
with two notable exceptions. On this all important coast-to-coast 
tour, two advance men--Oscar Chapman, the Under Secretary of the 
Interior, and Donald Dawson, a presidential administrative assistant--
traveled ahead of the Ferdinand Magellan to check out the details of 
all political appearances. According to Irwin Ross, they wanted no 
repetition of the empty hall in Omaha, Nebraska. Also, this time 
Truman welcomed aboard his "suite-on-wheels" any Democratic politi-
cian that wished to greet him. 29 
The pace was killing. Wherever the train stopped Truman made 
a point of showing "himself to the curious window shoppers." He 
was like a "mannikin in a show window. 1130 Yet he seemed to thrive 
on perpetual interruptions, lack of sleep and constant motion. He 
said in his book, "It was quite a campaign. I worked my staff al-
most to death. I believe that at one time or another I put them all 
to bed, and despite its long hours and hard work I gained weight 
29 "Hell on •.n...eels, and Ross p 181 VH1 t • e 
3011Hell on Wheels. 
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'. 
during the campaign."3l 
His stamina and cordiality were demonstrated clearly when he 
welcomed Jake Arvey, Chicago's Democratic boss, aboard the train at 
2:15 in the norning. The meeting c~used quite a stir because Arvey 
had been in the vanguard of the dump-Truman movement. Furthermore, 
Arvey had made no ef::'ort to see the President when he stopped in 
C"nicago in June. In spite of this background of dissension, Presi-
dent Truman received his guest, sitting up in bed attired in pajamas 
and bathrobe. Said Arvey sheepishly, "He looked sleepy and I felt 
like a heel for getting him up." Nevertheless, at 5:00 a.m. more 
Illinois politicians climbed on board the train to be photographed 
\"ith Truman. Described as "fresh and chipper, 11 the 64-year old 
President amazingly showed no signs of wear and tear. 32 
The campaign train finally rolled into Dexter, Iowa where 
Truman was to deliver his first major address of the tour. The 
occasion was the National Plowins Contest. The day was hot and hu-
mid as 75,000* men and women crowded onto a 10-acre alfalfa field.33 
"The plowing plus the feet of 75,000 farmers and their families 
stirred up a huge cloud of choking dust, which simply hung there," 
31 Truman, Memoirs, II, 211. 
3211Hell on ~v'heels." 
*Truman claimed there were 96,000 people present at Dexter, 
Iowa. He based his figures on the following assumption. "There 
was ten acres, and the place was jammed full. !Io'.• figure three to 
the square yard and you'll see how many there were." (Merle Miller, 
P• 258) 
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said Margaret Truman in her reGollections of ts~e event. 34 Yet, de-
spite the 90 degree sun and "ankle-deep dust,'' the crowd listened 
intently as Truman discussed their probler.is. 
The President displayed an unranny ability to identify with the 
farmers. In Merle Miller's book Plain St)eakin;::;, Truf:lan said, "You've 
got to know how to talk to people. ':'hat's the whole tting, and you've 
got to convince them t~at you know what you're talking about. They 
don't go for high hats, and they can spot a :?hony a mile off."35 
Thus when Truman reminded them that he too had been a farmer and 
could plow a straight furrow, they believed him. And when he pointed 
to fifty private planes parked in an adjacent field, and told them 
l:ow they had prospered under the Jemocratic administrations, they 
b 1 . r. ' . 36 e 1eveu. nim. And when he pointed out t~e failure of Con[ress to 
provide storage bins for their grain, they believed hi~. And when 
he told them that the Republicans were out to ''scuttle the whole 
farri price support system," the:r believed him. 37 
Significantly, what hit t~e headlines were Truman's more vol-
atile, and by now traditional, phrases. For instance, Ne·t1sweek 
quoted these excerpts from his speech: " ••• t!l.e PresiC.ent ••• gave 'er:i 
hell ••• he assailed his political enemies as 'gluttons of privilege' 
•.•• he accused ther.i of aimin8' to 'take the country over, lock, stock, 
and barrel," ••• he said 'that notorious do-nothing Republican 80th 
34Margaret Truman, n. 21. 
35Miller, p. 258. 
3GPhillips, p. 236. 37Abels, P:?• 1?1-176, and Phillips, n. 236. 
Congress ••• has already stuck a pitchfork in ;:;:1e farmer's back' ... and 
he warned his listeners against being fooled b~· 'plain hokum.' 1138 
Happily for Truman, the press had missed the salient points of his 
speech. They saw only the rabble-rousing techniques of a game 
fighter, thus lulling themselves and the GOP into a false sense of 
security. Consequently, it was here, in the heartland of Republi-
canism, that rruman captured a significant number of votes. 
"Lack of money is almost silencing the Democratic campaign. 
Up to the middle of September the Republicans in Oregcn had collected 
$77,578, the Democrats less than $3,000. 1139 It was true the Demo-
crats lacked money, but it was false that it silenced the campaign. 
Many times the President him~~lf was forced to solicit funds for his 
trip. And more than once, the occupants of the "Truman Special" 
found themselves without enough cash to get out of the train station. 
But somehow with the frantic efforts of all, the bills were paid, 
the train redeemed and the company moved on. 40 
Howard McGrath and Jack Redding, the publicity director, fre-
quently carried $25 1 000 to $30,000 in cash in order to pay for radio 
time. It was not uncommon for President Truman to be cut off in 
the middle of a sentence. Yet, according to Margaret Truman, this 
kind of treatment helped his image \vith the American people who 
3B"Hell on Wheels, p. 18. 
39Richnrd ?;euberger, "Slow-Bell Campaign in the Northwest," 
Nation, October 16, 1948, p. 422. 
40 Margaret Truman, PP• 20-21. 
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tended to favor the unde~no~. - -in spi"te of thes~ i"nc i· - ~ o • "" onven ences, 
however, the Ferdinand r-:agell~ rolled along with unvarying regularity. 
The routine aboard the train followed a regular pattern. Usually 
the presidential party began its bu~iness of politicking between 6:00 
and 8:00 in the morning. At this ti~e any aspiring candidate for 
office, local hero, Governor, Senator or Congressman--all Democratic, 
of course--would board the 17-car train to see and be seen. With the 
social amenities thus taken care of, the President would then attend 
one or two outdoor rallies and return to the train in order to keep 
to his schedule. "Wherever a crowd gathered along the way at a rail-
road station, the President would stop to chat. The grand finale con-
sisted of the introduction of Mrs. Truman and daughter Margaret. 
Truman's family proved enormously popular on the tour. Even 
the hostile press wrote engagingly of Bess and Margaret. At 63, 
Mrs. Truman was described as "cool, calm, and collected." Though 
she never discussed politics, she watched the audience reaction 
with a keen observant eye. Possessed of a "great r.atura.l dignity," 
she ministered not only to the needs of her husband, but of "cam-
paign aides, secretaries and dignitaries alike." She was much 
loved. The President's 24-year old daughter was a perfect compli-
ment to her. As outgoing as Mrs. Truman w'.1.s reserved, Margaret 
laughed, waved and signed autographs. She admittedly enjoyed the 
't t f . . 42 exci emen o campaig!ll.ng. 
4211His Woman Have It," Newsweek, October 4, 1948, pp •. 22-23. 
\ 
On Monday, September 2C:, the 285,000 p·.:iund, bulletproof train 
roared its way into Denver, Colorado. Here the President addressed 
an audience of 25,000 in front of the state capitol. It was broad-
cast over a national radio hookup. 43 In a direct appeal to the 
western states, Truman said, "Every time I come out this way I feel 
again the tremendous vitality of the West ••• This is a straight-from-
the-shoulder country, and it has produced a great breed of fighting 
men." He attacked the Republicans for attempting "to turn back the 
clock to the day when the West was an economic colony of Wall Street." 
Then in reference to the specific concerns of Colorado, Truman dis-
cussed the need for conservation of natural resources, reclamation 
projects and public power. Always aiming his barbs at the do-
nothing Eightieth Congress, the President reminded his audience that 
in 1947 the Republicans took control of Congress. "And that was the 
first year in which the Congress took a step backward in the spiral 
44 of soil conservation since that program was begun." 
"Cordial but unenthusiastic" reported the Newsweek about the 
25,000 people who attended the rally. The old technique of playing 
the East against the West might be a common practice, but it will 
make no difference as far as Colorado's six electoral votes are 
. 45 
c~ncerned, concluded the editors. 
His throat ra.w from giving so many speeches, Truman never-
43Ross, p. 186 and Margaret ~ruman, P• 1. 
44 Harry s. ~ruman, "The Democratic Record," Vital Speeches, 
October 1, 1948, p. 746. 
45"The Truman Punch," Newsweek, October 4, 1948, p. 21. 
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theless continued his offen.s~ 'Ti:'! w.l' th vi· 
0
"'or. · ~ lt L k C · t 50 000 -- - ~n a a e 1 y , 
people lined the street fro~ the railroad station to his hotel. And 
later that evening, 11,500 poured into the r·formon Tabernacle under the 
beautiful ''melon-shaped dome'' to hear the President deliver his message. 
In spite of an appeal to subdue their ap:olause, the crowd forgot the 
injunction and interrupted ~ruman's speech sixteen times with uncontrolled 
t
, . 46 
en ~usiasr.i. 
"At first the critics referred to my tour as a "one-r:ian-circus and 
called it less efficient and less dignified than the campaign being 
put on by the ~epublicans, '' said Truman in his Eemoirs. ''But as the 
crowds grew larger and lareer and more people flocked to my train 
than showed up around the Dewe:y train, our O:?ponents began to get 
L~7 
worried.'' Note well, Truman said his "opponents11 were beginning 
to worry, not the press. ~eporters consistently ex:olained the crowds 
away by saying they 1.-1ere ''bie;'' but ''unenthusiRstic." Eypnotized by 
their own predictions of a Dewey landslide, the fourth estate was 
unable to reverse its decision. 
At Reno, Nevada, the President accused the Republican chairmen 
of the Senate an~ the Ifouse of Representatives of being "a bunch of 
old mossbacks ••• livinz in the 1890's." In Roseville, California, 
h~ enjoined the crowds to enlist in tl1e crusade 0 to kee::; t'.le country 
from going to tr~e dop;s. ·148 And at Fresno he stated. that "You have 
got a terrible Con:-ressrnan here in t 11is district ••• :re is one ~.if the 
46Ibid. 
47Truman, Memoirs, II, 210. 
48 "That Trurian Punch." 
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worst obstructionists in the Congress. Ha has done everything he possibly 
could to cut the throats of the farmer and the laboring man. If you send 
him back, that will be your fault if you get your throats cut. 1149 
According to the Time magazine, Truman's temper was becoming as 
raw as his throat. At Ogden, Utah, he interrupted his off-the-cuff 
speech "to scold and silence a group of noisy boys who had climbed a 
nearby tree." (Margaret Truman's version of this episode is very 
different.) But things got worse. Irritated by the sr:ia.11 turnout 
in Oakland, Trurna.n is said to have taken it out on the cameramen 
"who popped their flashes at him." Snapped the President, "I have 
trouble enou~h seeing, as it is. Those things blind me. Stop it. 
Stop it."50 The camera corps apparently registered amazement at 
the impatience of the President. In the past, he had always been 
one of the, most courteous and obliging of politicians. 
However, even Time magazine acknowledged that Truman's 
characteristic good humor had reasserted itself as the train edged 
toward Los Angeles.51 Though the crowds had been thin in the Bay 
area, they picked up perceptibly in southern California--a half 
million people, once again, lined the streets of L.A. to cheer him. 
Albeit the press at~ributed the large numbers to the fact that more 
people were on the street at 5:00 p.rn. than at 4:00 p.m. when Dewey's 
motorcade arrived.52 The warm reception plus the news that the 
49 Ross, p. 188. 
50"They Tear You Apart,"~' October 4, 1948, P• 19. 
52Leo Egan, Special to the New York Times, September 25, 1948. 
Gallup poll showed he had g:ilned six points c'.nce early September 
buoyed him up immeasurably.53 
The triumphant swing back home began as Truman left San Diego 
where he had met his most enthusiastic audience to date.54 The 
"Presidential Special" cut through Arizona and New Mexico, with a 
few brief stops, and then into Texas. The four-day tour of the Lone 
Star State was considered extraordinary since Texas was traditionally 
Democratic. The Dixiecrat infiltration, however, had necessitated 
the move. President Truman made a total of twenty-four stops. 
Governor Beauford Ir. Jester, Representative Sam Rayburn and 
Attorney General Tom C. Clark greeted Truman at the border at El Paso 
in an attempt to show a unified Democratic front. "'Maghty welcome,'" 
said Beauford.55 Jester's display of southern hospitality differed 
radically from his earlier statement that Truman had stabbed the 
South in the back.56 Nonetheless, the time had arrived to hold hands 
and mend fences. 
Clearly sidestepping the civil rights issue, the President 
plunged into his usual hyperbolic oratory. He accused the Republi-
can leaders of cutting the reclamation program for the West by more 
than 50 per cent. Chairman of the Appropriations Comm:ittee, John 
Taber of New York, defended the cut, said Truman, by saying ''The 
53"The Truman Punch. " 
54w. H. Lawrence, Special to the New York Times, September 25, 
1948. 
55"That Truman Punch," P• 22. 
56Abels, P• 183, and Margaret Truman, P• 33. 
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West is squealing like a stuck pig. 1157 
Early Sunday morning, September 26, Truman stopped at Uvalde 
to visit a friend and former vice-president of the United States, 
John Nance Garner. The visit had tremendous political value for the 
President. "Cactus Jack" at 79 was still one of the most revered 
members of the conservative Democrats in Texas, and he made it mani-
f estly clear that he was for Truman. 
Aside from the political connotations, the occasion has been 
remembered for two reasons: l) the breakfast the Presidential party 
ate and, 2) the fact that Mrs. Truman spoke to the crowd of well-
wishers. The menu for the "super-Texas breakfast" consisted of 
"orange juice, mourning dove, white-winged dove, chicken, rice and 
gravy, ham, bacon, scrambled eggs, biscuits, Uvalde honey, preserves, 
pecans, and coffee. 1158 Truman ate a little of everything and then 
gave Garner a bottle of snake-bite medicine in appreciation.59 
"Glad you liked it," muttered Garner, and then replaced his store 
60 bought teeth in his pocket. Mrs. I'ruman said, "Good morning and 
thank you for this wonderful greeting." 61 It was 5:00 a.m. And so 
began another day in the long campaign trail. 
The policy of "voluntary segregation" saved the President from 
57,'They'll Tear You Apart,'' P• 20. 
59Margaret Truman, P• 34. 
60 ''The 'I'ruman Punch." 
61 Ross, p. 202. 
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any embarrassinCT or unpleas~"r..: situation. Tr'.1::nan did experience 
a few tense moments in 1:laco when the crowd booed as he shook hands 
with a black woman. But on the whole, the attitude of both Negro 
and white was one of aloof detachment. 11··ie 1 re not aiming to provoke 
anybody, least of all ifr. Truman,'! capsulized a ~allas Negro. 62 In 
fact, the much dreaded rally in Dallas proved to be enor~ously sue-
cessful. The Rebel .Stadium was pac~ed and there were no racial dis-
turbances. 63 './hen Attorney General Tom Clark introduced t:::e Presi-
dent as the man "w::o stopped Joe Lewis," Truman laughinr;ly explained 
to the baffled audience: ''Tom gave ne too much credit. It · .. ms John 
L . I t d I d ' t h ' 1 t ,,. t d J 1164 ewis s op:)e • on .ave enoug:: mu.sc e o uave s oppe oe. 
~he quip endeared ~ruman to the blacks in the audience. 
The cross-cour1try trip continued through Oklahoma, (-!issouri, 
Illinois and finally drove deep in ''Kentucky' s 'hoss' country." In 
Louisville, 40,000 union members turned out to hear the President 
speak, only to learn that he was two hours behind schedule. Informed 
of the delay, the crowds were told to go home and retura later. A.ma-
zingly, 35,000 people did return, with thousands of ot~ers streaming 
into the old arnory for the r.:ajor address of the evenin.g. Kentucky 
vocally de:nonstrated its attitude towarO. the civil ri,;::1ts issue 
when the crowd roared its approval of Governor :3arle C. Clements 
opening staterient. :Ie said, ~'Kentucky remained in t!-te Union in 1861 
6211They Call He Harry," Hewsweek, October 1, 1948, p. 25. 
63Margaret Tru.~an, p. 32. 
64Ibid. 
and she'll not secede in 1948. ri65 
In Lexington, the following morning, Truman spoke to an audience 
from the rear platform of the train. Unabashedly, the President 
compared himself to Citation, the money-making horse who was a slow 
starter, but a strong finisher. "You people k.~ow a great deal about 
horse races in Lexington, and you know that it doesn't matter which 
horse is ahead or behind at a given moment," said the President. 
"It's the horse that comes out ahead at the finish that counts. I 
am trying to do in politics what Citation has done in horse races. I 
propose at the finish line on November 2 to come out ahead ••• 1166 
Truman had every reason to believe he would make a Citation-
like finish. The immense turnouts continued in Kentucky and West 
Virginia. In the very heart of John L. Lewis's bailiwick, the coal 
miners poured out from the surrounding hills to meet. the President. 
At Montgomery, West Virginia, 12,000 thronged the streets of the 
mining town to prove their loyalty and trust. The population was 
only 5,000. 
The first lap of the Presidential race ended for ~ruman as 
the Ferdinand Magellan pulled into the Union Station on Saturday, 
October 2. The crowd which met the train was described as "meager," 
and the welcome as "perfunctory." In spite of this, the President 
remained confident and unafraid. Looking forward to a four-day 
rest before setting out on his next whistle-stop tour, he gaz~d 
65Ibid. 
6611The Long Shot Won't Give Up," Newsweek, October 11, 1948, 
P• 25. 
"indifferently" at the desert:d streets of :-Ia2hington, D.C. 67 
''Thomas E. Dewey wasn't giving anybody hell."68 Dressed in a 
blue business suit and gray Homburg, the Governor and his family 
attended Mass at St. Peter's Episcopal Church on Sunday, September 19, 
and later in the afternoon boarded the "Victory Special" for the 
first tour of the campaign. Dewey was "off to dog" the footsteps 
of th~ President, who had begun his trip two days before. 
Truman and Dewey had one thing in common in their campaigns. 
They both welcomed politicians on board their respective trains when-
ever they entered a new state. But the similarity stopped there. 
0ewey's 17-car train was run like a computerized robot. The time-
table mapped out for the Governor was exact down to the last detail. 
Even more remarkable, was that the "Victory Special" worked with 
such clinical precision the train was never more than twenty minutes 
late. As the projected winner of the Presidential race, more jour-
nalists joined the Dewey cavalcade than Truman's. The Governor's 
"personal staff numbered 43, compared with Truman's 20-odd. 1169 And 
each member performed his task with unquestioned professionalism. 
The GOP strategy was adhered to from the very beginning of the 
tour. Dewey was to play it safe. He was to avoid all verbal con-
frontation with his feisty opponent who was trying to draw him into 
6711They Call Me Harry," P• 26. 
6811Harmony Express," Newsweek, September 27, 1948, P• 18. 
69 Ross, pp. 191-192. 
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open debate. The polls didn't lie. He was to be the next President. 
The only danger for the Republican party was the loss of control in 
the Senate.• 1170 With this in mind, Dewey set out for Iowa to plug for 
the Republican senatorial candidate, Senator George A. Wilson. 
''That Iowa would go for Dewey was a cinch."7l 
On Monday evening, September 20, Dewey delivered his kickoff 
speech in the Drake University Field House, Des Moines, Iowa, The 
address was noteworthy for its absence of farm issues. Drafted by 
the efficient Dewey team, the speech "was intentionally a mass of 
generalizations about national and world problems," with little or 
no concrete advice as how to solve them. This first speech set the 
72 pattern for those that were to follow. 
The excerpts taken from the Des Moines address typify Dewey's 
style. "Tonight we enter upon a campaign to unite all America ••• ',/e 
will rediscover the essential unity of our people and the spiritual 
strength that makes our cotj.ntry great ••• I pledee to you that, as 
President, every act of mine will be determined by one principle ••• 
Is this good for our country?"73 
Nowhere did Dewey strike a responsive chord with the farm belt. 
The high-sounding oratory remained in the stratified air of the in-
tellectual. Whereas Truman had given the farmer something to think 
70 Abels, P• 179. 
71Harmony Express." 
73'riiomas E. Dewey, "Time for American Affirmation," Vital 
Speeches, September 27, 1948, p. 740. 
about in Dexter, the reverse <.vas true of De\~e:r. "The farmer remem-
bered nothing of what Dewey had said precisely because Dewey had 
said nothing-. 1174 
There were times during the speech, contended Irwin Ross, that 
the tone seer.ied more appropriate ''to a victory statement than a 
campaign manifesto. 1175 He cited the following exarr:ple: "I will 
not contend that all our difficulties today have been brought about 
by the present national administration. They haven't. Some of 
these unhappy conditions are the result of circumstances beyond the 
control of any government. •176 Presum,tuous of victory and conde-
scending in tone, Dev,rey' s magnanimous gesture of absolution ~,ras, 
nonetheless, applauded by the press, or at least by the majority of 
the press. However, there remained a few voices crying in the wil-
derness. One such wrote a witty and discerning critin_ue of the 
speech which appeared in the Nation: 
"~./hen Governor Dewey launched his ca~paiGn at Des .Moines a few 
weeks ago, he promised his audience: 'I will not offer one solution 
to one group and another solution to anot~er grou?.' He has kept 
his word. To date, he has offered no solution to any group ••• " ':'he 
journalist continued his dissection of t:-te speech. Dewey's formula 
for good go'rernrnent is to hire "an administration of able and honest 
men and. women.'' Cal::1-ing t!iis polic? into question the author wrote, 
11.'1.ble and honest men and women may be just what the governme:-:t needs, 
74~ Q .11.bels, p. lc;O. 
75Ross, p. 194. 76Dewey, ~· 7~·1. 
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but not even Boss Tweed wou:ci have run on a p~ank. calling for 
incompetent and dishonest men and women." l'he article of denun-
ciation ended with the scathing comment. "According to the Baltimore 
~' Tom Dewey 'is a middle-of-the-~oad man if ever we saw one.' 
How can the Sun tell, when Dewey won't get out on the road."77 
The Nation, of course, did not reach as many American homes as 
Time and Newsweek which were ferociously anti-Truma.'l.. The fallowing 
is an example of Newsweek's analysis of Dewey's speeches. "3ven if 
Dewey rarely got down to specific issues, his audiences liked what 
he said. 1178 Such divination boggles the mind. Not only were Dewey's 
speeches sleep-inducing, but seldom did they evoke the kind of au-
~ience reaction Truman got. Usually, Dewey's crowds applauded with 
polite restraint. Oregon, a state noted for its rambunctious elec-
tioneering, greeted the New Yorker with apathy. According to one 
report, "Dewey drove through Portland to applause so feeble it would 
not have brought a vaudeville hoofer back for an encore. Yet he is 
practically certain to win in Oregon. 1179 
Still the press continued to bestow its benediction on Dewey. 
They billed him as the "new Dewey, the human Dewey." They worked 
to overcome the image of a cold, aloof personality. The results 
were embarrassing. Dewey was quiet and reserved by nature, and the 
artificial camaraderie he displayed occasionally seemed stilted and 
7711Cautious Tom," Nation, October 16, 1948, P• 416. 
?B"The Dewey Calm," Newsweek, October 4, 1948, P• 20. 
79Richard Neuberger, "Slow-Bell Campaign in the Northwest," 
Nation, October 16, 1948, P• 422. 
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awkward. For instance, wher. n. bold woman in _ ,·;ck Islancl) .Illinois, 
screeched "Hi, Tom!" while he was talking, the "new Da',..-e;: 11 smiled, 
waved and yelled back "Hi !1180 This much touted story wa:._0 as out of 
keeping with his personality, as his romp with the Oregon 1..:avemen. 
However, this was the portrayal the press wished to props:~te. 
The Dewey train moved westward with "leisurely assvra.nce. 11 
The crowds in Illinois, Iowa, Colorado, Arizona and Nc1; !exicc turned 
t t h th 11 l 'tt · 1 t · t d 11 f th ,..,or, · · · t Bl ou o ear e g J. ering p-a 1 u es o e u t canu:.tc '~ .e. 
Like Truman, Dewey spoke to his admirers from the rear platform of 
the train; but unlike Truman, he never changed the format of his 
talks. He appealed for "unity, 11 promised hoILest and com;.'et ent gov-
ernment, denounced those who played group against group a:1d criticized 
the nation's "wobbling" foreign policy.
82 
His most popu13.r statement, 
however, dealt with the Communist issue.* Said Dewey, "~::-:.~ s adminis-
tration asked Congress for $25,000,000 to spot and fire th0 Communists 
80 
The. Dewey Calm," p. 19. 
8111D · c1· · d th '.I t '' T' o t b 4 - 9t' '.< -1 ogi igin an • e :;es , ~' c o er , .l to, p. c:. • 
*During the height of the 1948 campaign, ::'.:lizabeth 3entley 
and Whittaker Chambers, former Comr:mnist party mem'oers, te2tified 
before the House Un-American Activities CorrJnittee th.:-it Cr:irr,:ntmist 
groups had O:?erated in :iashington, J.C. before and J.uril:i;,_ the war. 
Alger Hiss, 43-year old former State Department offici3.l haci been 
identified as a key member of the ring of Communists wit:~in the 
gove~nment. :'his became a major issue in the campaign. l'rurr.:in 
branded the Comr.iittee's hearings and its demand for federal employee's 
records as a "red herring," and prol".lised to fi;ht the cer::;;a.it;n issue 
along that line. Governor Dewey promised to 11promptly 11 n.d U.e gov-
ernment of all Communists. ( 11.Spy Investigation, ;i Newswe•·iS, August 30, 
1948, p. 15; "'.fide of the Mark," Tine, August 16, 194.3 1 '.~. 17; and 
"Communist Control Plans, 11 U.S. H~ September 10, 191+3, t=• 18.) 
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whom they ther1selves put in the government. I have a better way to 
handle t!1e Communists--and a cheaper one. '.1e won't put any Cormnunists 
in the governr.ient in the first plri.ce. ,,33 
The "Bl'1ck Viustache," the Navajo's name for Dewey, paid special 
attention to the newly enfranchised Indians in trew Mexico and Arizona. 
Presur:iably, they 1.-1ere registering under the Republican banner. 1Je'.vey 
and his wife posed happily with the Ind.ians.
84 
Los Angeles was a high-water-mark for the Governor. Urged by 
the top California. Republicans to cnange his approach, Dewey deli-
vered a pepped up speech which "wowed'' the audience of 23 ,ooo. 
According to the !\e11s11eek, Dewey didn't like the revision as well as 
the original, but he was told to get down from his Olympian heit;hts 
and sock it to them. Since he had failed so miserably in his 1944 
speech in Los AnBeles, Dewey had no alternative but to acquiesce.
85 
The main thrust of his speech was Comrmnism. rte proposed a counter-
offensive of propaganda against the Reds, and ridiculed I'ruman for 
ref erring to the threat as a "red herrint;. '' 
Encourap;ed by t!-1e res:9onse in Los Angeles, Jewey maintained 
his "pugnacious'' stance at San Francisco. He still refused to use 
Truman's n:1.me in his talks, 'but there wn.s no doubt w".lo he meant 
when he n.ccused the Administration of "drop?ing mon..'key wrenches into 
the economic mGchinery." The audience must have been :sileased with 
hi6 short-lived sluggins match; t~ey interru~ted his speech 32 times 
831'The Jewey Calm, 11 p. 20. 
8411Dogi Cligin. 11 85"The Dewey Calm." 
with applause.86 
Despite this brief departure from his usual high-flown style, 
it is generally acknowledged that Dewey maintained a temperate tone 
throughout his campaign. So much s0, in fact, that the press com-
plained it was a dull show. Dewey's refusal to spar with Truman 
"suppressed the natural excitement" of a Presidential race. Moder-
ate and non-controversial, "Dewey's campaign increasingly came to 
resemble an elaborate lecture tour. 1187 Jules Abels inserted in his 
book a list of hackneyed sayings taken from Dewey's speeches. The 
inventory was compiled by the Democratic National Comird.ttee. "You 
know that your future lies ahead of you," "Our streams should 
"l.bound with fish," "Everyone that rides in a car or bus uses gas-
oline or oil," "The miners of our country are vital to our welfare." 
No one could take exception to these comments and apparently that 
was the only objective of the Dewey team. They deliberately avoided 
any "specifics." Said Zlliott Bell, one of "'SJewey's speech-writers, 
it is far more difficult "to write a speech saying nothing, than to 
write a speech saying something. 1188 With this non-committal attitude 
firmly entrenched in their minds, the Dewey "Victory Special" toured 
the Pacific Northwest, then raced home through Wyoming, Kansas and 
M~ssouri. 
On October 3, Dewey returned to Albany, having completed an 
8,862-mile trip. Though his th:·~at had been sprayed every morning, 
8611Dogi Cligin." 
87Ross, p. 205. 
88 
Abels, P• 189. 
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it seemed none the worse for ~1ear after delivering thirteen formal 
addresses and forty-seven rear platform speeches.* Nor had his con-
fidence been weakened as to the final result of the race--though he 
should have given more pause for reflection. 89 "The crowds were 
good--but no more than good--and they reflected their candidates 
calm confidence. 1190 The polls continued to sustain Dewey in his 
erroneous belief of ultimate victory. Dewey's team should have 
been more alert. 
Elliott Bell admitted to Irwin Ross in an interview after the 
election, that the warning signs of public apathy were plainly 
visible had they been wise enough to divine the meaning. The crowds 
were appreciably smaller, but they missed the point. Bell recalled, 
"'We hit Salt Lake City around five p.m. I was strack by the fact 
that there were very few people on the sidewalks--and a good many 
people walking hardly bothered to look at the motorcade.' He was 
puzzled, but hardly worried."9l 
• • • * • • • 
The game of electioneering would not be complete without the 
campaign tours of the vice-presidential candidates. Thus while Tru-
man and Dewey paused between bouts, Alben Barkley and Earl Warren 
*Truman had traveled slightly less than Dewey. 
8,;00 miles, yet delivered more speeches--140 in all. 
Me :.~arry," Newsweek, October 11, 1948, P• 26.) 
He covered 
("They Call 
89"The Human Dewey," Newsweek, October 11, 1948, p. 27. 
9011Dogi Cligin," p. 21. 
91Ross, p. 207. 
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continued to stump the country for votes. 
Barkley, the "poor man's candidate," traveled by plane, train 
and rented car. He covered thirty-six states and made over 250 
speeches. He spoke anywhere and everywhere--in hotel dining rooms, 
town halls, jerry-built platforms and trailer trucks. Like all 
good running mates, Barkley refrained from voicing his own opinions, 
but instead echoed ~ruman's views. However, in all fairness to the 
Veep, it has been noted that he far surpassed Truman in delivery. 
His energy was astounding arid his good temper unfailing. When asked 
by a New Haven reporter if he thought the Democrats would win, he 
replied with a chuckle: "Certainly. What do you think I'm running 
around for? 1192 
Governor Earl \farren' s tour was in sharp contrast to Barkley's. 
The vice-presidential candidate traveled the United States in a 15-
car train almost as luxurious as that of a president. He left Sac-
ramento, California on September 15, for a thirty-one-day campaign. 
His route took him across the Rockies to Utah, south to New Mexico, 
then through Texas, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Kentucky, north to Ohio 
and Michigan, east to the New England and Middle Atlantic States, 
dipped briefly into the South, thence on to the 'Midwest and back 
h9me to California.93 Though he covered a lot of territory, the 
pace seemed to have no negative effects on his physical stamina. 
He ""as relaxed and amiable. The speeches he delivered were devoid 
9211Poor Man's Candidate," Time, October 4, 1948, P• 20. 
93Ernest K. Lindley, "The Warren Good-Will Tour," Newsweek, 
October 18, 1948, p. 34. 
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of substance, but he was er.gaging, folksy a.~d apparently sincere. 
''Little wonder that the Governor's campaign became known as the 
'Warren goodwill tour. 11194 
Just before the President embarked on his Eastern tour, av 
unfortunate incident occurred which many felt had further diminished 
his chances for victory in November. According to Time, Truman was 
groping for some gesture which would improve his waning political 
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fortunes. "I've got to do something dramatic," the President pur-
portedly said, as he paced around the White House.95 Thus on October 3, 
Truman made the decision to send Chief Justice Fred Vinson on a 
personal mission of peace. He was to meet with Stalin in the hope 
of achieving a better understanding between the United States and 
Russia. Secretary of State Marshall strenuously objected to the 
move, and the plans were ultimately canceled.96 Dewey did not use 
the incident as a campaign issue, but the political debacle was 
not forgotten by the press. In the New York Times Dewey's cohorts 
were quoted as saying the Vinson affair was "an error of judgment 
of such proportions that it could alone be sufficient to swing the 
election, if the contest were in doubt" ••• as it is, "the effect ••• 
will be to increase the size of victory. 1197 
On October 6, Truman left on a three-day whirlwind tour of 
94Lindley, Ross, p. 210, and "Out-Unified," Time, Octoter 4, 
1948, P• 21. 
95"You Have to Do Something," Time, October 18, 1948, P• 23. 
96Ibid. 
9?special to the New York Times, October 11, 1948. 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and upsta.te New York. It was 
during this brief campaign trip that the news of the abortive Vinson 
mission hit the headlines. But the revelation in no way diminished 
the enthusiasm of the crowds. In f:3.ct, they grew larger and more 
vociferous at every stopping point.98 
The President's "entertainment value" was foisted off as the 
excuse for the large turnouts. In Philadelphia tr.e streets of the 
Republican donunated city were lined with 500,000 cheering spec-
taters. And in the Convention Hall, 14,000 people yelled, screamed, • 
stomped and applauded for so long that Truman lost five minutes of 
his precious air time. The President brought down the house when 
he said, "I'd rather have lasting peace in the world than be Pres-
ident. I live for peace, I work for peace, and I pray for peace. 1199 
Jersey City was a duplicate of Philadelphia, except that Frank 
Hague, the Democratic boss, was now "eating crow." The 300-car 
Presidential motorcade drove down the streets to the accompaniment 
of 300,000 cheering voices. Time magazine reported the crowds were 
lined 40 deep. A fireworks display illuminated the "triumphal pro-
cession" as it wound its way to the high school auditorium. Inci-
dentally, the display caused the only mishap of the day. Sparks 
from the Niagara Falls replica ignited some paper decorations which 
fell into the car bearing Mrs. Truman and Representative Mary Norton. 
Secret Service agents quickly eY.tinguished the flames. The women 
9B"Will Rogers Truman," Newsweek, October 18, 1948, P• 33. 
99.,Why They Came Out," Time, October 18, 1948, p. 24·, and 
''Will Rogers Truman." 
remained smilingly unmoved a~ the visitation :ontinued without 
another hitch.lOO 
Not even rain deterred the crowds from welcoming Truman. In 
Syracuse, New York, the audience listened enraptured as the Presi-
dent spoke from under a beach umbrella. In Auburn, John Taber's 
domain, 7,000 people braved a violent cloudburst in order to hear 
Truman lash out against his foe. "Your congressman used a butcher 
knife, a saber and a meat ax on every forward-looking appropriation," 
said Truman. He called the performance "The Taber Dance." The 
story repeated itself again in Albany as the people stood "glee-
fully" in an early morning downpour. During the month of October 
the crowds grew from large to stupendous. 
John L. Lewis still bellowed his disapproval of the President, 
but the words were being drowned out by the tide of Trumanite fol-
lowers. James C. Petrillo, president of the .~FL American Federation 
of Musicians, "tooted his horn" for the Democratic candidate. ·when 
asked why he had joined Truman's bandwagon Petrillo res?onded, "Be-
cause he's a piano player." Reminded that Dewey was a singer, Mr. 
Petrillo stated that it was irrelevant since "church baritones were 
t · d h · · · d · t · 
11101 Th t · d ·o t no ou si e is Juris ic ion. e repar ee was enJoye , u 
lesson was learned. 
Exhilarated, in spite of the continued harassment about the 
lOODispatches from the New York Times, October 8 and 9, 1948. 
10111For and Against Truman," Newsweek, October 18, 1948, P• 38. 
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Vinson affair, Truman set off on another tour through th~ Midwest 
on October 10. Ee stumped six states in six days, traveling a total 
of 3,700 miles. The crowds he drew were fantastic. Charter Heslep 
calculated 3,387,000 peo!)le had seen rruman since Labor Day.102 But 
true to form, the press predicted he would lose. " ••• Few people," 
printed Time magazine, "gave him even an outside chance of getting 
the electoral votes necessary for election." It is still a senatorial 
103 race. And Newsweek accused the President of attempting to start 
a chain reaction. "When a Presidential candidate is up against 
insuperable odds," stated the magazine, "he must convince himself, 
so he can convince others, so they can convince still others, that 
h · h . . d . 1 111 o4 H . t . f t . 1 . d. is c ances are improving ai y. aving sa is ac ori y ri i-
culed the President, the article then went on to enumerate Truman's 
successes in Ohio, Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Indiana and West 
Virginia. 
On October 11, 100,000 people lined the streets of Akron, Ohio, 
and later 2,500 jammed into the city's armory to hear the President 
"take the hide off 'em from top to bottom." In Illinois, the state's 
electoral votes were supposedly written off as "hopeless;" yet rruman 
drew a capacity audience at Springfield where the crowd whco?ed with 
d~light at his "me too" characterization of Dewey. This was on 
October 12. The following day in Minnesota, St. Paul's civic theatre 
l02,.T I A II u , 0 t b 25 1948 27 rurnan s cres, 11ewswee~<, c o er , , P• • 
l03"The Real Fight," Time, October 25, 1948, p. 21. 
lo4 "Prayer for a Chain Beaction," Newsweek, October 25, 1948, 
P• 27. 
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and three adjacent halls were filled with 15,000 persons. Hubert 
Humphrey grinned his approval as the President delivered his most 
caustic speech to date. He called Dewey "mealy-mouthed," he said the 
GOP "either corrupts its liberals or it expels them." The crowd cheered 
42 times. Still the press asked, "Did the cheers mean votes?"l05 Truma,.-i 
appeared to relish his position. He had always held Dewey in disdain 
and had no compunction about driving the shaft deep. "This is no 
parlor game, 11 said '.Lruman about his hard-fisted campaign.106 
At the famous university city of Madison, Wisconsin, the stu-
dents demonstrated with all the native gusto of youth--30,000 citizens 
thronged the streets. At Milwaukee's Borchert ball park, 10,000 
turned out. And as the train swung into Indiana on October 15, the 
numbers became even more astonishing; 25,000 at Kokomo, 20,000 at 
Ham.~ond, 12,000 at Logansport, 9,000 at Tipton, and 45,000 at the 
War Memorial in Indianapolis. On October 16, in ~Jest Virginia, 
ex-senator Matthew M. Neely told the President that he hadn't "a 
doubt in the world" that his state would go Democratic. 107 
Truman was pleased with the trip. "He had consistently out-
drawn Dewey. In St. Paul, Dewey had an audience of only 7,000 to 
Truman's 21,000. In Hammond, Indiana, 20,000 turned out to see 
Truman, only 15,000 for his rival." There were going to be a lot 
of surprised pollsters on November 3, predicted Truman. "We have 
105 "Truman's Acres," P• 27. 
1o6' 
Abels, p. 236. 
l07Dispatch to the New York Times, October 12, 1948, and 
"Truman's Acres," p. 28. 
not had a dud on the trip."l08 
This was not braggadocio on Truman's part. He believed his 
victory was certain and proved it by taking his own poll. On Octo-
ber 13, as the train was traveling from Duluth to St. Paul, Truman 
gave George Elsey, one of his aides, a state-by-state breakdown of 
the election. His forecast showed he would win by 340 electoral votes, 
Dewey would poll 108, Thurmond 42, i/ith 37 doubtful. Tue President 
did not reveal his figures to the press because he felt it would give 
them more ammunition to ridicule him. Thus when the reporters asked 
him if he thought he would win, the President retorted, "That's your 
job. That's what you're along for. I am the candidate. The candi-
date is not going to comment. He's optirnistic. 11109 
Dewey also began another week's tour on October 11, the day 
after Truman started his Midwest campaign. This time he was going 
to cover nine states in the East and Midwest. Pittsburg, the steel 
capital of America, was to be the jumping-off point. Here Dewey 
delivered his principal labor speech of the carnpaign. 110 
According to Time magazine, reporters expected Dewey to dis-
cuss possible changes in the Taft-Hartley law because it was still 
a·source of contention with labor. Yet Dewey would make no promises. 
"Labor has its special problems," he said. "But these problems 
10811If I Hadn't Been There," Time, October 25, 1948, P• 24. 
l09Margaret Truman, p. 36, and Ross, P• 221. 
llO"Victory in the Air," Time, October 18, 1948, p. 24. 
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have not been solved ••• by separating labor from the rest of America." 
In direct reference to the hated Taft-Hartley bill, ':Jewey, said, "The 
new law is not perfect. Ho law, or any other human handiwork, is 
perfect. It can always be improved and wherever and whenever it 
needs change it will be changed. 11111 Labor was puzzled. 
A perceptible shift in tone was noticed in Dewey's speech, 
however. It has been conjectured that ~ruman's growint; box-office 
appeal and his co!ltinued jibes against Dewey had finally scored a hit. 
Piqued by the attacks, Dewey retaliated against the Administration 
by calling it "weak,'' "fumbling," "unstable," "irresponsible,'' "in-
com?etent, 11 and 0 miserable." Nevertheless, if TJewey was beginning 
to experience qualms about the outcome on November 2, he concealed 
it well. Like Truman, he displayed a resolute, victorious counte-
nance. Even when the crowds i·rere sr:iall, Dewey and his teammates 
unhesitatingly explained it away. 11 ••• In every ca1:1~n.ign Governor 
Dewey had entered he had lost when the crowds were big and won when 
the crowds ~vere small," said his confident friends. 112 In the mean-
time, the journalistic world continued to laud his performance. 
Time, with its usual penchant for exaggeration, reported that 
the Dewey staff could hardly see any reason for making the tri?• 
This. was wri~ten on October 25, just shortly before the election. 
But, the article continued, since the tour h8.d been scheduled, the 
Dewey staff felt obli~ed to go. 113 
111Ibid. 
11211Confidence on ·rlheels," Newsweek, October 25, 1948, P• 28. 
ll3"Don't ':forry About He,'' Time, October 25, 1943, :?• 21. 
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In Louisville, Kentuc'..:y ~ ":Jewey endorsP,1 Senator John Sherman 
Cooper for reelection. "Don't worry about me," said Dewey, empha-
sizing his concern about the senatorial race. He then made an 
oblique reference to the Vinson mission.114 
The tour was dogged by unpleasantries. In Ht. Vernon, Illi-
nois, four teenage boys--Time called them "hoodlums"--spattered Dewey 
with tomatoes. At Beaucoup, Illinois, the engineer of the train 
inadvertently backed into the crowd. No one was injured, but Dewey, 
caught off-guard, lost his composure and snapped: "That's the first 
lunatic I've had for an engineer. He probably ought to be shot at 
· 115 
sunrise but I guess we can let him off because no one was hurt." 
Surprisingly, the incident caused quite a furor. The engineer 
remarked at an interview when told of Dewey's reaction: "I think as 
116 much of Dewey as I did before and that's not very much." Truman 
made great sport of the slip. "I was highly pleased when I found 
out ••• that the train crew on this train are all Democrats," said 
the President three days after the incident. "We have had wonderful 
train crews all around the country and they've been just as kind to 
us as they could posdbly be. 11117 Dewey was not to be forgiven. 
The Democrats determinedly set out to prove the hap~ening meant 
Dewe·y was hostile to the workingman. 
11411confidence on Wheels." 
ll5"Don 1 t Worry About Me,"; "Confi'.'lence on ':/heels, and 
Dispatch to the New York Times, October 13, 1948. 
11611confidence on Wheels." 
117Dispatch to the New York Times, October 15, 1948. 
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The "Victory Special 11 r'Jlled into Oklo· ... 11a. and Ldo,;ey, once 
again, made his pitch for the Republican Senator from t;}·,e c;tate. 
"Don't worry about me, but vote for Ross Rizley for the senate. 
We need him on our team in ·,fashinr;ton .. " The crowds were not large. 
At Sapulpa, the candidate and his wife greeted Mrs. Dewe;v' s parents, 
the Orla T. Hutts. Afterwards, they had dinner at their home.118 
The crowds were described as "mildly curious" whenever Dewey's 
motorcade drove from the train to the hall where he was to speak. The 
campaign lacked verve. The candidate's speeches were soporific. "As 
never before," droned Dewey, "we need a rudder to our sl:ip of state and 
we need a firm hand at the tiller ••• We know the kind of ;::overnment we 
have now. It's tired. It's confused. It scolds and co:nplains ••• It's 
119 coming apart at the seams." So was his campaign. 
In Missouri he got bursitis, but no electoral votes. In Minn-
esota he plugged away for Senator Joe Ball who was fighting for his 
political life against the upstart, Hubert Humphrey, and got splattered 
by another tomato for his efforts. At St. Paul's Municipal Audi-
torium, he played host to a half empty hall, presum3.b1y because of 
the rain.120 Immediately after St. Paul, Dewey ms.de a benevolent 
visit to 2ensselaer, Indiana, to smooth things over with Charles 
HC!-lleck. 
11811Don' t Worry About Me," PP• 21-23; ''Confidence on Wheels," 
and Dispatch to the New York Times, October 13, 1948. 
ll9"Don't Worry About Me." 
12011confidence on Wheels," p. 29. 
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If the tour wa.sn' t tr:'..:.lmphant, the welr:-:me Dewey received from 
his mother made up for everything. "Mater"* met her boy at Jackson, 
Michigan. "Where's my Tommy?" questioned Mrs. Dewey at the trainside. 
They embraced and posed for the photographers. "Was there ever such a 
lucky man as I am?" beamed Dewey. "I have a wonderful mother and a 
wonderful wife and they are both here with me."121 Everyone was happy 
and together they set out for Owosso, Michigan, the candidate's home 
town. He was popular there. Twenty-thousand people lined the streets 
of Owosso to cheer their hero. Nine bands blared their welcome, and 
nine floats, depicting Dewey's life, rolled past in review. This was 
121 his greatest success. Contentedly, Dewey entrained for Albany 
that evening. "There was just one more week to go." 123 
News reports were sparse about the Wallace and Dixiecrats 
movements. Both parties had "peaked" months before the final push 
f' h . 124 o_ t e campaign. While Truman and Dewey were slugging it out, 
Wallace and Thurmond were losing ground rapidly; their political 
supporters deserting them. In October, Newsweek reported that a 
rift had developed between Henry '1/allace and his campaign manager, 
"Beanie" Baldwin. At a $100-a-plate dinner at the Commodore Hotel 
in New York, "Beanie" announced the Progressives would endorse the 
*"Mater" was the name Dewey used when addressing his mother. 
121 "Don't Worry About Me," P• 22. 
12211Confidence on Wheels." 
123"Don' t ·Ylorry About He." 
124 Ross, p. 224. 
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liberal Democrats. Chester 3owles and Repre::;;~.1tative Helen Gahagan 
Douglas of California. #allace was caught off-guard and reproach-
fully said, "'We've got to build a party.' And how could you build 
it with 'guys' like Bowles who 'go in two directions at one time' 
or even with people like 'Helen Gahagan Dulles (sic)? 111125 The next 
day, Wallace informed the press there had been no misunderstanding 
between "Beanie" and himself. The newspapers had misinterpreted, 
he said. But it was obvious to all that the Progressive Party was 
deteriorating. The situation was equally distressing for Thurmond. 
His own cousin, 35-year old "Hummon" Talmadge of Georgia, hesitated 
126 to join the Dixiecrat ranks. No one wanted to waste his vote on a 
loser. Consequently. the lai::-t months of the campaign were for Wallace 
and Thurmond anticli~actic. 
"I am very tired," said Henry '.'!allace upon corr.pletion of an-
other sixteen-state speaking tour.127 It was the end of October 
1948 and he had been campaigning for al~ost two years. The violence 
which 't/alla.ce met on his Southern tour attested to the underlying 
truth of hate and prejudice.• Nevertheless, his atte~pt to gain 
the confidence of the American people failed. Many reasons have 
12511The Ross and Beanie," Newsweek, October 4, 1948, p. 23. 
12611As Georgia Goes," Newsweek, October 11, 1948, P• 29. 
12711Running Down," Newsweek, November 1, 1948, P• 26. 
•rn Houston, Texas, a seaman let loose with a barrage of eggs 
and tomatoes just as Henry Wallace began an address before an un-
segregated audience. As the policeman hustled him out he explained 
apologetically, ''I gave the guy three chances and he still couldn't 
hit Wallace, so I threw him out." ("Fair Try", Newswe~, October 11, 
1948, P• 29.) 
been given for his rapid decl::ne in popularity. Soviet intransigence, 
negative press reports, the fiasco of the Philadelphia Convention, 
lack of labor support, campaigning too early, the takeover of the 
civil rights issue by the Democratic party and Wallace's own imperfec-
tions as a politician were said to have precipitated his fall. 
Prospects of success had been so bleak in Wallace's filltll 
campaign that a few weeks prior to the election he resorted to radio 
broadcasts. The Progressive Party was no longer attracting the 
crowds and it was felt another media should be employed. Wallace had 
used radio broadcasts in the past, but never with such frequency. 
However, this last ditch-stand proved as abortive as the other tech-
n;.ques. "'.i:'he Progressives left no stone unturned. They neglected 
no possible technique or medium--old or new, tried or unproven--for 
publicizing their candidates and canpaign. From comic books to 
billboards, they attenpted to blanket the nation."128 All to no 
avail. 
Karl M. Schmidt, who has done one of the most comprehensive 
studies on the election results, concerning 'dallace, claimed that 
the downward trend indicated by the pollsters was far from accurate. 
"From an early high of 11.5 percent in February, the pollsters had 
ch~rted a decline of popular sentiment to 7.5 percent in April, 
6 percent in J'une and again in August, and to a final 4 percent 
in the final days of the campaig1:. The actual Progressive vote 
128Karl M. Schmidt, Henry A. ·,fallace: .~uixotic Crusade (New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1960), p. 234. 
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amounted to 2.37 per cent of ~he total casL 11129 
Governor J. Strom Thurmond may have been a poor choice as a 
presidential candidate, but he was well suited for the role of comic-
relief in the election of 1948. In late July, Thurmond wrote a 
letter to William H. Hastie, the governor of the Virgin Islands, 
inviting him to visit South Carolina. "It is my earnest hope that, 
during my term of office you and your far.iily will honor South Carolina 
with a visit to Columbia and be our guests at the Mansion." Hastie 
declined. Later, Thurmond was appalled to discover what he had done. 
"I didn't know Governor Hastie was a Negro. Of course, it would have 
been ridiculous to have invited him,'' said Thurmond ungraciously.130 
By mid-October, Governor Thurmond's judgment had not improved 
one bit. He boasted that the Southern states would give him 100 
electoral votes, enough to throw the election into the House. 
Furthermore, he contended most, if not all, the Southern states 
b h . d h. 131 were e in im. One writer for Newsweek seemed to agree. The 
Wallace movement was gaining impetus. He noted, Thurmond and 
Wright were on the ballot in thirteen states and "awaiting a court 
decision to get on the ballot in Oklahoma. 11132 They were listed 
l30"The Pot Boils," Time, October 25, 1948, p. 24, and Ross, 
P• 232. 
l3l"The Unsolved South," Newsweek, October 18, 1948, p. 34. 
l3211Truman's 1:/rong Guess," Newsweek, October 25, 1948, P• 32. 
as the regular Democratic CB.n:iidates• in Alc.cama, Mississippi, Loui-
siana and South Carolina. According to Irwin Ross, Truman and Barkley 
did not appear on the ballot at all in Alabama due to a peculiarity 
in the law.133 In Tennessee, Arkansas, Georgia, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Kentucky, Texas and North Dakota, the Thurmond-Wright 
ticket was listed as States' Rights Democrats. In Florida there was 
no party designation.134 
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Allegations that Thurmond was a tool of oil and business interests 
appears to have little validity. His campaign was "as spartan as that 
of Norman Thomas. 11135 Money was always a problem. Jules Abels claimed 
that if the oil interests did finance Thurmond, ''the low gear in which 
the States' Rights campaign was conducted (it consisted of a~out thirty-
five major speeches made by him alone) would testify, if anything, to 
the meager resources" of his backers.136 The fact that Thurmond 
stumped the Southern states with only his wife as his companion would 
further argue the impecunious position of his party. 
Money alone did not cause the decline of the Dixiecrats, how-
ever, Thurmond himself stated that an air of futility pervaded the 
movement. The Dixiecrats were seriously handicapped because they were 
*The States' Rights :Jer.iocrats claimed to be the "true Democratic 
Party in the Deep South." They frowned on being dubbed the "Dixie-
crats," and were "even unhappier about calling 'l'ruman followers 
'Democrats.'" In retaliation, they coined the word "'I'rumancrats." 
("Dixie," Newsweek, October 18, 1948, P• 34.) 
133Ross 230 t P• • 
134 "Truman's Wrong Guess," p. 32. 
135Ross, P• 231. 136 Abels, P• 215. 
a "third party in an essenti::illy two-party Ey.stem ••• Party regularity 
has become engrained in the electorate ••• voters have been wary of 
giving all out support to minor parties, regardless of the worth of 
their objectives, because of a feeling that they would 'lose their 
votes' through ineffectiveness if cast for third party candidates. 11137 
Fear of political reprisals was another reason given for the drop in 
recruits. In 1928, the South had denied Al Smith its support. It 
took years for the Democrats to heal the wound, and many cautioned 
against a repetition.138 The adverse publicity of the press, focusing 
on the white-supremacy issue, also dealt the movement a blow. (It 
should be pointed out here that Truman was criticized by nearly all the 
lli~jor newspapers in the United States, including the Southern journals.) 
Lastly, Ader cites the growing liberalism of the South itself as a 
major factor of disunity. From all evidence, there existed a basic 
h D. . t th t . 139 disagreement amongst t e ixiecra s on e race ques ion. 
No longer is there anything like unanir.lity of belief in 
the maintenance of the status quo as far as the Negro 
is concerned. uue to the work of progressive politicians, 
journalists, clergymen, and others, and to a changing 
southern environment, there has developed a new concept of 
the place of the Negro in southern society. There is to be 
found below the Mason-Dixon line today a belief in Neg:o. 139 advancement diametrically opposed to the Dixiecrat position. 
Faced with all these negative factors, it should not be 
l37Emile B. Ader, "Why the Dixiecrats Failed," Journal of 
Politics, August, 1953, P• 359. 
l38Abels, p. 219. 
139Ader, p. 360 
140
Ibid., P• 366. 
surprising the southerners foiled to flock t.:i Thurmond's banner. The 
consequences were too great; the hurdles too high. As he concluded 
his campaign, desertions became more common. Still he had his ad-
mirers. "Whatever the fallacies of the reasoning, Thurmond's can-
didacy is one which he personally and the South can look back on 
with pride," opined Jules Abels. "He was no extremist. 11141 
Norman Thomas, the perennial presidential candidate of the 
Socialist party, announced that the 1948 election would be his last 
race. With his unfailing good humor he said, "I have made almost as 
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many farewell tours for the Presidency as Sarah Bernhardt. But, ladies 
142 and gentlemen, this is your l<J.st chance." His running mate for the 
1948 election was Tucker Smith, a "Quaker, labor organizer, educator, 
and forty-nine-year-old fighter for free socialism. 11143 
Thomas at sixty-three was conducting his sixth and final cam-
paign for the highest office in the land. Like Thurmond, he did 
not expect to win, but he did hope that the disavowed liberal Demo-
crats would join the Socialists "in the creation of a new mass party 
144 similar to Britain's Labor Party." With Truman's victory, of 
course, the longed-for political realignment was defunct. 
141 Abels, p. 215. 
14211The Pot Bo1· 1s," T · 0 t b 25 1948 24 ~' c o er , , P• • 
143McAlister Coleman, "Why I'll Vote for Thomas," Nation, 
October 2, 1948, P• 368. 
144Harry Fleischman, Norman Thomas (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 1964) p. 234. 
Though Thomas polled :ewer votes in th2 1948 election (140,260) 
than he ever had before, his popularity was unquestioned. He was a 
man of high principles and possessed a wit which endeared him to all. 
Typical of his humor were the following comments made at a lunc~eon 
given in his honor. 111.lhile I'd rather be right than President, at 
any time I'o ready to be both." And again, "I'm the only r.18.ll in 
America who can stand on a platform. In fact, I'm the only one with 
a platform to stand on." A newsman present at the occasion remarked, 
"Why, we'd do anything for that guy! Anything, that is, except give 
him our votes. 11145 Unfortunately for 'l'homas, the :reporter summarized 
the attitude of the voting public of America. 
The countdown had begun. It was the final week of the campaign, 
and Truman, with a volcanic burst of energy, started his last tour. 
It surpassed all the others. As November 2 drew nearer, the crowds 
became almost hysterical. No Rock singer had ever topped Truman's 
performance. 
In Chicago, the motorcade was reduced to a crawl because of the 
146 crowds. "The Chicago Democratic organization pulled out every 
political stop known to man, 11 said Margaret Truman.147 Fifty-
thousand people marched in a parade from the Blackstone Hotel to the 
169 
Chicago Stadium, with another 500,000 people cheering on the sidelines. 
The f es ti ve mood was climaxed by a gigantic fireworks displa~· which 
146New York Times, October 26, 1948. 
147 Margaret Truman, p. 36. 
had "enough flame ••• to burn the whole town."148 Truman knew how 
to enjoy the scenario. 
A few days previously in Pittsburg, rruman launched into a comic 
routine. before an audience of 15,000 in the Hunt Armory. It was con-
sidered his most spectacular performance of the presidential contest. 
With all the flourish of a master showman, Truman recited the dialogue 
between a doctor and his patient. Twirling his imaginary mustache the 
doctor asks, "You've been bothered much by issues lately?" 
The patient replies, "Not bothered, exactly. Of course, we've 
had quite a few ••• '' 
Doctor: "You shouldn't think about issues. What you need is 
my brand of soothing syrup--! call it 'unity.'" 
Patient: 11 •• .'•Jhat is wrong with me?" 
Doctor: "I never discuss issues with a patient. But what you 
need is a major operation--Not very serious. It will just mean taking 
out the complete works and putting in a Republican administration." 
The grandstands hooted their approval and Pennsylvania's Demo-
cratic leade::-, Senator Francis J. Hyers said, "When they fill even 
the doorways, windows and rooftops, it could mean victory. 11149 
Catholics, Jews and Negroes were of primary concern to Truman 
i~ his final week of campaigning. Consequently, in Boston, Truman 
148nispatch from the New York Times, October 25, 1948; "View 
from a Polling 3ooth," Time, November 1, 1948, p. 21, and Margaret 
Truman, p. 36-37. 
149 11Trying Hard," Newsweek, November 1, 1948, p. 19. 
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referred to Al Smith and th~ ar.ti-Catholic sentiment ai:ned at him by 
the GOP in 1928. In Harlem, the President discussed the civil rights 
issue. In Madison Square Garden, he made a direct appeal to Jewish 
voters when he asked for "a strong, prosperous, free and indepe11dent 
Israel. 11150 Th 1 . . h" en apsing into is now familiar comic routine, Truman 
told how he had complained to his doctor that he had the feeling 
somebody was following him. His doctor told him not to worry. 
"There is one place where that fellow is not going to follow you--
and that's in the White House. 11151 
"Yes, I'm for Harry Truman, the human being. By the same token 
I'm against Thomas E. Dewey, the mechanical man," proclaimed the 
throaty Tallulah Bankhead.152 The blow fell short of its mark. The 
"mechanical man" wasn't listening. The November 1 issue of Newsweek 
reported Thomas E. Dewey showed no outward signs that he was even 
running for the Presidency. ."With only a handful of days left before 
Election Day, he seemed to be more concerned with his duties as 
governor of New York than with the hurly-burly of the Presidential 
campaign."l53 Incredible but true. Not even the taunting jibes of 
his adversaries could shake him loose from his complacency. He still 
150 Abels, PP• 244-245. 
151Margaret Truman, P• 37. 
l52Anthony Leviero, Special t.o the New York Times, October 
22, 1948. 
l53"Coastin~," Newsweek, November 1, 1948, P• 19. 
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preached "unity'' and sighed for tte end of the campaign. 154 
Tradition prescribed, as the Time magazine put it, that the 
Presidential candidates make one final, last-minute appeal and per-
haps "a low blow or two, just before the bell."l55 Accordingly, 
Dewey leaped back into the fray. His pulse had quickened somewhat 
at the persistent vitriolic attacks from Truman. But his desire to 
extract a "pound of flesh" was squelched by his advisers. Fearing 
any rebuttal would be interpreted as weakness, Dewey continued to 
deliver his "sorry bromides." In Chicago, he cautiously chastised 
the President for his "r.iudslinging" campaign, and insisted he would 
never stoop to such a level. In Boston, Dewey devoted the major por-
tion of his speech to his welfare program. And on October 30, the 
156 Governor concluded his campaign at a .Madison Square Garden rally.-
Truman ended his canpaign in St. Louis at the Kiel Auditorium. 
His speech, labeled one of his "greatest," was completely extempora-
neous.157 This was on October 30, the same day Dewey was enjoying 
h . h . ht . . N Y k C · t l5B is tore lig paraoe in iew or i y. Although the campaign 
had officially concluded, Truman made two more speeches the follow-
ing day. "The first was a non-political address to members of the 
Ara.rat Shrine in Kansas City Auditorium during the afternoon." 
l55"View from the Polling Booth," Time, November 1, 1948, P• 21. 
156Ib' ,~ 
~· and Ross, pp. 235-239. 
l57Margaret Truman, p. 38. 
l5B"View from the Polling Booth." 
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In the evening, the President spoke to the m:..'.:3.on over four radio 
networks from the living room of his home. 159 Tir.:e maga?.ine, pre-
dictably, had something to say about rruman's final appeal to the 
voters. ''He had continued to fight right up to the last night. On 
election eve, while Tom Dewey piously urged everyone to get out and 
vote, Harry ~uman had broken all the rules of proper election-eve 
conduct by urging the people to get out and vote for Der:iocrats. His 
last words, which sounded to the experts li~e a last gasp, were: 
'Why, it can't be anything but a victory. 111160 
In his Memoirs, Truman calculated he had traveled a total of 
31,700 miles and delivered 356 speeches. "I was used to hard work," 
+:he President said, "and my job was cut out for me. I campaigned 
for thirty-five days and averaged about ten spe~ches every day. On 
161 one single day I delivered sixteen speeches." From twelve to 
fifteen million people had seen Truman. His "one-mc:.n crusade" was 
without parallel. The only thing remaining to be done was to wait 
for the election returns. 
Pearl Harbor Duy and Election Day, 1948 posre.35 irrefutable 
shock value. "Both dates saw the utterly incredible cor.ie to pass.
11162 
On November 2, at 10:00 a.m., Harry S. Truman, tl;r;q. ?ruman, ar..d 
M;µ-garet ?ruman--who was votine for the first time in a Presidential 
l59 .... ,,..,,.,.,,,,... ue,...01· '"'S 'I 2?'' J..L\.4.U~ .. , rl i•1 • 9 ..... , L.. ... ··• 
16011IndepenJ.ence Day," Time, November 8, 1948, P• 21 
161Truman, Memoirs, II, 219. 
162Phillips, P• 245. 
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election--mar1-ced their ballots. The cubicl;.;f; ·,:ere open affording the 
cameramen fr~e access to the President. They almost crawled into the 
balloting box with him. Truman was relaxed, confident and smiling.163 
"Are you going to sit up for +he returns, Mr. President?" 
"No," he answered, "I think I'll go to bed. I don't expect 
final results until tomorrow. 11164 
He wasn't bluffing. In the afternoon, the ?resident, accompanied 
by three Secret Servicemen, slipped out the back door of the Rockwood 
Country Club and drove to a secret hideaway at the Zlms Hotel in 
Excelsior Springs. There he had a Turkish bath, a rubdown, a sandwich 
and a glass of milk, and then went to bed. It was 7:00 p.m. According 
4 0 reports, he remained in contact with his aides, who were settled in 
165 the penthouse suite of the Muehleback Hotel. In spite of these 
occasional contacts with his associates, he rested well. As a matter 
of fact, the evening appeared to be much r.iore exciting for Margaret 
Truman than it did for her father. 
Margaret reported that in Delaware Street the reporters were 
frantically "storming the house." The long awaited Dewey victory 
message which was to be delivered at 9:00 p.m. had been postponed. 
Truman wo.s ahead. As the gap grew wider, the reporters grew noisier. 
In I~ew York, the day had bet;un in much thP same way for the 
Dewey fa~ily. The Governor and his wife had a leisurely breakfast 
163 "'Country ?ioy's' Faith, 11 Tir.ie, November 8, 191+8, p. 21. 
164M t T ·39. ;argare 'ruman, P• 
165Margaret Truman, p. 40, and "'Cou:it.:::-y Boy's' Faith." 
in their suite at the Roosevelt Hotel. At ,..,,..: · -' ·+i-, · '"--~-.··,_.ay, wi~-- sirens 
blo • D ' ., . . h ' d ~ t' ' WJ..ng, ' e\·1ey s ..... imousine ,_e3ae.. :::or ne polls at a ,·fanhatta.n pub-
lie school. Flashbulbs popped as De;.,rey stenued from his car and 
strode into the building. Ducking behind t:1e curtain and reemer13:ing 
rapidly, "';Jewey quipped, "'foll, that's two votes we've got anyway. 11166 
Upon returninr, to his apartment, the Governor ate a light lunch, 
consistj_ng of V-8 juice, salad and milk, and then stretched out on 
the couc!:1. ':'n'.lt evening he dined at the home of his lonstime friend, 
Roger Straus, where he heard the first discouraging returns. Still 
later, surrounded by his family, Dewey settled dm·m in his own suite 
to hear the resul~s. The television cci.r.ieras focused their lenses on 
Dewey's balcony where he was expected to oake a triumphal a:opearance. 
All W9.S set. Downstairs in the ballroor., campaign mana.ger :Ierbert 
Brownell announced, ''It is now apparent th:tt we will wind up by 
sweeping two-thir-ds of the states. 0167 
The hours dragged by. Dewey smoked one Harlboro after another. 
Eis son Jobn fell asleep. At midnight, the other brother was sent to 
bed. People were drifting out of De· .. ;ey' s hec:;.dquarters downstairs. 
One wag ask.ecl 11if it were true t"!':at they were stretching nets out-
. d .,.. ' - -" "168 m· • . . 11 f' J:' ,_ d tur d si e LJewey s.w1nuows. ...ne creeping cni _ o~ ... ear na ne 
i:nto a frozen mound of panic. The figures on the scoreboard couldn't 
be true. At 11:30 ;;;.rr-. Brownell appeared to sa.y "'Je1t1ey had carried 
Philadelphia. 3fo hadn't. At 1:45 a.m. Brm.vnell said to the t'eporters 
166"The Avalanche That Fniled, 11 Time, November S, 1948, p. 22. 
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clustered arou...."ld him, "\'le k:10•1' that Governor Jewey ;.;ill carry New 
York by 50,000 and will be the next President of the United States." 
At 5:00 a.m. Dewey was "still confident." At 8:30 a.m. Dewey went 
to bede 
Back in Independence a different atmosphere reigned. The 
funereal gloom said to exist in Truman's headquarters vanished--if 
it had ever been there. At midnight Truman awoke and turned on the 
radio to listen to H.V. Kaltenborn. He was ahead by 1,200,000 votes. 
Truman went back to sleep. At 4:00 a.m., Jim Rowley, one of the 
Secret Servicemen, unable to restrain his excitement, woke the 
President up. This time Truman was ahead by 2,000,000 votes. 
Kaltenborn was still broadcac-ting that he didn't have a chance.169 
At 4:30 Truman's staff called from headquarters at the Muehlebach 
liotel. They had been celebrating, said Margaret Truman, "well past 
the point of sobriety. 11170 The President laughingly told his aides 
he would return at 6:00 a.m. 
"Harry Truman's moment of victory found him prepared." He was 
rested, barb0red, and attired in a fresh white shirt and a neat 
double-breasted blue suit. 11171 With his staff he waited on the ele-
venth floor pentho~se of the Muehlebach. The verdict reached him 
when a sudden .shout vibrated through his room. D h d . d 172 ewey a conceae • 
In Independence, the to1-m went wild. ':lhistles, sirens, automobile 
169Truman, Memoirs, II, 220-221. 170Margaret Truman, p. 41. 
171.:.iucounty Boy's' Faith." 
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horns, air-raid alarms and ~~e cheers of thou.;;.J.nds filled the air. 
Truman, the only man who knew he would win, humbly thanked the crowd. 
n1 thank you very much indeed for this celebration, which is not for 
me. It is for the whole country. It is for the whole world."l73 
It was 10:14 Missouri time. 
In New York, Dewey had been awakened by Herbert Brownell who 
told him the bitter news. In his own hand, Dewey penned the tele-
gram of congratulations to Truman. It read: "My heartiest congra-
tulations to you on your election and every good wish for a successful 
administration. I urge all Americans to unite behind you in support 
of every effort to keep our nation strong and free and establish 
peace in the world. 11174 
Dewey held a press conference at 1:00 p.m. When queried by 
one reporter :.s to what went wrong, Dewey replied, "I was just as 
surprised as you are ••• " He ended the interview by saying, "It has 
been grand fun, boys and girls. I . d . t . 1 11175 enJoye i i~mense y. The 
press termed it "his finest hour." 
The contrast in the '•lallace camp was startling. The dignity 
and graciousness displayed by Dewey was sadly lacking in the Pro-
gressi ve party candidate. Time magaz.ine described Wallace as "an 
~gry, spiteful Gideon'' on election night. "When the networks gave 
him time for a three-minute talk ••• Wallace cried: 'The cup of ini-
quity o!' both the old parties will overflew and one or the other of 
173U:~~garet mlruman p 42 n"'"" • t • • 
174 Ross, p. 243, and ''The Avalanche That Failed,'' p. 23. 
175Ross, p. 243. 
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the old parties '.1ill disappear.' He exhorted his 'dorkers: 'This 
crusade is going ahead with renewed vigor.• 11176 But it did not go 
ahead with renewed vigor. The death knell had sounded. The defeat 
at the polls had been too overwhelming. There was left only the 
formal burial of the party. 
The image of Wallace as an embittered, cynical loser is borne 
out by his friends as well as by his detractors. Curtis MacDougall, 
a staunch advocate of his policies, recounts the closir..g hours of 
the election. Before Wallace left his headquarters at 2:00 a.m., 
he had given his ck~y to a telegram to be sent to Harry s. Truman. 
Apparently, when it was shown to Clark Foreman for approval he ob-
::0cted to it because there had not been any word of congratulations 
in the mE.:ssage. './hen Foreman a-:;tempted to change the wording in the 
interest of good sportsmanship 'dallace retorted, "Under no circum-
stances will I congratulate that son of a bitch."l77 
Some years later, Herle Miller, who lived near 'viallace' s farm 
in South Salem, New York, and who held several conversations with 
him remarked, 111 have never been more disappointed in a public fig-
ure. He was a muddled, totally irrational man, alr.10st incapable of 
uttering a coherent sentence. He was also the bitterest man I have 
178 
eve~ encountered." Presumably, the campaign had left the indel-
ible mark of Cain on Henry Agard Wallace, one which was never to 
176 8 "Ar.iong the Ruins," Time, November 15, 194 , p. 27. 
17~ 88 'Curtis Ma.cDoug?.11, Gideon's Army, III, 2. 
178Merle Miller, P• 251. 
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be erased. 
In the South, J. Strom Thurmond wired Truman, "You are entitled 
to the united support of a united people ••• " Other messages from 
the South bombarded the White House asking if they could shift their 
votes to the ~ruman column. Apparently, the Dixiecrats did not wish 
to go down in history as havins defected from the Democratic ranks.179 
l79"Among the Ruins." 
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CHAPT~R VIII 
LOOKING BACK 
"It seems incredible," marveled Robert Bendiner, "that millions 
of us should have taken it for granted that while our-fellow-Ameri-
cans liked Harry Truman, even if they gasped at his blunders, they 
would grudgingly troop to the polls and vote for Thorr.as E. Dewey, 
whom they neither liked nor trusted ••• 111 In Europe, the people had 
waited anxious] y for the outcome. 'w{hen 'Iruman won they sighed, 
"This means peace. 112 Others, angry and unrepentant, refused to 
accept the Tr'..lm:in victory. George Sokolsky snarled, "Truman gave 
out during the campnign, becoming boisterous 3.Ild vulgar. Some say 
that he made votes for himself that way. If true, that is a 
reflection on the intelligence of the American people."3 Presuming 
Sokclsk:.; wc:s correct, the following chart divides the intelligent 
from the unintelligent American. Here are the final figures of 
the election:* 
1Robert Bendiner, "Two and Two Make Four," Nation, November, 13, 
1948, P• 540-
2J. Alvarez del Vayo, "A Victory for Peace," Nation, N0.,ember 
13, 1948, !'.'• 5.38. 
3"What Happened, !t Time, November 13, 1948, P• 66. 
•These figures fail to agree with Harry Truman's own tally in 
his Memoirs .. 
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TABLE III 
CANDIDATE POPULAR VOTE EI,EC'.L'ORAL VOTE STA'.L'.ES 
Truman 24,045,052 304 28 
Dewey 21,896,927 189 16 
Wallace 1~137,957 
Thurmond 1,168,687 38 4 
The four southern states which Truman lost were: South Caro-
lina, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. Wallace snatched New York 
from him. The Progressive party candidate drew a half million votes 
from the American Labor Party, otherwise Dewey would have lost his 
ow-n state to Truman. The entire western bloc went to the President, 
except for Oregon. Ironically, however, Dewey captured a large seg-
ment of Democratic territory in the Northeast--from Maryland through 
Maine (excluding Massachusetts and Rhode Island)--and Truman captured 
many traditionally Republican farm states. The pivotal states were 
considered Ohio and California. :-Jithout thesa, 'l'ruman claimed he 
"would have been assured of only 254 electoral votes, twelve less 
th . _?66. 114 .an the required He achieved something no President had 
ever done before. Truman won the election wHhout New York and the 
Solid South. The maddening question which remained was, how? 
James B. Reston of the New York 'I'imes declared: "Before we in 
the newspaper business spend all our time and energy analyzing Governor 
Dewey's failure in the election, maybe we ought to try to analyze 
our own failure. For that failure is almost as spectacular as the 
PresiGent's victory, and the quicker we admit it the better off 
4narry s. Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 221. 
we'll be. 05 ~ listed an nanthology" of er:·Jrs which the press 
perpetuated throuc;h:mt the campaign. The magazine gave these fol-
lowing examples: "Few voters believed that there would be any con-
test ••• When Harry Truman damned the 80th Congress and Taft-HartJey 
law, nobody seemed really to care or listen •• .'·'le' re going to miss 
lil' ole He.rry ••• The course of events cannot be halted for three 
months until Mr. Dewey is inauguratea. 116 The list continued for 
nearly two columns. NeYer had the press been so wrong 1 and as they 
themselves admitted, it could not be laughed off. The newspapers 
had been four to one in favor of Dewey, and in terms of circulation 
the ratio ~n October was eight to one, again favoring Dewey. 7 But, 
it was not because 65 per cert of the press had backed the Republi-
can candidate that they were culpable. This was their privilege. 
The fault was that the press had failed to report accurately. Time 
ma.gazine, one of the worst offenders, had this to say about it. 
"The press was morally guilty on several counts. It was guilty of 
pride: it had assumed that it knew all the important facts--without 
sufficiently checking them. It was guilty of laziness and wishful 
thinking: it had failed to do its own doorbell-ringing and bush-
beating; it had delegated its journalist's job to the pollsters. 118 
5James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press C/ashington: 
Public Affairs Press, 1964), p. 35. 
6nstudy of Failure," Ti:ne, November 15, 1948, P• 63. 
7 Polla.rd, P• 35. 
8 "What Happened," p. 64. 
James Reston gave thr0e primary reasons for the election results. 
He stated the press had failed to talce into consider~tion that no 
previously defeated presidential candidate had ever been elected. He 
said employment and national income were high, and that the political 
influence of the Roosevelt era had been almost totally ignored.9 
Reston's second assertion that the Americans were enjoying 
prosperity, therefore unwilling to change parties, seems feasible. 
Samuel Lubell, in a postelection survey done for the Saturday ~vening 
Post, uncovered some interesting facts. When he asked the people why 
they had voted for Truman, Lubell received the following responses. 
"The Democrats are the labor party. We workers are Democrats." In 
a well-to-do suburb in Arlin8~on one man said, "I own a nice home, 
have a new car and am much better off than my parents were. I've 
been a Democrat all my life. 
,0 
Why should I change?""'" Even more 
surprising was the response from a Republican farmer. "I talked 
about voting for Dewey all summer," he said, "but when voting time 
came, I just couldn't do it. I remembered the depression and all 
the good things that have come to me under the Democrats ••• I had 
exactly two dollars and a quarter in my pocket then. Now I have a 
farm, all. paid for, a new car, a herd of cows, money in the bank. 
That's what the Government did for me. 1111 Such testimonials were 
9Pollard, P• 36. 
lO"Who Really Elected Truman?" Saturday Evening Post, January 
22, 1949, P• 17. 
llib.d __ 1_., P• 56. 
not infrequent. The common. man hi.d prospered under the Democratic 
regime. 
Samuel Lubell refers to the emergence of the Roosevelt era as 
the "Third American Revolution. 1112 The toppling of the :rtepublican 
party was more than just a desire for change, it presaged a new 
pattern of political life. "In Roosevelt, the 'common people' saw 
their benefactor. 11 Truman was the natural heir, and used his a.dvan-
tage well. ''He had fighting, folksy tones to appeal to the Roosevelt 
elements--labor, unorganized as well as organized; the foreign-born 
and their first and second generation offspring; also Negroes and 
Catholics. 1113 
The post mortems continued. George Gallup, Elmo Roper, 
Archibald Crossley and all the other pollsters were worri.ed. They 
had reason to be. '?ne Peoria Journal, the Nashville ·;ennessean, 
the St. Louis Globe Democrat and others had canceled their contracts 
with Gallup. And what had happened to one could happen to another. 
The entire business of polling was at stake. What went wrong? Had 
there been indications which the pollsters failed to read? Accord-
ing to Edward '•foittlesey and William McPhee, who ran a statewide 
poll in Colorado, the figures they compiled in June showed Truman 
would win the state. "But they got worried when their results dis-
12samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1952), P• 3. 
l3"Who Really Elected Truman?", P• 16. 
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agreed with Gallup's, .so t:1ey juggled them for publication. 1114 
Perhaps. But the unpublished figures of two men does not explain 
the unreliabil:i.ty of the major polling firms. 
~n an election study taken at Elmira, New York, these facts 
were discovered. Truman ditl not gain the majority of votes in the 
last days of the campaign. This was a much publicizP.d rationaliza-
tion of the Republicans who condemned Dewey for taking it easy. 
The "undecided" voter constituted an important source of votes for 
Truman which the pollsters s~ould have discovered. The failure on 
the part of Gallup and others, to follow up on their initial ques-
tion of why they were undecided, caused the .mistake. For instance, 
had they asked "Well, even though you don't know for sure hew you 
will vote, which candidate are you leaning toward now--Dewey, Tru-
man, or Wallace?" Invariably, concluded the study, the "undecided" 
t m 15 vo er was pro-· ,.ruman. The other findings were equally enlighten-
ing. The study showed Truman gained votes directly from Dewey. And 
finally, it proved that Truman's victory was not attributable to a 
lcw Republican turnout contrary to popular belief. Governor Thomas 
E. Dewey himself blamed the election results on this factor. "I 
was quite surprised by the very low vote," he said. "It looks as 
though two or three million Republicans stayed ho~e, out of over-
1411The Great Fiasco," Time, November 15, 1948, P• 66. 
l5Helen Dinerman, 111948 Votes in the t:.aking, 11 Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Winter, 1948, p. 589. 
confidence. That one fact stands uut from the returns so far. 1117 
The major issues of price control and control of unions sti-
mulated the greatest response from the people polled in Elmira.18 
But there is ample evidence that these subjects were important to 
all Americans. Labor had played a vital role in winning votes for 
Truman. The politicos worked quietly and deliberately. "In 1944 
we made a lotta noise. In '48 we worked," said one determined union 
member. The AFL and CIO worked side-by-side to defeat the framers 
of the Taft-Hartley law. They combed registration lists, rang door-
bells, distributed leaflets, and on Election Day provided baby-sit-
ters and free taxi service.19 
The explanations for tl1..:- "Truman miracle 11 are almost endless. 
The movement cf the German-American voters to the Democratic fold 
was considered another major element in the victory. "Efforts to 
sell Dewey as a farmer stirred suspicious. 'What was Dewey's farm 
program?' demanded one farmer. 'We knew where Truman stood. 1 " 20 
Interestingly enough, the civil rights issue rallied not only 
the Negro to the Democratic ranks, but others as well. All those 
''who, as children an<! grandchildren of immigrants, shared memories 
of racial and religious discrimine.tion." The intensity of identifi-
l7"Zxpla.."1ations, '' Time, i'iovember 15, 1948, P• 24. 
18n· 593 i.nerman, P• • 
l911Cro...,~f_-,·r~, 11 T:i." rne, November 15 1948 p 24 ~  - l t ~ ' • • 
20"Who Really 3lected ~ruman?", P• 54. 
18£ 
cation was expressed dra~~tically by an Italo-American veteran. He 
said, "The Dixiecr&ts made me think of Al Smith. 1121 
Governor Dewey himself has been blamed for the GOP def eat. 
Congressman Fred Hartley, Jr. said, ''Mr. Dewey started acting like 
the President of the United States too soon." And Speaker Joe Martin 
growled, ''We offered too many Brahmins: too many plutocrats ••• 1122 
Irwin Ross suggests, "A campaign less devoted to high-minded plati-
tudes ••• might have made enough of a difference to have swung the 
three states which in the end proved decisive. 1123 Yet, given the 
political attitudes of America in 1948, the only way Dewey could 
have won would have been to adopt Trurran's platform. Correction. 
C~oucho Marx offered a second solution for victory. 11The only way 
a Republican will get into the White House," qu.ipp€d the comedian, 
24 "is to marry Margaret Truman." 
21Ibid., P• 56. 
2211Explanations," P• 25. 
23rrwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaign. (New York: New 
American Libr~ry, 1968), P• 261. 
24
Ibid., P• 270. 
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